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(43) "Privacy and Research Ethics" Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, Vol4,
No I (June 2002),30-38.
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Philosophia Verlag, 1987, 289-305.
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(104) Meyer, Martin and Dwyer'The Fundamental S-theorem: a Corollary'Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 1983 (21984:53 8.030 I 7)
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7. Conference Papers
Many conference papers and invited papers (see CV p2)
Summary
This collection of a book and 44 articles revolves around my book Inconsistent
Mathematics, Kluwer Mathematics and Its Applications Series (1995). Inconsistent
mathematics is an emerging new field. To date, it is principally interesting as pure
mathematics, and for its philosophical implications on the nature of mathematics.
However, as we see, physical applications cannot be ruled out. I claim to be the first
person to use the phrase "inconsistent mathematics" (Ml987b,p5l2), and to have
written the only book on the subject. I was invited to write the entry on inconsistent
mathematics for the prestigious Stanþrd Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and for the
forthcomingHandbook of the Philosophy of Science.
Inconsistent mathematics is the mathematical part of a broader theoretical
enterprise, The Theory of Inconsistency. This has a number of sources: (l) theories of
motiõn and change, (2) semantic paradoxes, (3) paradoxes in the foundations of
mathematics, especially in set theory and category theory, (4) anomalies in physical
theories, such as QM and black holes, (5) semantic theories of relevance, (6) cognitive
and informational studies of inconsistency-tolerance in reasoning, (7) geometry,
including impossible images (Penrose triangle, Schuster's Fork, M.C.Escher etc). All
these sources are taken up in the works that follow.
But the theory of inconsistency, and in particular inconsistent mathematics,
must meet a challenge, from inside logic itself from where it seemed to originate. The
challenge is the bold claim that the inconsistent has no structure. This is a highly
apriori claim, since it flies in the face of the evidence presented herein. The logical
principle underpinning this challenge is Ex Contradictione Quodlibet,ECQ,from a
àontãd¡ct¡on every proposition can be deduced. ECQ in turn is supported by the
logical principle Disjunctive Syllogism. Both these principles hold in classical two-
vJued iogic; but they fail in a large class of logics, paraconsistent ("inconsistency-
toleranf') logics. Paraconsistent logics thus become of technical interest in their own
right, as well as representing differing approaches to reasoning about the inconsistent.
Inconsistency should not be conflated with impossibility, of course. Paraconsistent
logics can be described as logics where it is possible for inconsistent premisses to
hold wittrout every proposition holding. This is exactly what one wants it one is to
study inconsistent structure.
These considerations lead into methodological and ontological questions about
mathematics and physics. Of particular interest are the various forms of realism
versus itealism, and their implications over how much of the anomalous can be
believed in a literal way. So we have discussions of realism/irrealism over: the very
small, QM, space, spacetime, the first instant of time, sets' numbers, quantities,
infinitesimali, and limits. These all have at least methodological implications for The
Theory of Inconsistency, if not direct applications.
The phenomenon of impossible images gives rise to the geometrical aspect of
inconsistent mathematics. Computer applications have not been ignored. There are
three computer studies, the most recent being around the theme of drawing impossible
images and animating them, which can be seen on the website-
The inconsistent does indeed have a complex and interesting structure.
Supporting I)ocumentation
Citations (Web of Scien0e)
56 in Science Citation lndex, 39 in Social Science Citation lndex, 9l in
Humanities Citation Index
Reviews of Inconsßtent Mathematics
(1) Da Costa (The Journal of symbolic Logic 1997, 683-ó85) "Such an
tnclertaking is naturally of great importance...The author has written a valuable book
showing tlr-at paraconsistent mathematics is both possible and interesting...it is
necessary that it be investigated and developed...the present work will contribute to
this goal."
(2) Restall (, ustralianJournal of Philosophy 1997) "...state ofthe aft..."
(3) Van Bendegem (Phitosophica Mathematica 1999, 202-212) "...a new kind
of position in the making here...one can only hope that he will develop this further in
the near future."
(4)Baez (Ihis week's Finds in Mathematicol Physics 26.10.99) "How can
you resist a book with a title like "lnconsistent Mathematics"?...he really makes a
good case for his clairn that inconsistent mathernatics is worth studyirrg.")
(5) Bueno (Mathematical Review s MRI 4 7 I 48 2 (9 8k: 0 j 002)) 
* 
.. . clearly and
concisely written...an orlginal mathematical developrnent of a field...the author has
shown that...inconsistent mathematics...is not only possible but interesting and
important."
(6) Priest (Zennalblattfur Mathematik 0S27.03013) "...an excellent
exposition of what is kttown, as well as pushing a number of the iflvestigations
nttttto...It is clear that the book heralds a very rtovel area of mathematical
investigations. It is an invaluable reference point for further work."
Invited Speeker
Invited speaker with plenary session at the Second Woild Congress on
Paraconsìstency, Brazil2000, see photocopy following (I also gave aplenary session
at the First World CoflSress in Ghent 1997, but that doesn't really count as I was one
of the Organising Committee of Four. The Third World Congress in Toulouse2003
had no streams, ie. all sessions were plenary)
Invited Contributions
I was invited to contribute the entry on Inconsistent Mathematics for the on-line
Stanford Encycopedia of Phitosophy (see their entry over). I was similarly later
inviied to contribute the entry on Change. I am the only person with two entries in
that Encyclopedia.I was also invited to contribute a long entry on lnconsistent
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philosophers have hitherto attempted to understand the nature of contradiction' the point
however is to change it.
1. Introduction: The Theory of Inconsistency.
In what follows I use the following referencing conventions. For my
publications included in this submission and referenced in this essay' I use the date
preceded by an "M", for example (M1995a). These are referenced in the contents of
this DSc submission, and also in a separate part of the bibliography at the end of this
essay. For other authors, I use the date alone, and these are referenced at the end of
this essay. Further references can be found in the bibliographies of all these papers.
Contributions to joint publications are all 50%.
Sfudies of the nature of inconsistency and inconsistent theories have a long
history. The ancient pre-Socratic Greek thinker Herakleitos (6ú-5ú Century BC) in his
Fragments postulated the "unity of opposites". Herakleitos did not really argue for his
position, so much as put it forward in rather delphic utterances. \ilhile he was earlier
than Plato and Aristotle (4tr Century BC), he was taken by both of them to be
intentionally asserting contradictions, that is asserting as true va¡ious propositions he
believed to be contradictions. Someone who contends that thçre ale true
contradictions is known as a dialetheist, alate-20û Century term due to Routley and
Priest. Plato and especially Aristotle argued against Herakleitos using the Law of Non-
contradiction which says that no contradiction is true. Anstotle went frrther and
offered an even stronger rebuttal using the principle now known as Ex Contrqdictione
Quodlibet (ECQ for short), namely from a contradiction, every proposition follows.
Latet Ancient Greek logicians such as Chrysippus and Sextus Empiricus took
Herakleitos seriously enough. However, perhaps because of Plato and Aristotle, the
theory did not attract much support until more than two thousand years later, when
Hegel (19ú Century AD) defended an inconsistent theory of motion, and cited
Herakleitos as one of his sources. This in turn was taken up by Mam and Engels, who
were much influenced by Hegel. Unfortunately, their argumentation left much to be
desired, and could as well be construed as symptomatic of little more than confusion.
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ln confast, the Hegelian thesis that change especially motion is real inconsistency,
contradiction in action, has been rigorously developed and defended in the last two
decades of the 20ft Century by the logician Graharn Priest (1987). I criticised Priest's
theory of motion in (M19954 Chap 6), arguing that the orthodox mathematical
account of velocity and acceleration is adequate. However, I retracted some of that
criticism in "Change" (M2002c), defending a version of Zeno's Pa¡adox of the Anow
as modified by Priest. We return to the theme of change in a later section.
In the second hatf of the 20û Century, the Theory of Inconsistency as a
rigorous study began to emerge and consolidate from several sources. We have just
seen one source with a long lineage: a modemised and rigorous account of change and
motion. Another source was the paradoxes. The Ancient Greeks had also been much
taken with paradox. I just mentioned Zeno, but there is also Eubulides (4ú Century
BC), who proposed The Liar Paradox (in modern dtess "This sentence is false"), and
The Sorites Paradox ("If I am hairy and I remove just one hair, I am still hairy. Hence
if all my hairs are removed I am still hairy.") Interest in these and other paradoxes
persisted throughout the ancient period, the middle ages and the modern period.
lndeed, in my view reasonable solutions to The Liar and The Sorites were not
forthcoming, ild they remain under contention even today. Thus we find the
memorable epitaph of the ancient logician Philetas of Cos (cited in Mates 1965,206):
Philetas of Cos am I,
'Twas The Liar that made me die,
And the bad nights caused thereby
How sad. I know exactly how he felt.
4 similar paradox of more recent orign is Grelling's paradox: some words
apply to themselves ("short", "English", 'þolysyllabic"), others do not ("long",
"French", "monosyllabic". So let *autologlcal" mean "applies to itself' and let
"heterological" mean "does not apply to itself'. Now ask: is heterological a
hererological word? A short argument should convince that heterological is
heterological if and only if it is not heterological. Yet another paradox is The Truth
Teller ("This sentence is true'). This has not seemed paradoxical to most writers,
however in Mortensen and Priest (M1981) it was argued that there is a genuine
paradox here: the truth teller sentence appeils to be neither true nor false, but there is
a
J
a general argument to the conclusion that it must be one or the other though we can
never say which.
One response that people have to the paradoxes is that they are somehow
logical tricks, with no more serious content than a parlour game. The problem with
this response is that if there is a simple trick here, then it ought to be simple to say
what it is. But it proves to be very dfficult to do so in any way that is not blatantly ad
hoc. Of course, to support this assessment requires detailed analysis of an extensive
literature which will not be undertaken here as my aims are otherwise. One example
will suffrce: the 20ú Century Polish logician Alfred Tarski attempted to solve The
Liar by declaring self-referential statements, of which the Liar is an instance, to be
mearringless. He supported this by an elegant construction which divided fonnal
languages into strata of object language, metaJanguage, meta-meta-language etc,
where reference to sentences of any level needed to be in the next level up.
Unfortunately, English and other natural languages are not so stratified, and indeed
English supports true self-referential statements, such as "This sentence has five
words" or "This sentence is in English". So, while The Liar does not a¡ise in Tarski's
construction, this shows little about its properties in natr¡ral language.
The ad hocery of such solutions to The Liar led some late 20û Centtrry
logicians, Richard Routley and Gratrarn Priest among them, to bite the bullet and
propose the dialetheist solution: that the Liar sentence is both true and false,'a true
contradiction. So we have a second ingredient in The Theory of Inconsistency,
namely the paradoxes of language, or at least some of them. It should be stressed that
not all paradoxes suggest a dialetheist solution so readily. For instance, The Sorites
does not obviously do so (though, in the absence of anything more plausible, this has
been contended by Dominic Hyde 1997).
The Liar, The Sorites, Grelling's Pa¡adox, and other paradoxes to do with
language are sometimes called semantic paradoxes, and contrast with sef theoretic
paradoxes, which have to do with sets. The best known set theoretic paradox is
Russell's Paradox. In 1902 Russell defined what we now call the Russell set R, as the
set of all self-membered sets. It is a short argument to show that R is a member if
itself iff R is not a member if itself. A pttzz.le of similar structu¡e is the Barber of
Seville, who shaves all and only those in Seville who do not shave themselves. The
contradiction so generated by The Barber is easily solved: there is no such barber,
because it is a contradictory concept, and that is an end to it. If there is any interest in
4
The Barber, it is in explaining why it is not immediately obvious that it is a
contradictory story. However, it is not so easy to take this line with the Russell set,
because an independently plausible principle implies that the Russell set exists. This
principle is known as Naïve Comprehension, and says that to every description (such
as "red" or "not being a member of itself') there exists a set of all elements satisfying
that description. This principle, unrestricted set fonnation, is exEemely useful for
mathematics. Frege founded his logical construction of the foundations of
mathematics on it, and regarded Russell's discovery of its inconsistency with
consternation. @rege's theory is known as logicism, on which see later sections.)
Indeed, Russell's paradox, exploding out of the clem blue sþ and threatening our
most natural principles of mathematical reasoning, led to an ouþouring of frrrther
paradoxes and attempts to solve them by weakening Narve Comprehension, resulting
in set theories such as Zermelo-Frankel ZF,YonNeumann-Bernays-Godel NBG, and
many others. An alternative "foundation" for mathematics, namely category theory, is
similarly bedevilled with contradictions, as is usefully described by Hatcher 1982.It
is fair to describe these paradoxes, together with related later discoveries such as the
Godel incompleteness theorems, as the drivers of 20ú Century symbolic logic and
mathematical for¡ndation studies.
From the vantage point of the late 20ú Century, these set theories all had the
appearance of being ad hoc and ugly. To take just one example, ZF needs deveral
independent arioms to be able to present a set theory of reasonable power, where
narVe set theory needs just one, NarVe Comprehension (or two, if we count the
definition of identity of sets). So, to retain the full ability to abstract sets from their
corresponding descriptions, theorists such as Da Costa Brady, Routley and Priest all
proposed acceptance of naïve comprehension and the Russell set. With that, of course,
comes contradiction in the foundations of mathematics. This then is a third source of
the Theory of Inconsistency, namely inconsistencies in the þundations of
mathematics.
2. Paraconsistent Logic
It can hardly have escaped the reader's attention that acceptance of true
contradictions is no easy thing. Apart from the counterintuitiveness of the claim that
some contradictions are true, there is hanging over all the threat of Ex Contradictione
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Quodlibet.If every proposition follows from a contradiction, then any contradictory
theory contains every proposition, which renders it useless as an arbiter of truth as
opposed to falsity. That is, for the Theory of Inconsistency to have any chance, ECQ
must be incorrect. For there to be theories whose deductive base is natural logic or
informal logic, ECQ must fail to be a valid principle of deduction in natural logic.
Now ECQ is certainly a valid principle in various/ormallogicq particularly including
classical (two-valued) logic, and one if its principal rivals, intuitioníst (open set)
logic. The argument fbr ECQ in classical logic appeals to the following typical
definition of validity: an argurnent is (classically) valid if there is no model (row of
the truth table) with all true premisses and a false conclusion. Since a contradictory
set of premisses cannot be true together, there is no model where the premisses are all
trllre, a fortiori no model where the premisses are all true and the conclusion false.
This vacuous satisfaction might seem like a bit of a cheat, and so it has seemed to
many non-classical logicians. Of course, the argument for rejecting ECQ will have to
do better than this vague intuition.
There is no disputing that ECQ is formally valid in classical and intuitionist
logics. One central question, however, is whether ECQ holds for natural logic. Of
course, the methods of formal logic are certainly relevant to this question, just as
formal methods are relevant elsewhere in science. Hence there has grown up in
approximately the last 40 years the formal study of paraconsistent logics.
Paraconsistent (or "inconsistency-toleranf') logics are logics in which ECQ fails. It
has proved to be relatively easy to construct such logics, and many thousands have
been defined and studied, both by proof theory and semantics, by now. These logics
fall into a number of broad categories. TmFortant among these are: (a) the Brazilian-
style logics of Da Costa and collaborators, also (b) Belgian-style adaptive logics of
Batens and co-workers, (c) discussive logics of the Polish school, (d) relevant logics
as originating with Anderson and Belnap and their students in Pittsburgh, (e) non-
adjunctive logics as with the Canadian logicians Jennings, Schotch and Brown, as
well as (Ð the Australian school of non-classical logicians, including among others
Routley, Meyer, Priest, Slaney, Brady, Bunder, and the author. All sha¡e the insight
that reasoning sometimes has to deal with inconsistent dat4 and therefore cannot
afford collapse into structurelessness.
One way to state ECQ which highlights its shortcomings is as follows. Logic
is fundamentally the study of validity, that is the distinction between valid and invalid
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deductions or arguments. This can be made precise by defining a logic L to be a set of
propositions closed under a deductive relation, written l- l, as well as under a rule of
uniform substitution. The rule of uniform substitution specifies that all deductions of
the sarne form are valid together, which captures the idea that valid argument ought to
be independent of subject matter. A theory (of a logic L) is any set of propositions
closed under the deductive relation of L, but not necessarily closed under uniform
substitution. Thus the shrdy of the theories of L is in effect the study of what follows
from various subject matters, various collections of axioms, by using the deductive
resonrces of L. A theory is said to be trivial if it contains every proposition (of the
language in which it is writteÐ. Thus, ECQ can be expressed as the thesis that every
inconsistent theory is trivial. This means that if inconsistent theories with interesting
structural properties can be shown to exist, then ECQ must be regarded as incorrect.
In essence, then, ECQ is the thesis that the inconsistent hss no structure. One of the
principal aims of the present study is and has been the rebuttal of this thesis, by
argument and by example, to display the rich and varied structures available in the
Theory of Inconsistency.
We noted above one argument for ECQ from the semantics of classical logic,
an argument which begs the question against semantics which do allow models in
which contradictions hold. Another well-known argument for ECQ is more proof-
theoretic in character. It uses two principles of ¡s¿5sning which are valid in classical
two-valued logic, narnely Addition 1n þevn) and Disiunctive Syllogism
(AvB,-A þU¡. Assume inconsistent premisses:
1. A (assumption)
2. -A (assumption)
3. AvB (1, Addition)
4.8 (2,3, Disjunctive Syllogism)
This is known as "The Lewis Argumenf', after its inventor, C.I.Lewis. It shows that
ECQ follows from just the two reasonable-sounding rules of Addition and Disjunctive
Syllogism (DS). It follows that it is essential for there to be a richly-structured Theory
of Inconsistency, that one or both of these two rules be invalid. Paraconsistent
logicians have largely rejected DS (though a small number reject Addition). But
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rejecting DS is not so easy, as it appears very natural: "Today is Wednesday or
Thwsday, it is not Wednesday, therefore it is Thursday''. In the early 1980s in "The
Validity of Disjunctive Syllogism Is Not So Easily Pfoved" (Ml983b) and "Reply To
Burgess and To Read" (Ml986a), I undertook to explain why DS has a false air of
reasonableness, by showing that the areas where it breaks down themselves involve
deparh¡e from everyday reasoning into conceptual regions where paradox is
threatened. This generated a considerable literature in which several contrasting
positions were staked out by Burgess (1981, 1983), Read (1983), and Lavers (1988)'
An important and early application of paraconsistent logic was the
demonstration that narVe set theory including the Russell Set does not trivialise in
various paraconsistent background logics. The pioneers here were the Brazilian
mathematician Da Costa (eg. 1974), and independently the Australian logician Brady
(lg7l,l9S9). This result is summarised in my Inconsistent Mathematics (M1995a) in
C}glp 14 sections 3-4 which were co-authored with Joshua Cole). ln the same place
we showed by applying Brady's fixed point technique that The Liar paradox can be
similarly tolerated in semantic theory as both true and false vnthout deductive
collapse. These results were important as the lust moves in applying paraconsistency
to mathematical structües; they indicate that inconsistent set theory might not be so
useless after all. Such a result in naive set theory gives a life-line to re-instate logic as
a foundation for mathematics, along the lines of Frege's logicism, though the situation
is complicated by the fact that other paradoxes such as Curry's Pa¡adox threaten narVe
set theory for reasons other than ECQ (see Slaney l9S9). rù/e develop this point about
logicism in a later section. In the spirit of altematives to set theory, Cole and I
extended the technique to the case of large categoríes in category theory, which has
similar problems with a tade-off between consistency and generality (see 'oFixed
Point Theorems for Inconsistent and Incomplete Formation of Large Categories",
Ml992).
In the late 1970s however, there was a technical problem with Brazilian-style
paraconsistent logics, namely how to algebraise them. Another of Da Costa's deep
insights was to attempt to dualise Brouwer's intuitionist logic, which admits
incomplete theories, with his family of C-systems, which admit inconsistent theories.
However, the outstanding problem for two decades was to provide them with an
algebraic semantics. Eventually I proved in "Every Quotient Algebra for Cr is
Trivial" (M19S0) that there is no non-trivial algebraic semantics for Da Costa's
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principal systems Cb Cz, .... This in part required a definition of "non-trivial" for a
Lindenbaum algebr4 which is the basic construction for algebraic semantics- At the
time, it seemed that this result was a substantial criticism of the C-systems- This
criticism was further developed in my "Pataconsistency and C1" (Ml987a), where it
is argued on this basis that none of Da Costa's systems could express a reasonable
implication connective/operator. This was written at a time when I was in the gnp of
the picture that the nature of implication ('if..then") is the central issue for logic, and
was seeking to defend Anderson'Belnap relevant implication against its perceived
Brazilian rival. This picture of logic now seems to me to be wrong, and the question
of implication to be less significant. fþe important virtue of the C-systems, apart from
their paraconsistency, is their abilþ to sustain inconsistent mathematical theories,
including narve set theory as described above.
Moreover, in recent years a very natural logic called closed set logic has
emerged. Closed set logic is topologically dual to open-set (intuitionist) logic. I
studied it in "Topological Separation Principles and Logical Theories" (M2000a)
where it is linked with topological separation principles, also in "The Leibniz
Continuity Condition, Inconsistency and Quantum Dynamics" (Ml997a) and "Closed
Set Logic" (M2003a). A computing study co-authored with Steve Leishman
..Computing Dual Intuitionist and Paraconsistent Logics" (Ml989c) computed all
such logics and their duals up to size 5 (there are finite-valued logics of all sizes in
this class). Significantþ, closed-set logic is Brazilian-style and so vindicates Da
Costa's dualising aims, since Ttis the most natural dual of intuitionism.
Studies in the semantics of Pittsburgh-style relevant logics led to another
sonrce of justifications for inconsistency. A logic is relevant if an argument is valid
only when there is a conceptual connection between premisses and conclusion, and
Anderson and Belnap proposed a formal definition of "concepfual connection".
Plainly no logic in which ECQ is valid can be relevan! since there is in ECQ no
general connection between premisses and conclusion. So televant logics are all
paraconsistent. Here Routley and Routley (1972) were fust to intoduce the Routley
star operaror (which I renamed the Routley functor in (M2002b). If S is any set of
sentences, then S* is defined as {A: -A Ê S}. Here it is necessary to refine the notion
of a theory. A set of sentences Th is called a semi-theory @f a logic L) if it is closed
under the one-premiss consequence relation of L, ie. if AeTh and A þ n then BeTh.
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A semitheory Th is atheory if it is additionally closed under conjunctions, and prime
iff a disjunction AvB is belongs to the theory only if at least one of its disjuncts A,B
is. A set of sentences is said to be inconsistent if both A and -A are members, for
some A; and incomplete ifit lacks both A and -4, for some A. It can then be shown,
on minimal assumptions about the background logic, that (l) Th* is a semitheory iff
Th is a semitheory, (2) Th* is a theory itrTh is a prime semitheory (3) Th* is a prime
theory iffTh is a prime theory. Importantly, Routley and Routley showed that (4) Th*
is inconsistent iffTh is incomplete. This enabled the Routleys to introduce for the fust
time into the semantics of relevant logics setups (worlds) which are inconsistent or
incomplete or both. That in tum is necessary if ECQ is to be made to fail: one wants
semantic setups in which the premisses of ECQ (namely A, -A) hold nontrivially
without every proposition holding. In short, the Routleys had provided a semantics
sufiFrcient to explain how the suspect semantic argument for ECQ in classical logic
fails. These results were summarised and extended in my (M1995a) Chap 13.
Paraconsistent logics can be studied for their own technical interest. For
example, in "Model Structures and Set Algebras for Sugihara Matrices" (M1982), I
showed how to convert a class of semantic algebras known as Sugihara chains or
Sugihara matrices, into world-lyle model structwes. The outcome was a world-style
semantics for a class of many-valued logics which had hitherto only had set-algebra
semantics, and a general method for doing the sa¡ne inter-conversion between
algebras and model structures in general. In *Aristotle's Thesis in Consistent and
Inconsistent Logies" (M19S4b) I addressed the problem of connexive logics.
Connexive logics are logics containing Aristotle's thesis -(A+-A). This is not a
theorem of classical logic, and cannot be added to classical logic without triviality.
Moreover, connexive logics have an air of plausibility about them, but as yet a nice
semantics has proved elusive. However, there are logics in the Anderson-Belnap
family of relevant logics (specifrcatly E and weaker systems) which admit the
addition of Aristotle's thesis inconsistently but not trivially. Note what this means:
almost all of the structures in inconsistent mathematics are inconsistent theories,
while ttrese are inconsistent but non-trivial logics. This is ha¡der to achieve since
logics are more constrained than their theories, and tend to collapse into triviality
independently of ECQ. In this paper I proved that result, then provided a more natural
semantics than hitherto. In "Prior and Rennie on Times and Tenses" (M1995b) I
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looked at the relation between tense logic and its relational semantics, which can be
written as a formal fnst-order theory that Arthur Prior called the U-calculus. I
criticised Prior's construction of the U-calculus within tense logic, and provided a
construction which escapes that criticism, The paper then describes a paraconsistent
tense-logic that is capable of assessing the consequences of inconsistent doctrines
about time (in line with Prior's view of logic as a frarnework for conducting
metaphysical disputes), and then illustrates the point by displaying an inconsistent
theory which combines without collapse into triviality two well-known rival doctrines
about time, relationalism (Leibniz, Mach) and absolufisn (Newton, Nerlich). Finally I
returned to semantical studies in the fashion of (M1982), looking further into the
relation between algebraic semantics and world-style semantics in "Algebraic
Analysis of Relevant Affixing Systems" (2003b, co-authored with Sylvan, Brady et.
al.).
Paraconsistent logics can also be studied as exemplars of various philosophical
approaches to contadiction-containment. But by themselves they cry out for work to
be done with them, that is applications. One area of application of paraconsistent
logic has been in the philosophy of science. To take an important example, realism
about micro-entities is the thesis that the very small is real. It contrasts with
instrumentallsm, which is the thesis that scientific theories about the very small are no
more than instruments for prediction of human-sized events, including particularly
observations which are events in human minds. Insffument¿lism has seemed athactive
to many scientists, especially those influenced by early 20ü Century logical
positivism. But it has largely been abandoned by philosophers, substantially because
of arguments by Karl Popper (1936) and J.J.C.Smart (1963). Popper and Smart both
argued in favour of realism that our theories of the very small (rnicroplrysical realism)
must be at least approximately trlue, since otherwise ow ability successfully to predict
otherwise unlikely events would be miraculous. This is a very plausible argument.
Unfortunately, it raises the question of a satisfactory analysis of "approximate truth".
Popper himself suggested a set-theoretic verisimilitude ordering (a partial order,
"nearer to the truth than") on sets of propositions. But this was shown independently
by Miller (1974) and Tichy (1974) to have a serious defect, namely that on Popper's
definition the only way Theor|1 could be closer to the truth than Theory2, is if
Theory1 is entirely true, that is contains no false statements. This is an intolerable
limiøtion on Popper's definition of verisimilitude, since partially false theories are the
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nofin for science, and it is unquestionable that some false theories represent progress
over others. But if there is no good defrnition of verisimilitude, then the Popper-Smart
argUment for realism is left to langUish, an trndesirable situation.
I analysed the situation in "A Theorem on Verisimilitude" (Ml978a), and
proved that the Miller-Tichy result depends on the assunrption of classical logic, and
that when that assumption is relæred, their result fails in all the usual relevant logics in
the Anderson-Belnap family. Thus it seemed at the time that the Popper-Smart
argument is vindicated as long as classical logic is abandoned in favour of the
independently-motivated relevant logics. However, in "Relevance and Verisimilitude"
(Ml9S3a) I proved a weaker variant of the Miller-Tichy result \ryithin all the relevant
logics, which still amounted to significant limitation on Popper's verisimilitude. This
result, proceeding from weaker assumptions than Miller-Tichy, kills Popper's theory
much more thoroughly, since it fails in large classes of reasonable logics, not just
classical logic. At the present, ys¡isimilitude is stitl being studied by others, though it
seems clear to me that Popper's set theoretic account has no chance, and that the right
place to look for verisimititude orderings is in the metaphysics of science, where
preferred classes of primitive predicates are utilised. At the same time, the Popper-
Smart argument for microphysical realism must be right, it seems to me, and this
should act as a spur to find a reasonable statement of approximate truth. The
significance of the results in Ml983a" then, is that they should alert us at the very least
to the possibility that a good theory of neamess to the truth, or any other construction
in the philosophy of science, ought not to depend on specifically classical
assumptions like DS and ECQ. Conversely, the existence of useful applications on
paraconsistent logic weakens the case for classical logic, which appears to be
"simple" and "natural" only if its applications are ignored.
So far, we have seen several sources of the Theory of Inconsistency: theories
of change and motion, the semantic paradoxes, the set-theoretic paradoxes, and
paraconsistent logics and their applications. These kinds ofjustifications of the study
of inconsistency have been classifred in more than one way (see Ml995a Chapl).
First, there is strong paraconsistency versus weak paraconsistency. Strong
paraconsistency is what was also called dialetheism above, namely the thesis that
there are true contradictions. Weak paraconsistency is the weaker claim that
inconsistent setups have to be allowed in the semantics of natural logic. It is apparent
that this is a weaker thesis: one can reject ECQ and accept relevant or other
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paraconsistent logic without going so far as to believe in true contradictions. One way
to state weak paraconsistency (not the only way) is to assert that contradictions are
possible without necessarily being actual.If contradictions are possible, then one can
say that ECQ fails because it is possible for there to be contradictory premisses
without every conclusion fotlowing. A limited, intermediate thesis here would be that
there are true contradictions, but they are limited to the logico-semantic realm, and do
not threaten to produce contradictions in physicat systems, for example. I was inclined
for many years to take the more cautious view here (except when the moon is fuIl)'
and have defended the thesis that contradictions are possible in three papers
"Anything Is Possible" (M1989a), "On Logical Strength and V/eakness (M1989b, co-
authored with Tim Burgess) and *It Isn't So But Could It Be?" (M2006). I return to
this presentþ in this section.
One more useflrl distinction between styles of justification of the Theory of
Inconsistency is between ontological motivations and epistemological motivations
(again see my (Ml995a), Chap l). Ontological motivations are again essentially
dialetheist, that is they aim to show that the mind-independent world, construed
broadly to include logic and mathematics, is or at least migtrt be inconsistent. Most of
what we have been discussing so far falls r¡nder this. But there are also
epistemological arguments (having to do witlì knowledge or cog¡ition) for
paraconsistent logic. These appeal to the evident capacity ef þ1¡¡ans and other
information-sensitive systems to contain contadictions without deductive collapse. If
humans can do this, then any halfivay-decent AI ought to be able to do the sa¡ne. In
this regard, one early and persuasive case was made out by Belnap (1977). He pointed
out that any information system with more than one input must allow for conflict
between its inputs without everything being deducible. An exarnple is tracking an
aircraft by both radar and infra-red, which must allow for the possibility of conflict
between these inputs. A different kind of example is when the FBI's data file on you
is told by one of its agents that your birthday is a certain date, and by another agent
that it is a different date. When both dates are entered, You would not like the
computer to apply the classical principle that from these conflicting pieces of
information everything follows, to deduce that you are a communist. In my
experience, computer scientists are much concerned with such reasoning rimong
anomalies, and generally greet with favour logicians' attempts to construct more
co gnitively-sensitive logics.
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At the same time, it might seem that such a weakening of the paraconsistent
enterprise to a merely cognitive or inforrration-theoretic project allows the criticism
that paraconsistent logic cannot be the logic of what is real, only of what is believed
or thought or cognised. If that is so, then so be it. It is a sufficient justification of
paraconsistent logic: it takes nothing away from paraconsistency studies nor from the
need for reasoning devices to navigate in anomalous cognitive environments. Even so,
the rejection of dialetheism about the real still would need to be accompanied by a
det¿iled refutation of all the ontological arguments outlined above. But these are
showing all the signs of continued robustness under the extensive application of
pressure. Moreover, the epistemological tends to collapse into the ontological
anyway. Physics certainly does contain anomalies on occasion: current examples are
the centre of black holes, the first instant of time and quantum nonlocality (these are
taken up later in sections 4 and 6). Now if an inconsistent theory of the world or a part
of it contains anomalies which persist under attempts to dissolve the contradictions,
then honest theorists have to ask themselves what f they are right? The rational
course is surely to believe the results of our best long-term theories, and if these
persist with anomalies in various places, then in the long run the rational course might
well be to believe that the universe itself is indeed anomalous-
The Theory of Inconsistency, the project of taking contradictions seriously,
suggests a general thesis to the ef[ect that anything is possìál¿. Such a theory is called
"possibilism". One can be a paraconsistentist or even a dialetheist without going as far
as possibilism, but still they shake resistance to possibilism, I would say. In three
papers mentioned above I defended aspects of this thesis in natural semantics arid
methodologt. In "Anything is Possible" (M1989a), I argued for possibilism by
attacking the sources of its opposite, necessitarianism, the thesis that there is at least
one necessary truth, then followed possibilism into defending the possibility of such
propositions as that every proposition is true and that no proposition is true. ln
another paper at the same time "On Logical Strength and \üeakness" (M1989b, co-
authored with Tim Btrgess) I utilised the tradition of fallibilism (Petce, Popper) to
offer a methodological fall-back position: if you don't want to go as far as possibilism
then at least prefer the weaker logic. Necessities or conceptual ties are bad
methodology, they bind rather than,líberate.ln a recent piece "It Isn't So, But Could
It Be?" (M2006) I again took up the extreme possibilþ (not the actuality) that every
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proposition be true, that is the possibility that the world is trivial. One result in this
paper is that this is a consistent position, it does not reduce to a contradiction.
For the fust two decades or so of its life, paraconsistency was exclusively
concerned with construction of logics, and mostþ propositional logics at that. This
trend remains predominant even today. But it must be conceded that if that were the
best that paraconsistent logic could do, then it would forwer remain a pimple on the
co{pus of classical mathematics. What is needed is a rich and distinctive inconsistent
perspective on mathematics. Conversely, if this can be demonstrateù then the theory
of inconsistency is conclusively vindicated. Thus, the theory of inconsistency and
inconsistent mathematics need each other (This argument is developed at greatet
length in "Prospects for Inconsistency" (M2000b)).
In consequence, having so far outlined the sources of the theory of
inconsistency and paraconsistent logic, we now must furn to mathematics.
3. Inconsistent Mathematics
In(1976),Robert K.Meyer produced the first inconsistent arithmetic. This was
significant in being a number tr*ry, and as sucb, unlike set theory or category
theory, is not a candidate for a foundation of mathematics. It was obtained by
constructing an inconsistent theory which was at once an extension of the natural
numbers, the integers and the integers mod 2. Inevit¿bly, this would be inconsistent,
the wonder is that it was not trivial. Now Meyer at the time was not a dialetheist, nor
even a relevantist (he later wrote a paper with the title "Why I am not a Relevantist").
His aim was somewhat foundationalist: to show that relevant Peano arithmetic R#
can escape the restrictions which Godel's second incompleteness theorem imposed on
Hilbert's Progrom. Hilbert had hoped to show all mathematics to be consistent using
finitary methods (methods expressible within Peano arithmetic: basically,
mathematical induction). Godel's second theorem dashed his hopes. It showed that in
Peano arithmetic with a base of classical logic, consistency cannot be proved if the
theory is consistent at all. Note that for the theories of logics ob.eyrng ECQ, there is no
distinction between inconsistency and triviality, whereas this intuitively reasonable
distinction can be maintained for theories of paraconsistent logics. Hence, Godel's
second theorem, which uses classical logic, can as well bc stated as saying that the
non-triviality of classical Peano arithmetic cannot be proved within itself, if it is
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indeed non-trivial. However, Meyer formulated relevant Peano arithmetic R# with
the same axioms but on a different logical base, namely Anderson and Belnap's
relevant logic R. He then produced an inconsistent model which extended R# to an
inconsistent arithmetic which he cotild prove by frnitary means (expressible in R#
itself) to be an extension of R#, and which was easily seen to be non-trivial. On this
basis, he argued that the Hilbert program was far from being buried since R is a better
candidate for natural logic than classical logic-
Meyer's construction was a brilliant result for relevant arithmetic. Two points
should be noted, however. Firs! Meyer had proved the non-trivialþ of R# by
methods available within R# itself, but he had not proved the (negation-) consistency
of R#. Indeed, since every primitive recursive frmction is representable in R#, Godel's
second incompleteness continues to apply and so the consistency of R# is unprovable
in R# if it is indeed consistent. Second" in his model 0:2, 0:4,0:6,.. . and -0:2,
-0:4, -0:6, . . . al! hold. What makes it non-trivial is that lf x + y (mod 2) then x:y
does not hold in his theory. Hence Meyer's construction does not rule out the
possibility that 0:2 might be provable back in R#. However, Meyer claimed in
passing and without proof that no classically false arithmetical equøtion can be
proved inR#.If true, this definitely strengthens the revival of Hilbert, since it imFlies
that if there is inconsistency anywhere in R#, it is far away and contained, and does
not disrupt ordinary calculations (as would certainly happen in the classical case)' I
stared at this for two days in 1982, until I realised that Meyer had seen all along that
his construction could be carried out using Z mod n for any n: for we can reduce any
false equation to a false equation x : y between integers x and y, then select a
modulus gfeater than the maximqm of these, in which x : y must fail.
From this point, many things rapidly dropped into place. There is an infinite
class of inconsistent extensions of R#, one for each nafural number modulus. These
can be intersected to form an arithmetic RMar in which all false equations fail
simultaneously (an outstanding question ¡spains about RMto, namely whether it is
decidable). The prime inconsistent mods are fields (as are the prime consistent mods
Zn), ,o there are non-trivial inconsistent theories which simultaneously extend all of
natural number arithmetic, integers, rational and real number theories. The
background logic can also be varied. All these results were displayed in "Inconsistent
Models for Relevant Arithmetics" (MI984a" co-authored with Meyer, written by me).
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Much more followed quickly. Dunn (1979) had begun the study of non-classical
model theory. The above results indicate the existence of a general approach to model
theory which, unlike previously, is not confined to the case of classical logic, and
which therefore can be expected to have different properties from the classical case.
This was investigated in my "Inconsistent Nurrber Systems" (M1988). One thing to
emerge from that paper is that after the restrictions of classical logic are relæred,
many of the properties of inconsistent theories tunn out to be invariant with respect to
change of background logics. This suggests that there is a certain dividing line
between logic and mathematics, which means that the logicist reduction of
mathematics to logic is misplaced.
Non-standard extensions of natural number and integer arithmetic are well-
known. These allow for inconsistent collapse. Inconsistent non-standard arithmetic
was investigated in "Inconsistent Nonstandard Arithmetic" (M1987b). In this paper
the phrase "inconsistent mathematics" appears for the first time (p512). Of interest is
the existence of infinite primes. Inconsistent collapse modulo an infnite prime allows
the frnite numbers to be quarantined off from inconsistency after a fashion.
Importantly, this provides a'þseudo-zero" ( which is a counter-example to Ferrnat's
Last Theorem, that is we have in this model ("+63', ilY n. Notwithstanding
Andrew Wiles' later proof, it looked to me at the time as if the detour through non-
standard inconsistent models might provide an explanation of why FLT was so hard
to prove, namely that it requires non-finitary (non-inductive) methods. This remains
inconclusive at present. Another paper "Alien Intruders in Relevant Arithmetic"
(M1987c, co-authored \¡rith Meyer and written by him) also addresses inconsistent
non-standa¡d models of the natural numbers, and shows that even the complex
numbers can be mapped homomorphically into the models.
Also at this time, the thought occurred to me that differential and integral
calculus might well have inconsistent versions. The history of the calculus is replete
with debates about infinitesimals, ever since Newton used them, divided by them, but
declared them to be zero when it suited him. Later mathematicians such as de
l'Hospital and the Bemoullis took varying stances on their reality. It is widely held by
currently-working mathematicians that the Cauchy-\tr/eierstrass method of (e,ô)
settled the matter by abolishing infinitesimals. However, they were revived in the
twentieth century by Robinson (1969), who demonsttated their consistency relative to
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the (e,ô) technique. One major advantage of Robinson's theory was that it reduces the
nurnber of quantifrers needed in the definition of a limit from three in the (e,õ) version
of calculus to just one, which makes for much simpler calculations. In my opinion,
mathematics departrnents ought to make more of this in their first-year calculus
courses (one could still be suitably irrealist about infinitesimals, as Robinson himself
was, treating them as useful fictions).
Unfortunately, there was a ba¡rier to inconsistent calcultts, with or without
infinitesimals. J.Michael Dunn seems to have been the first to notice that if any false
equation x: y is added to real or hyperreal number theory and the result closed under
the operations of the real or hyperreal numbers, the,n a trivial theory results (every
number equals every other number). For a proof, see my "Prospects for
lnconsistency''(M2000b), where I introduced the concept of mathematical triviolity
(triviality in the mathematical part of a theory). It is important to see that Dunn
showed that mathematical triviality followed using mathematical principles
irrespective of ECQ. Hence, it is not enough simply to dispense with ECQ if one
wants a rich inconsistent mathematics: one has to take further theoretical precautions.
It is no use for a theory to identiff atl its objects, so an inconsistent calculus had better
relax some mathematical laws. I did this in "Models for Inconsistent and Incomplete
Differential Calculus" (M1990), by constructing a nilpotent ring of hyperreals,
containing the real field as a substructure. Certain infinitesimals could be
inconsistently set to zero without triviality resulting, and limited but controlled
division by these can be done. The theory has all the calculatory advantages of
Robinson's. [rterestingly, this construction does not seem to have the snme
simpliffing consequences for integration.
The above results were all summarised in the fust five chapters of Inconsistent
Mathematics (M1995a). That volume caried the range of topics ñlrther. It tums out
that there are many branches of mathematics with an inconsistent aspect. To
summarise briefly, first there is the issue of inconsistent continuous functions. A law
of a dynamic system can be described by a function from time to other dimensions of
a phase space, and so in certain dynamical systems the function may not be C',
indeed may even be discontinuous. These can be described inconsistently by
instantaneously "rolling up" the appropriate dimension of the phase space so as to
identiff the distinct values. This was flrther developed in "The Leibtnz Continuity
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Condition,Inconsistency and Quantum Dynamics" (Ml997a), where it was applied to
describing quantum measurement. The problem is that causality seems to be carried
classically by continuous ñtnctions, quantum measurement is prima facie
discontinuous, and yet quanfum measurement is in some sense a causal process (the
possible outcomes, the eigenvalues, are generally limited and have probabilities
attached). The answer proposed in (M1997a) was that the function is inconsistently
continuous. That paper also concludes with the tentative suggestion that "quantum
nonJocality is inconsistent locality". This further possible development remains not
worked out at this time.
Then there is the problem of differentiating such frmctions. Classically, one
differentiates the Heaviside function to get Dirac's delta "function", with the
properries (1) ô(x) : 0 (for all x +0), and (2) J A(*)¿* : I (on the whole real line).
These are anomalous properties since there is no such fi¡nction. And yet, the delta
function proves particularly useful in quantum mechanics, ffid that application
romped along in physics for several decades. However, the situation was in
theoretical hiatus until Schwartz' theory of distributions "solved'o the problem by
treating it as a functional, not a function. From the inconsistent point of view,
differentiating an inconsistent continuous function ought to produce an inconsistent
delta function, and this turns out to be an inconsistent function rather than a
fi¡nctional.
The case of inconsistent systems of linear equations has been known for a long
time, but little attempt was made to probe it, since it seemed that Gaussian reduction
reduced all such systems of equations to 0:1. However, restricting the operations in
Gaussian reduction allows inconsistent solutions in terms of inconsistent equations,
for exarrple 0:2n, which can be achieved on the surface of a cylinder with
circumference 2n. The use of inconsistency here is particularly pleasing since the
existence of classes (subspaces) of solutions to systems of linear equations is well-
known. These can be described as incomplefe solutions, ild incompleteness is a
natural dual of inconsistency tmder the Routley functor. h (M19954 Chap 8) this was
adapted to the description of a malfunctioning control system. The idea was to
produce an inconsistent picture of the situation by superimposing the "expected"
control matrix onto the "observed" stream of ouþuts. In general this has no consistent
solution; however, it has inconsistent solutions. It was shown in software simulations
t9
that such systems can be "fault toleranf in that they can remain operating in restricted
circumstances without complete shut-down. These results were written up in
"Inconsistent Control Systems" (1997d, co-authored witlì Steve Leishman), but it
must be stressed that they are limited and at best suggestive, and so remain something
to be followed up one daY.
The practice of "identifting" subspaces is ubiquitous throughout geometry. In
(Ml995a Chaps 9 and 10) this was analysed as inconsistent identificatíon. Projective
spaces and topology were studied. This differs from the usual classical treaûnent in
that the identification x : y is the same in both the consistent and the inconsistent
cases; however, the remaining disidentity -(x : y) in the inconsistent case tracks the
origin of the identification in the space from which the projection was rnade.
Geometrical structures turn out to be somewhat easier to deal with inconsistentþ than
are numerical structures, which seems to be due to the absence of the full
functionality of fields such as the reals and hyperreals.
Earlier, closed set logic and category theory were mentioned. Closed set logic
has been known to be paraconsistent and topologically dual to intuitionist (open set)
logic since Nicholas Goodman's paper (1981). Now there is a widespread claim that a
well-known branch of category theory, namely topos theory, has a "natural" logic
which is intuitionist. This seemed suspicious to me: there ought to be structures which
stand to closed set logic exactly as toposes stand to open set logic. This was addressed
in (M19954 Chap 11 which was jointþ written with Peter Lavers). It was shown
there that toposes themselves are enough to do the job, as long as the interpretation
functor is dualised. Thus the usual intuitionist Public Relations exercise is incorrect:
there are two equally natural logics for topos theory. At the same time, this result
represented the first paraconsistent logic to be given a categorical semantics.
Goodman's paper was critical of closed set logic on the grounds that it lacks an
implication operator definable in terns of (&,v,-). But it is apparent that any lattice
(including the closed sets of some topological space) with maximum element T and
minimgm element F has a natural implication operator defined by the condition: if x <
y then x+y: T, else x-+y: F. In (M1995 Chap 1l) this was shown to have a
categorial description. Thus, not only does closed set logic have a reasonable
implication but it too has a categorial semantics. Further investigations of closed set
logic are in (M1992), (M2000a), (M20034). In (Ml989c), co-authored \Mith Steve
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Leishman (who did the prograrrming), the finite (many-valued) closed and open set
logics were computed up to size 5. Finally, the topological duality between closed and
open set logics interacts with the Routley functor (Routley-*-duality), as described in
(M1995, Chap 13, see also Chap 12 written by V/illiam James).
4. Inconsistency in Geometry
The book (M1995) had a significant bias toward algebra and number theory.
Of geometry there was not a lot, and pictures were even fewer. But there are salient
examples of inconsistent images, which cry out for a treahent in terms of the Theory
of Inconsistency.
Consider, for exarnple, the following picture:
Of this picture, it can be said that it is a picture of an impossible object or situation,
and that it is importaritly a geometrical thing. It is a geometrical contadiction, not
something verbal or numerical. (On the distinction between geometrical and verbal
contradictions, see Mortensen 2002a). The doyen of artists of impossible pictures is
Oscar Reutersvaard, who drew the above pictwe in Stockúrolm in 1934 at the age of
17. This began a brilliant career in which he drew over 4,000 impossible fictures, and
was honoured by the Swedish government in the 1980s with several stamps of his
work.There a¡e in fact very many visual paradoxes or impossibilities (see Emst 1986,
1989). Just a few are:
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I have been able to trace examples of paradoxical pictures back to the walls of
pompeii. There ate examples to be found as medieval altarpieces, and in Piranesi's
Carceri.Later,there carne the well-loved masterpieces of M.C.Escher (Ascending and
Descending, Waterfall, Belvedere and the like), who was tmdoubtedly influenced by
Reutersvaard. In the last few years at Adelaide frirther images have been constructed
by me and my students. For examPle:
v
So there is an important area to be addressed by the Theory of Inconsistency,
namely to make sense of the inconsistency, to make sense of the reaction I see it but I
don't believeit. Until very recently there were but three papers on this problem, all
by classical mathematicians: Cowan (1974), Francis (1987) and Penrose (1991)- I
addressed the problem in a series of papers "Peeking at the Impossible" (Ml997c),
"Paradoxes Inside and Outside Language" (M20A2a), and "Towards a Mathematics of
Impossible Pictures" (M2002b). I argued that the contributions of Cowan, Francis and
Penrose, worthy though they are, fall short because they do no answer the question of
how it seems when it seems to be an impossible object. My proposal is that the mind
encodes an inconsistent theory, which stands to the two-dimensional images in
)
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something the same way that a theory describing a 3-dimensional object stands to its
2-dimensional projection in projective geometry. The aim is then to write inconsistent
theories in which the contradiction is apparent. This has also led to a series of
computer studies by me and my students in which these objects ¿¡s animated
(M2005b, co-authored with Quigley, Leishman and Mercier). It was conjectured by
Emst (1986, 1989) that an impossible image cannot be rotated. This is shown to be
false, see my website:
http://www.orts.adelaide.edu.aúhumanities/philosopþ/inconsístent-images/index-ht
ml.
One direction in which this is leading is towards buitding a virh¡al reality environment
(the ability to rotate such images is obviously a necessary part of being able to walk
around them).
5. Geometry, Groups and Logic
Logicians have tlpically steered clear of linking their subject with geometry
(contrary to the slogan over the doorway of Plato's Academy), and with all due
respect geometers are generally not well-informed about logic. Yet there are obvious
bridges between the two. One is the mathematical concept of a group, an associative
operation with an identity and inverses. On the one hand, the application of goup
theory to the description of geometrical structures is ubiquitous. On the other hand,
there is a significant body of literature on goup logics, as we will see.
Indeed, the basic intuitive understanding of the group operation calls out for
logical application. First, there is the idea that that the elements of a goup can be
transþrmations,that is actions of a certain sort. This lends itself to the thought that a
group is a space of propositions, namely the propositions describing the result of
carrying out the actions. Relations between propositions are, of course, the subject
matter of logic. Second, the basic goup operation for combining transformations is
readily understood as "fhst do this and then do that", which is undoubtedly a kind of
conjunction. More than that, it is a conjunction which is associative but not
necessarily commutative. Many interesting non-Abelian groups a.re known in
geometry, which thus ought to tanslate itself into many interesting non-commutative
logical conjunctions, with built-in applications. Thfud, the idea of the inverse of an
element of a group is an obvious candidate for a kind of negation, one which obeys
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the Law of Double Negation -(-a):a. These three ingredients suggest that there ought
to be various rich classes of logical structures forthcoming from group theory and
associated geometrical objects.
There are in the literature three approaches to logics arising from groups. First
there is the construction of MV-algebras by Chang, eg. (1958) and many others
(usefirlly surveyed in Cignoli, D'Ottaviano and Mr¡ndici 2000). It is well known that
this produces the class of Lukasiewicz Logics. Second, there is Abelian Logic, due to
Meyer-Slaney (1989, 2002). Thfud, there is the Lewin-Sagastume approach, which is
closer to Abelian logic; see Lewin-Sagastume (2002), Galli-Lewin-Sagastume Q004).
Now all of these derive from structures which are not simply groups btfi lattice'
ordered groups (groups with an additional structure which is a lattice). Lattices are
well-known as part of the semantics of most (non-group-based) logics. ln the context
of groups, the lattices supply what can be described as the extensional structure of the
togic (conjunction, disjunction and the quantifiers), while the groups supply the
intensional structure (fusion, fission, implication and negation). Strictþ, negation is a
hybrid concept.
An important connection between geometry and paraconsistency is aflorded
by Ulam games. Twenty Questions is a trivially decidable game where the aim is to
deduce an unknown number less than a million in no more than twenty questions.
Ulam games are games similar to Twenty Questions, save that a stipulated maiimum
number of lies are permitted in answer to the questions. Ularn games are
paraconsistent because (since lies are permitted) opposite answers to the same
question may be given, without a deductive log-jam ensuing. Three things were
known in the literature about Ulam games (eg. Cignolí et al2000, Mundici 2002): (l)
as long as the marimtrm number of lies is known to the questioner, the answer may be
deduced using Lukasiewicz Logics of more than two values; (2) the maximum
number of lies determines the number of values of the corresponding (many-valued)
logic; and (3) the case of one lie has a natural geometrical modelling in tenns of the
vertices, edges and faces of an n-dimensional cube. These elements of cubes have
natural union, intersection and negation operations, and these operations are called
cubic togíc by Mundici (2002). The direct connection between geometry and logic is
apparent in this case. What was not known was how to extend the geometrical
modelling beyond one lie and its associated (3-valued) Lukasiewiczlogic. However,
in "Cubic Logic, Ulam Games and Paraconsistency''(M20054 co-authored with Peter
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Quigley), it was shown how to extend the result to the general case, which involves
arrays of n-dimensional cubes. This result supports the contention that geometry and
logic have much in common that is unexplored.
6. Philosophy of Physics and Mathematics
Among the topics taken up in previous sections were applications to
ønomalies in physìcs, particularly discontinuity in quantum measurement, the Dirac
delta function, and inconsistent systems of linear equations. Running in tandem with
these studies, I addressed other issues in the philosophy of mathematics and physics.
These all revolve in various ways around the theme of realism, though most of them
also touch in one way or another on the theory of inconsistency. Earlier we noted the
debate over realism versus instrumentalism about the entities described in
microphysics, namely that there is a plausible argument for microphysical realism
which employs the notion of nearness to the truth, and that r¡nforn¡nately this notion
proves elusive to capture in a rigorous way, though I also indicated that a different
approach had better prospects. However, there is a more general argument, due to
Quine and Pubram, which takes realism about physical entities (electons, quarks and
the like) for granted, ffid rrgues that it applies equally well to realism about the
mothematical entities appearing in physics (eg. groups, sets, topological spaces,
numbers, categories, phase spaces). This essentially throws down the challenge: sets
and the like are indispensable to physics because they are essential for the formulation
of the mathematics necessary to express physics, and if sets are indispensable to
physics then they should be treated realistically as much as electrons are. Conclusion:
sets, numbers and the like are every bit as physically real as electrons and quarks.
I have always been suspicious of realism about sets. Sets of any kind, naiïe,
ZFC-ish or whatever, strike me as a clear case of a formalism which is overly
structured and as such builds more into physical reality than is in fact there. The most
objectionable featu¡e of sets is the package deal that you get with set theory, because
the package deal includes the null set {}, and null entities of any sort are ontologically
unfounded. ln a slogan, nothingness does not exist. Of course it is one thing to have
such methodological intuitions, and quite another to support them with rigorous
argument. One way to develop the argument with appropriate theoretical caution was
to approach the problem with a selective realism, realism about some

25
mathematicaVphysical entities but not others. Th:us some physics and mathematics can
be taken instrumentally, but not necessanly all.In my experience, such selectiveness
is well received by physicists and mathematicians as preserving the intuition that
instrumentalism has a reasonable core: theorists try on various formalisms, which
should therefore not be taken too literally and credulously. So in an early paper
..physical Topology" (M1978b, co-authored with Graham Nerlicþ I argued that the
apparent indispensability of sets from the usual definition of a topological space,
while unquestionable for mathematics, was misleading when apptied to the physics of
spacetime. In the briefest of terrns, the argument is that mathematical set theory
supplies too manytopological spaces, all such set-theoretic constructions equally exist
as mattrematics (all the ingredients exist in Platonic Heaven). So there must be
something real but non-set-theoretic about space that supplies the principle to choose
between the equally existing mathematical alternatives. A construction using
mereologt, the theory of the part-whole relation, was offered as a replacement- This
is not irealism about topological structure, of course, but it is irrealist about any mode
of presenting this structure which is set-theoretic. In Pâssing, this also suggests that
the more ontologically perspicuous formalism for topology may be category-theoretic.
In another early paper "spacetime and Handedness" (M1983c, also co-
authored with Graham Nerlicþ, I took up realism about physical geometry. Newton
had been realist about physical space, while Leibniz had denied it, preferring relations
between physical bodies. Nerlich had argued in his book The Shape of Space (1976)
that realism for physical geometry, specifically metical geometry, was supported by
the phenomenon of handedness: since locally handed objects may or may not be
globally handed, their handedness must be due to their relation to a container space,
which perforce must exist. Now that argument was stated in terms of classical
physics, but it is not immediately apparent that it goes over easily to relativistic
spacetime, since spatiøl handedness is not relativisticatly invariant. The aim of the
paper M1983c was to make the necessary distinctions to carry the argurrent over to
the spacetime case. Note the selective realism: physical geometry and set theory yield
diflerent conclusions over realism.
In another paper around the same time "The Limits of Change" (M1985) I
addressed an old problem of change. A chariot moves off from stop at noon. What is
its state of motion at noon exactly? If it is in motion, when did it start; and if it is at
rÊst, how can it ever start? I explored several different answers, including
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inconsistency and incompleteness, that are appropriate under different background
conditions. The theme of change was also developed in a much later paper "Changeo'
(M2002c). By this time I wrls more sympathetic to dialetheism, as is evidenced by the
theme of the paper: Priest's inconsistent account of change was expounded and
supported with cautious qualifications. In an even later paper I endeavoured to work
out what sort of accotrnt of change a Buddhist should give. Buddhist thought is a
strong tradition of interesting philosophical issues, and their view on change is among
the most interesting, having considerable resemblance to the spacetime realism of
relativity theory. So in "Dharmakirti and Priest on Change" (M2004) I contrasted
priest's inconsistent view with that of the 8ft century Buddhist logician Dharmakirti,
ultimately siding with Dhannakirti, again with qualifications.
Realism about numbers was addressed in a paper in the 1980s and two papers
in the 1990s. In "Arguing for Universals" (M19S7D) I argued for an ontology of
universals, the best exemplars being the quantities of physics. As a blproduct, there is
a smooth account of (dimensionless) numbers as "comparison ratios", that is (real)
second-order relations between r¡niversals. This was an idea in the atr at the time, as
several Australasian philosophers (Forrest, Armstrong, Bigelow, Pigden and others)
put it forward, so that it seems to have come to be an official part of "Australian
realism". In "On the Possibility of Science WithoutNumbers" (M1998), I addressed a
general instrumentalist argument against Quine and Putram which is due to Hartry
Field in his well-known book Science Ílithout Numbers (19S0). I argued that Field's
construction was mote complex than is needed for his general irrealist argument.
However I also argued that when properly understood there needs to be a premiss in
Field's argument which may hold for certain mathematical concepts but not others.
Thus Field cannot avoid the hard metaphysical work of defending a position which is
agatnselectively realist. As an example, I again sided with realism about numbers as
being supported by an analysis of the role of quantities in physics.
Finally, I took up two specific issues in the philosophy of physics, both
concerning the ideal of "explaining" everything, and how realist we should be about
proposals about the fust instant of time. An ancient question is: why is there
something rather than nothing? ln "Explaining Existence" (Ml986b) I took up the
physicist Edward Tryon's suggestion that the universe began as a quantum fluctuation
out of "nothing". This leads to some interesting speculations as to the ways the
universe might be for there to be an explanation of everything . Later, as discussed in
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A Brief History of Time (1988), Stephen Hawking (with Hartle) sought to avoid the
singularity at the first instant of time by multiplying the time variable f by the square
root of minus 1, i. However Hawking also evinced a thorough instrumentalism about
the ontological commiünents of theoretical physics, along with making some
discourteous remarks about the technical abilities of philosophers. Hawking's
irealism invites the Popper-Smart objection noted above, of how his suggestion could
be regarded as explaining anything at all, if it wasn't to be taken as at least
approximately right. In "In the Beginning" (M2003c, co-authored with Julianna
Csavas), I made this realist point, then canvassed several interpretations of key
r¡nclarities in Hawking's position that various philosophers and physicists @avies,
Gribbin) subsequentþ made. I argued that these interpretations all had their problems,
then offered an interpretation different from those in the literature, which avoids those
problems.
In the late 90s, I was endeavouring to work out a general view of the role of
mathematical forrnalism. The mathematician Brian Rotman had published several
books and papers which aimed to push semiotics, the general theory of signs, as a
useful tool for understanding the function of mathematics (1987, 1993).In "Semiotics
and the Foundations of Mathematics" Qvll997b, co-authored with Lesley Roberts), I
argued that the details of Rotrnan's arguments were very weak, but that nonetheless
the general thrust of his position was along the right lines. Orn broad argument was
supported by the observation made by my student Edwin Coleman of the very many
different styles of symbol codes that mathematics has found to be useful. Hilbert had
taken the revisionist view that canonical mathematics should be written in abstract
axiomatised systems written in a formal language. But, like other revisionist positions,
this fails to account for the efficacy of the varieties of mathematical texts, pictures gnd
diagrams. This leads to firther anti-þundationalist and antí-essentialist conclusions:
the heterogeneity wthwhich mathematics skilfully utilises symbol systems is crucial
to the nature of mathematics, and is to be explained as more like Wittgenstein'sfamily
resemblance thesis than like reduction to a single essential foundation. It also leads in
the direction of explaining mathematics as efficacious kinds of text. One of the virtues
of this position is that, unlike Platonism, it brings with it a plausible epistemologt: the
varieties of text and our abilities to exploit them are surely natural phenomena. The
dominos tumble even further here, for the premiss that mathematics is primarily text
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leads to the antïPlatonist conclusion that mathematics is not primarily a window onto
an abstract realm. I take these points up again in the final section.
In sum, these studies have as their major theme the varieties of mathematical
and physical realism. Realism in physics is to be treated sympathetically but not
uncritically, ffid ultimately selectively; while realism for mathematics, particularly
pure mathematics, is regarded as not generally true. This seems to be in accord with
the relative diflerences in experimental practice between these two disciplines.
7. Significance of Inconsistent Mathematics for the Nature of Mathematics.
The funda¡nental question for the philosophy of mathematics is: what is
mathematics? A second question is: what is true mathematics? Recognising this
distinction alone permits progress in the philosophy of mathematics. To apply it,
consider firstfoundationqlism. Foundationalism in the philosophy of mathematics was
mentioned earlier, and I now retum to it. Fotmdationalism is the general thesis that
mathematics has a foundation. An example of a foundationalist program is that of
Frege and Russell, who took the view that mathematics is no more than logic, suitably
augmented with appropriate definitions, ie. that mathematics l's logic. The logicist
foundational program has the virtue of stressing the apriori nature of mathematics, by
aiming to account for it in terms of the apriori nature of logic. (We recall in passing
that the apriori nature of logic is nonetheless questionable, as discussed at the end of
Section 2.) Now logicism had, a chance while it looked as if the necessary set theory
could be obtained just by naïïe comprehension together with identity of sets, since
these might with some plausibility be viewed as definitional for sets. When Russell's
Paradox caused a flight to find a consistent set theory, the candidates (eg. ZFC, or
Russell's own Theory of Types) unfortunately looked like anything but definitions or
principles of logic, and it was appreciation of this fact that historically spelled the
death-knell of logicism.
Now a common reaction by mathematicians to such foundationalist claims is
that a foundation is certainly not needed to practice their craft. That is surely correct.
Thus foundationalism gives the impression to mathematicians of a take-over attempt
by logicians. So let it be made clear once more that it is emphatically not my view that
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mathematics should be reducible to a foundation, for reasons given at the end of the
last section.
Even so, a sufficiently determined logicist might reasonably feel that their
progtam can be rehabilitated by the non-triviality results for narVe set theory stated
above, namely that inconsistent narVe set theory with a suit¿ble base logic which is
paraconsistent, has all the deductive power sufEcient to express any mathematical
theory. To date, defenders of this re-habilitated logicism have not emerged. But there
does emerge from inconsistent mathematics a different reason to reject logicism. This
is the observation made earlier thal inconsistent mathematics is invariant over a large
class of paraconsistent background logics. Let us call this the irwariance thesìs.Herc
is behoves us to ask: what is the domain of interest of logicians and what is the
domain of interest of mathematicians? Logic is often defined as the study of the
validity relation: the difference between the validrty and invalidity of argurnents. As
we see modem symbolic logic presented in logic books, logic begins by studying the
behaviour of the operators (&,v,-,-+,ë,f,V,:), then proceeds to a variety of topics
such as modality (!,0) and tense (F,P,G,H). Set theory, the behaviour of the
membership relation e, is certainly studied by logicians, as are the natural numbers
and other number systems, but these are intermediate cases between logic and
mathematics whose interest for logicians flows out of a concern for the semantics and
expressive po\Mer of logic. Algebra is likewise studied for its application to semantics,
which explains why logicians know a fair amount about lattices, but little or nothing
about groups, rings and fields, let alone analysis and geometry. Another intermediate
case, between logic and computer science this time, is recursion theory.
My point here is that logic concerns itself centrally with the general properties
of the deducibility relation, while mathematics is restricted to only certain contents,
and these require calculations that are required by the nature of the contents
expressed. Calculation consists in the systematic application of functionality: one
calculates the value of a fi¡nction (for example +(x,y) for inputs x,y) and substitutes
the outcome into a ñrther equation. Addition + is typical of the frrnctional operations
that mathematics distinctively concerns itself with. This, then, is why logicism falls
short: any deduction is a matter of logic plus definitions, whereas an understanding of
the nature of mathematics demands an accotrnt of the contents that a¡e distinctive to
mathematics, and this is what logicism leaves out.
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At the same time, it is might be mistakenly thought that inconsistent
mathematics proposes itself as somehow better than the original. This impression
might be obtained from an analogy with intuitionist mathematics. Intuitionism, fust
proposed by the mathematician Brouwer, is another foundationalist program which is
revisionist in that it contends that there is mathematics proper, which is constructivist,
while all non-constructive methods (such as those of classical analysis) yield inconect
results. It is important then to correct any misapprehension: inconsistent mathematics
does not require truncation of mathematics in the name of the constructivist ideal nor
any ottrer. Indeed, the diffrculty for revisionist philosophies of mathematics is that
they answer one important question, namely what is true mathematics; but fail to
address the prior question, namely what is mathematics, for they fail to say what is
mathematical about proscribed (non-constructive) mathematics. Inconsistent
mathematics is, in fact, the opposite of revisionism, in that it aims to expand ot]I.
conception of mathematics, not reduce it. It proposes that we have here a new
,.branch,, or area of mathematics, an "extension" of the obviously excellent corpus of
traditional mathematics. It is not in any way intended as "better" than classical
mathematics, only different. It aims to expand our conception of what is possible for
mathematics.
8. Conclusion
Let us summarise these implications of inconsistent mathematics for the
faditional philosophies of mathematics: Frege's logicism, Brouwer's intuitionism,
Hilbef's formalism and Platonism. (The theses of this section are ñ¡rther discussed in
Ml995a Chap 1.) lnconsistent mathematics holds out an olive branch to logicism in
that narve set theory can be rehabilitated as inconsistent without any obvious threat to
calculations, as long as a paraconsistent background logic is employed. Nevertheless,
logicism has other failings. It does not identiff what is distinctive for mathematics,
namely functionality and calculation. Intuitionism is to be rejected because, as a
revisionist doctrine, it can at best provide an answer to the question of what is true
mathematics, and not the prior question of what is mathematics. Hilbert's program,
like logicism, gains some support from the Theory of Inconsistency, n¿tmely in the
escape it aftords from the strictures that the Godel incompleteness theorems impose.
However, Hilbert's formalism, in proposing a canonical type of text, falls down in its
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inability to provide an analysis of the many styles and uses of real mathematical
textuality. Finally, this emphasis on text locates the epistemological problem for
mathematics in an accessible place, in contrast to Platonism which would see it
banished to epistemologically inaccessible realms'
These negative conclusions lead me to propose three positive theses that arise
from inconsistent mathematics. They are an essence thesis, an invariance thesis, and a
special case thesis.
The essence thesis is twofold. In answer to the primary question "What Is
Mathematics?", we can say that mathematics is distinctive varieties of text,
particularly symbol, picture and diagram. The use of the plural "varieties" is intended
to convey a sense of family resemblance not universal essence. ln answer to the
secondary question "What Is True Mathematics?", we can say that while logic is
obviously used in drawing mathematical conclusions, it is the role of functionality in
making calculations that is distinctive of mathematics, and in this the logical operators
(other than identity) play little or no role-
The invariance thesis is that inconsistent mathematics has proved to be
invariant over a large class of background paraconsistent logics. This re-inforces the
rejection of logicism: once inconsistency-tolerance is secured, different doctrines of
the nature of implication, deducibility and the logical operators have little effect on
the principles govenning inconsistent structures. \What does govern them is, again, the
ability to calculate the values of fimctions for various inputs, including variable
inputs, and then use the results in frrther calculations by substituting into other
contexts. This hardly means that all there is to inconsistent mathematical theories has
already been determined by classical mathematics: there is certainly much noveþ in
inconsistent mathematics. The explanation, in the end, is that weaker logics permit
more meanings to be distinguished than a stronger logic which binds with more
conceptual connections, but the noveþ is rather independent of logic itself.
The special case thesis is that classical mathematics is a special case of general
mathematics, under the asstunption of consistency. In this, it follows the relation
between two-valued logic and logics in general: classical logic is a special case of
general logic, under the assumption of consistency. In fum, we can see that this
accords with the rejection of revisionism. Nothing of classical mathematics is
rejected. It seems that this amounts to a new freld of mathematics, and that our view
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of what is possible for mathematics is thereby expanded. In sum, The Theory of
lnconsistency is vindicated; the inconsistent has rich and interesting structure.
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The following idea has recently been gaining support: that the world is or
might be inconsistent. In its modern manifestation it has been the province of rig-
orous symbolic logic, with motivations from logic, semantics and the foundations
of mathematics. However, the idea finds roots in an older view, that change espe-
cially motion is contradictory, which can be traced back through Engels and Hegel
to Zeno and Heraclitus, and has recently been revived, e.g. by Priest [46].
Two recent convergent motivations have been the paradoxes of logic, semantics
and set theory, and the semantics of relevant logic. A theory is a set of sentences
closed under a deductive relation (but cf. Definition 2.8). A logic (Def 2.7) is
then a theory with the extra property of being closed under the rule of uniform
substitution (relative to a specified set of connectives, such as 'and', 'or', 'not',
'if..then', 'for all', 'there exists', 'equals'). This expresses the idea that the logic
of a collection of connectives ought to be neutral as to subject matter. The point
stressed here is that deductive theories come with a logic in the background, albeit
one which is perhaps tacitly presupposed as natural.
Let us consider set theory first. The most natural set theory to adopt is un-
doubtedly one which has unrestricted set abstraction (also known as naive compre-
hension). This is the natural principle which declares that to every property there
is a unique set of things having the property. But, as Russell showed, this leads
rapidly to the contradiction that the Russell set (the set of all non-self-membered
sets) both is and is not a member of itself. The overwhelming majority of logicians
took the view that this contradiction required a weakening of unrestricted abstrac-
tion in order to ensure a consistent set theory, which was in turn seen as necessary
to provide a consistent foundation for mathematics. But all ensuing attempts at
weakening set abstraction proved to be in various ways ad-hoc. Da Costa [10]
and Routley [51] both suggested instead that the Russell set might be dealt with
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more naturally in an inconsistent but nontrivial set theory (where triviality means
that every sentence is provable, see Definit\on2.4). Since the triviality of a theory
undoubtedly makes it uninteresting, this means that the background logic of any
inconsistent theory should not validate the rule ez contradictione quodliáeú (trCQ:
from A and not-A to deduce any B), which two valued Boolean logic validates. Da
Costa proposed C1 as one such iogic, and demonstrated some C1-independence re-
sults for set theories containing the Russell set. Graham Priest argued persuasively
that semantic paradoxes such as The Liar, and set-theoretic paradoxes such as Rus-
sell's, are best solved by accepting that there are some true contradictions; rather
than sacriflcing the generality and naturalness of principles like an unrestricted
truth predicate or unrestricted set abstraction (e.g. [45],[46]). The need follows
for a logic in which ECQ fails. Such logics are known as inconsistency-tolerant, or
paraconsistent.
A second motivation came from Anderson and Belnap's investigations o1 rele-
aance or conceptual connection. The idea was that correct natural entailment rests
on conceptual connection; so that ECQ could not be a universally valid princi-
ple, because its premises can evidently be irrelevant to its conclusion (B may have
no connection to A and not-A). However, subsequent discoveries in the seman-
tics of sentential relevant logics by Belnap-Dunn-Fine-Meyer-Plumwood-Routley-
Urquhart made it clear that the existence of inconsistent theories was necessary
for relevance (though not sufficient). On this point theIgT2 paper by Routley and
Routley [52] was one of the earliest and most telling.
One can distinguish two strands of doctrine here: strong paraconsistentism is
the acceptance of true contradictions, while weak paraconsistentisrn is the thesis
that contradictory possibilities or structures have to be considered in the semantics
of natural logic. Within strong paraconsistentism one can locate the two views we
began with. First there is the modern motivation that true contradictions arise
by a priori argument from various paradoxes; (for example, the argument that the
Liar sentence 'This sentence is false' is demonstrably both true and false; or the
Paraconsistency
argument that the Russell set is demonstrably both a member of itself and not
a member of itself.) Second there is the older motivation that a philosophically
correct account of change forces true contradictions on us. Within weak para-
consistentism, on the other hand, one can distinguish the thesis that inconsistent
semantic structures represent genuine possibilities; so that while no contradictions
are true, some contradictions are possible.
Two further distinctions are worth making here. First, we began by noting the
thesis that the world is or might be inconsistent. But inconsistency is, strictly,
a property of linguistic things like propositions or theories: the'not-A'and the
'A' of a contradiction are the kinds of things capable of being true or false, that is
propositions or sentences. So one can instead have a linguistic version of the central
thesis: that the one true and exhaustive theory of the universe is inconsistent.
The universe would be inconsistent, then, just to the extent that its true and
exhaustive theory was inconsistent. We will not really need to make anything of
this distinction in this book, though it can be said that the approach is certainly
to study theories and other language-like items. A second distinction which has
been made, is between viewing contradictions as propositions which are both true
and false, and viewing them as true propositions of the form A and not-,A (see
e.9. Meyer and Martin [26]). Again, we will not be making much of this possible
difference in this book. But it should be noted that to facilitate formal study, the
mark of inconsistency in a theory is taken to be the presence among its consequences
of the propositions A and not-Á.
The attraction of the Russell set is that of providing a foundation of mathe-
matics on a simple principle such as the naive principle of comprehension. An al-
ternative contradictory foundation might be found in category theory, which looks
interestingly close to inconsistency in places (see Chapter 11), as any broad abstrac-
tion principle will. Mathematicians undoubtedly flirt with such principles. There
are, it should be noted, technical problems with inconsistent naive comprehension:
while the Russell set can be tolerated, a stronger paradox, Curry's paradox, threat-
3
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ens triviality for deeper reasons (Meyer-Dunn-Routley [29], Slaney [53]) Brady has
done important work demonstrating that the ordinal structure in such a set theory
does not collapse in [5].
These ideas are foundationalist in spirit, while this book is not foundationalist.
Many working mathematicians (though by no means all) are suspicious of logicians'
apparent attempt to take over their subject by stressing its foundations. Surely
one can reasonably feel that contradiction in set theory or category theory could
not remotely threaten the immense corpus of mathematical results and applications
discovered over more than two millenia. That alone is an argument for the natural-
ness of limiting the spread of contradictions. I do not mean that no foundationalist
program for mathematics could succeed, however. A foundationalist program might
succeed, and the inconsistent versions look the most promising. Indeed if the spe-
cial case thesis defended later is true (that consistent complete mathematics is a
special case of general mathematics), then any successful foundationalist program
should be inconsistent or paraconsistent in some sense. But I have been persuaded
by Edwin Coleman [8] that foundationalism in mathematics should be regarded
with considerable suspicion; or at least that proper 'foundations', arguably both
formalist and conventionalist in broad senses, would be much more complex and
semiotical than twentieth century mathematical logic has attempted. In which case
it would be arguable whether 'foundations' is an appropriate term.
The first consciously inconsistent number-theoretic structure seems to have been
Meyer's inconsistent arithmetic modulo two (see below Chapter 2); though it is fair
to say that his main concern was with demonstrating the consistency of the rele-
vant arithmeLic Rff, rather than with inconsistency for its own sake [23],[24],1251.
Routley replicated the result using a different nonclassical background logic [51].
Dunn's admirable paper [11] considered three-valued paraconsistent model theory
with applications to arithmetic and type theory. Priest and Routley called for in-
consistent infinitesimals [a7] on the grounds that inconsistent claims abound in the
pre-Weierstrassian history of the calculus. See also Asenjo [6]. It is argued here that
Surnmary
without a properly developed inconsistent calculus based on infinitesimals, then in-
consistent claims from the history of the calculus might well simply be symptoms
of confusion. This is addressed in Chapter 5. It is further argued that mathematics
has a certain primacy over logic, in that paraconsistent or relevant logics have to
be based on inconsistent mathematics. If the latter turns out to be reasonably rich
then paraconsistentism is vindicated; while if inconsistent mathematics has seri-
ous restrictions then the case for being interested in inconsistency-tolerant logics is
weakened. (On such restrictions) see this chapter, section 3.) It must be conceded
that fault-tolerant computer programming (e.g. Chapter 8) finds a substantial and
important use for paraconsistent logics, albeit with an epistemological motivation
(see this chapter, section 3). But even here it should be noted that if inconsistent
mathematics turned out to be functionally impoverished then so would inconsistent
databases.
2. Summary
In Chapter 2, Meyer's results on relevant arithmetic are set out, and his view
that they have a bearing on Gódel's incompleteness theorems is discussed. Model
theory for nonclassical logics is also set out so as to be able to show that the
inconsistency of inconsistent theories can be controlled or limited, but in this book
model theory is kept in the background as much as possible. This is then used to
study the functional properties of various equational number theories.
Chapter 3 considers equational theories constructed from inconsistent models
modulo an infinite prime. Chapter 4 introduces order. In the first section it is
shown that the result of classical model theory that the theory of dense order
without endpoints is Ns-categorical, breaks down in the inconsistent case. In the
second section arithmetical functions are added and results about ordered rings
and fields are summarised.
5
In Chapter 5, a congruence relation on the ring of noninfinite hyperreal numbers
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is defined; leading to an inconsistent theory in which reasonable notions of limits,
continuity, differentiation and integration can be defined, and Taylor's formula and
polynomial differentiation proved. A simple change to this theory produces an
incomplete differential calculus. In both theories every function is continuous. The
latter theory is shown to have some similarity with synthetic differential geometry,
a well-known incomplete theory in the language of categories due to Lawvere, Kock
and others.
In Chapter 6 we begin by considering Priest's use of the Leibniz Continuity
Condition (LCC) to produce an inconsistent theory of motion. The LCC is seen to
have further implications. It is then shown that inconsistent functions are definable
which can be regarded as everywhere continuous derivatives of certain classical
functions which are úot everywhere differentiable from the classical point of view.
Chapter 7 puts together the previous two chapters to produce a structure in which
functionality fails though in a controlled way; and uses this for an account of
delta functions, which can in turn be regarded as inconsistent derivatives of the
inconsistent continuous functions of Chapter 6.
Chapter 8 applies the additive group ideas of Chapter 6 to the solution of
inconsistent systems of linear equations, and implications for control theory are
outlined. Chapter 9 briefly considers the case of inconsistent vector spaces which
suffer similar limitations to inconsistent fields. However inconsistent projective
spaces over these vector fields do not suffer the same limitations. In inconsistent
projective geometry modulo an infinite prime, it is shown that the usual projective
duality theorem can be extended to a stronger language.
In Chapter 10, inconsistent quotient topologies are studied. It is shown that
there is an interaction between classical topological concepts and the functionality
of certain inconsistent topological spaces.
In Chapter 11, consistency problems for category theory are briefly surveyed.
Then an important type of category, namely toposes, are studied. It is shown that
Philosophical Implications
a simple dualising operation gives rise to topos-like structures whose natural logic
is not the usual intuitionist open-set logic, but rather its topological dual closed-set
logic, which is paraconsistent. In Chapter 12, this open-closed duality is pursued
further into the theories of presheaves and sheaves. In Chapter 13 extra dualising
operations are considered, and it is shown that again inconsistent and incomplete
theories can be regarded as duals. In the light of these dualities, it is argued that
inconsistent and incomplete theories are deserving of equal respect.
Finally, in Chapter 14 we look briefly at the foundations as they are traditionally
conceived. First, looking at the concept of provability, the fate of the Gödel sentence
in the setting of inconsistent arithmetic is studied. Then, turning to the concept
of the truth predicate, Kripke's nontriviality result using an incomplete theory is
surveyed. It turns out that it is easily adapted to produce an inconsistent theory
which represents the Liar sentence as a true inconsistency. Finally, turning to
set theory containing unrestricted abstraction, we survey Brady's use of a fixed
point method similar to Kripke's to produce an inconsistent set theory in which
the Russell set is inconsistently self-membered. Here, the duality is seen to work
in reverse, in that an incomplete set theory which does not decide on the self-
membered status of the Russell set and other non-well-founded sets, can readily be
constructed.
3. Philosophical Implications
To paraphrase Marx: philosophers have hitherto attempted to understand the
nature of contradiction, the point however is to change it. Recent debates on the
rule Disjunctive Syllogism (DS: from (A or B) and not-A to deduce B) have centered
on whether according to the natural logic of mathematicians that rule is valid. In
most of the structures of this book, DS fails. In view of the well known Lewis
arguments, paraconsistentists are committed to denying that DS is valid since it
leads quickly to the validity of trCQ. (Proof: take as premisses A and not-4. From
A deduce (A or B) bV the Principle of Addition. Then using (A or B) and not-A
7
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deduce B by Disjunctive Syllogism.) However, giving up DS does not seem to be
such a heavy burden, as argued in [31] and [32] (see also [6],[7],[20],[49]). In any
case, if reasonable mathematics can be developed without DS and ECQ, then the
claim that they are universally logically valid is weakened.
The question of the validity of DS and ECQ has not always been distinguished
from the question of whether mathematicians are habitual consistentisers. Now it
seems to me that mathematicians are indeed habitual consistentisers, at least in
regarding inconsistency as implying something wrong with the premisses. However,
this needs some qualification: mathematical practice is not absolutely univocal on
the matter. For example, consider the history of infinitesimals in pre-Weierstrass
calculus, or the old quantum theory (Bohr theory of the atom), or delta functions
both before and after Schwartz, or the terminology of identification' in quotient
constructions (see later chapters). As well, as noted earlier, there are persistent
tendencies among mathematicians to use very general abstraction principles for
both sets and categories, which can lead to inconsistency in short order. And of
course there is the semantical thinking about self reference which has mostly been
the province of logicians. But it is argued here that consistency can be relaxed
without complete disorder resulting. In turn this casts doubt on any attempt to
argue back from habitual consistency to the logical validity of DS and ECQ.
These claims apply to inconsistent mathematics considered as pure mathemat-
ics. There are, I suggest, at least three justifications for studying inconsistent
mathematical theories. The first justification might be called the argurnent from
pure mathematics. The argument from pure mathematics for studying inconsis-
tency is the best of reasons: because it is there. In other words, nothing in this
book relies on the thesis that contradictions are true. Nor is it claimed that the
mathematics needed to describe existing physical systems is inconsistent. But then,
how could you be perfectìy sure? Just possibly a physical reason might be found,
or perhaps some pleasing metaphysical reason (for example, the thesis that incon-
sistent calculus gives a better theory of motion). It is always dangerous to think
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that a physical use will neuer be found for a given piece of mathematics. Nor is
present-day mathematical physics anomaly-free: witness the singularities at the
beginning of time or in black holes, delta functions in elementary quantum theory,
or renormalisation in quantum field theory.
These observations amount to a second reason for studying inconsistent theories,
what can be called the ontological justification. This is, essentiallg the paracon-
sistentist claim that a contradiction is true or might be true, backed up by one's
favourite arguments from semantics or physics. Ontology here means having to do
with how things are; and contrasts with epistemology, which has to do with how
things are known.
Thus there is also a third reason for studying inconsistent theories, what can be
called the epistemological justifi,cation. This is the argument that any information
system with more than one source of information must permit the possibility of
conflict between its sources. Here it can be conceded that the world is consistent,
so that an inconsistent database would inevitably be incorrect somehow. But it
is not always easy to produce a consistent cut-down of one's information base, at
Ieast one which is not arbitrary in its selection of what to discard. Yet humans
display the ability to operate in an anomalous data environment. This is plainly
because evolving creatures face real-time difficulties; it might just take too long
to solve the problem of what is the truth about one's environment. Evidently,
informationally-sensitive machines face similar problems. For example, an aircraft
aloft might be receiving contradictory data from its sensors but be unable to take
the luxury of shutting down before solving the problem of what is the nature of
the physìcal environment. Thus, rules for operating deductively in an inconsistent
data environment are necessary, and the rule ECQ which permits the deduction
of everything from an inconsistency ìs unhelpful. At the very least, a study of
inconsistent theories in which such a rule is broken is indicated as part of the long-
term goal of artificial intelligence. Thus, even if the world is consistent, and having
to deal with inconsistencies turns out to be because of the epistemic limitations of
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finite humans or computers, inconsistency-tolerance might well remain a permanent
part of a good expert system.
A special case thesis was mentioned earlier. No claim is being made that in-
consistent or incomplete mathematics is better than classical mathematics. Still,
classical mathematics is a special case in two ways. To the extent that the logic of
classical mathematics is classical two-valued logic, then classical logic is a special
case of paraconsistent logic, holding over a restricted domain in which the assump-
tion of the truth-preservingness of DS holds. Further, general mathematics can be
consistent or inconsistent, complete or incomplete, prime or nonprim". (A theory
is nonprime when it contains some disjunction without containing the disjuncts:
Meyer's l?f interestingly turned out to be nonprime, and there is nonprime quan-
tum arithmetic, on both of which see Chapter 2; as well, classical Peano arithmetic
is nonprime by Gódel's theorem.) Nontrivial classical theories satisfy the special
assumption of DS, so nothing is lost because it is all there in the classical special
case. The aim of the present work is to expand conceptions of mathematics, not to
deny the obviously excellent corpus of classical mathematics.
Intuitionist mathematics is the home of incomplete theories (but note that any
consistent axiomatisable classical theory containing arithmetic is also incomplete by
Gódel's theorem). The present point of view is firmly in favour of intuitionist and/or
incomplete mathematics (see especially Chapters 5, 6 and 11). Let a thousand
theories bloom. However the main concern in this book is with inconsistency,
if for no other reason than that incompleteness has seemed easier to swallow than
inconsistency, something not so easy to justify given the duality results of Chapters
11-13. Those results turn on the topological duality between open sets and closed
sets. It is well-known that intuitionist logic is also the logic of open sets; that is, that
intuitionist logic stands to open sets as classical two valued Boolean logic stands to
sets in general. It is less well-known that the logic of closed sets is paraconsistent,
and this is considered especially in Chapter 11. Intuitionist theories have sometimes
been very complicated. The three-valued approach to incomplete theories (below,
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Chapter 5) can often illustrate many of their features in a simple and natural way.
But conversely the complex brilliancy of incomplete theories in, say, the theory
of sheaves, or synthetic differential geometry, is highly admirable. A three-valued
incomplete approach to the truth predicate was taken by Kripke in his excellent
paper 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' [19], which is discussed in Chapter 14. Kripke's
approach has been nicely generalised to the inconsistent incomplete case by Fitting
[12].
It can also be said that the use of closed-set logics for various theories below
contributes to the re-vindication of the point of view of Brazilian logic. Brazilian
logic studied paraconsistent logics partly with the aim of dualising intuitionism
(see Da Costa [10]). For a time, however, it looked as if these logics suffered a
serious limitation, because they do not admit a reasonable implication operator
(see [30] and [36]). However, closed-set logic can fairly be described as Brazilian-
style. Also, a somewhat cavalier attitude is taken to implication in later chapters:
to the extent that implication is the converse of deductibility, the latter is usually
preferred below. Mathematics, unlike logic, seems not very interested in nested
implications, and even less interested in nesting of depth three or more (perhaps
it should be). This is in line with the position defended later in this section and
elsewhere, that mathematics is functional rather than logical. And needless to say,
existing theories based on Brazilian logics (see above first section) are as legitimate
and interesting as any other.
I would further argue that the only way to establish validity of the paraconsistent
point of view is to demonstrate the existence of a rich and interesting inconsistent
mathematics. Without that, the paraconsistent position would seem to rest on
a motivation at best epistemic and computational, and functionally impoverished
at that. That is why frnding a distinctive inconsistent perspective on analysis, the
crown jewel of classical mathematics, is desirable. The present book falls somewhat
short of that; again for functional reasons the real numbers look to be essentially
consistent (see especially Chapters 2-5 below). It is to be hoped that the situation
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with inconsistent analysis will ultimately improve. Combining inconsistency with
incompleteness would seem to be the right way to go here. For an example of this
combination, see Chapter 6.
Fortunately or unfortunately, the methods and results in this book indicate
that the 'essence' of mathematics is deeper than paraconsistentists have thought,
though it is also argued here that this is no vindication of any classical consistent
limitation. Definitions are necessary to explain this point. A theory is functional
iff, if an equatior f1 : ú2 holds then Ff1 holds itr Ft2 holds, where f' is any
atomic context (roughly, F is any 'logic-free' context lacking &, V, -, -,V,3); and
a theory is transparenú iff the same is true except that .F is any context, including
possibly the logical operations as well. (See Definition 2.11.) Now in the following
chapters it is clear that being at least functional, if not transparent, is a good
constraint to have on a theory. Without it, control over identity seems to be lost
and one wonders what equality stands for, especially in the equational subtheory
(though in a few theories later there is a controlled relaxation of functionality, see
e.g. Chapter 7). But a method of proving inconsistent theories to be functional is
commonly to find existing consistent theories which are invariably functional, add
appropriate denials of atomic sentences using a paraconsistent background logic,
and let the functionality of the latter ride in on the back of the consistent theory.
Indeed it is not hard to show that any inconsistent complete functional theory
has a consistent complete functional subtheory, which one might expect millenia
of classical mathematics to have encountered. So one might say that classical
mathematics, interested in functionality, concentrated on the consistent functional
subtheory, naturally failing to notice related inconsistent supertheories.
At its strongest this might be the criticism that inconsistent mathematics leads
to no new functional insights, a typical mathematician's complaint. But I do not
want to concede too much here: the situation is nowhere near as bad as that. For
one thing, one can say that inconsistency is functionally no worse than consistency.
The consistency constraint is unnecessary and binding, and full functionality is
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available without it. One might further argue that this shows that functionality is
deeper than consistency, completeness, or primeness. The question of the validity
of DS and ECQ is irrelevant to the essence of mathematics, one might say. This
also gives the prospect of searches for partly functional structures, where the failure
of functionality is controlled by a combination of incompleteness and inconsistency.
But also, it is not true that there are no interactions between functionality and
inconsistency or incompleteness. The down side of this is the difficulty of incon-
sistentising real number theory, the essential consistency of the real and hyperreal
number fields which was just mentioned. But the up side is that this can lead to
interesting insights about functionality; for example Chapter 10 on topology, and
any other time a quotient construction is done by thinking of identifying' distinct
elements (Chapters 9,10 and elsewhere).
The essentialist talk above about the essence of mathematics should not be
taken too literally. It is only intended to claim that abandoning functionality is a
bigger departure from mathematics as it is practised, than abandoning consistency
or completeness is. If anything, inconsistent mathematics suggests antiessentialism
and antinecessitarianism about mathematical truth. By necessitarianism is meant
here the claim that there is a special unshakeable status for the truths of mathe-
matics and logic, that true mathematics and Iogic cannot have been false. I think
the argument here against necessitarianism proceeds by attempting to whiteant
the necessitarian's resolve, rather than knockdown refutation. But if consistency is
not a necessary constraint on rigorous mathematical reasoning, then surely noth-
ing is sacred. For further argument in favour of antinecessitarianism, also called
possibilism, see [35] or [38].
In place of necessitarianism, it seems right to put conventionalism about math-
ematical truth. By this is meant the idea that mathematics, particularly pure
mathematics, is more like a decision than a discovery of a pre-existing truth. I do
not mean the kind of conventionalism that confers a mystical power on conven-
tions or decisions to inaugurate or sustain necessary or logical truth. The old game
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analogy does seem the right one: the 'truths' of pure mathematics are internal to
mathematical theories in a way like rules are internal to games, and quite unlike
the way empirical claims about the physical world are true or false.
There are of course some interesting disanalogies: mathematics seeks unity
between its branches, while games seem quite huppy to be isolated from one another.
Also, certain mathematical propositions have a preferred status (accepted) over
others (denied), whereas preferred strategies can be reversed in different games.
But whatever the explanation here, it presumably lies in the social. The question
wherein lies rigor presumably has an explanation in terms of mathematical society
and its relations to the rest of society and to the physical world and its properties
(forms). Certainly an explanation in terms of the necessity of certain propositions,
as opposed to their mere truth, would add nothing.
Another conclusion to draw, perhaps more speculatively, is antiplatonism about
the abstract objects of pure mathematics. Of course, the relationships between the
propositions of mathematics and the forms (properties) of objects in the physical
world, are very complex. Still there seems to be no difficulty in principle in denying
timelessly existing abstract mathematical objects as truthmakers. One can be
gripped by the picture of eternal objects, if one thinks of theories as necessarily
consistent. Freeing up consistency suggests ultimate freedom from any constraint.
But the absence of external constraints is the mark of fiction, not of fixed existing




The first consciously inconsistent arithmetical structure can fairly be dated at
Robert K. Meyer's 1975 nontriviality proof for the consistent relevant arithmetic
Rff. In deference to history and to whet the reader's appetite, this chapter begins
with a simplified version of his argument. We will see that it has considerable
significance for the understanding of Gódel's incompleteness theorems. Later in
the chapter, the style of argument used by Meyer will be extended so as to study
a broader range of number systems. First we need a formal language. This is
the standard type of first order language used for studying formalised arithmetic
theories, save that for technical reasons a distinction is made between two impli-
cation operators I and --+. The language has names for all the natural numbers,
0, 0', 0', . . . , the arithmetical operations * and x, and the usual logical apparatus.
Definition 2.1. The language L contains a single binary relation symbol :,
a single constant 0, term-forming operators *, X, ', (the latter is read 'the suc-
cessor of'). 0(") is defined as 0'"'' with n superscripted dashes. That is, 0(') is
a name for the natural number n. In addition, there is logical apparatus con-
sisting of variables rru,z¡..., a unary propositional operator -, binary propo-
sitional operators &, V, J, f , r, <-+, and quantifiers V and l. The number of
primitive operators can be reduced by defining AV B :df - (- Ak - B),
A: B :df (A ) B)k(B ) A), A <--+ B :df (A --+ B)U(B -+ .4), and
(l ) :dÍ - (V ) -. The connective --+ is not material implication ). The latter
can be defined Ïty A > B :dT - AV B; the former is intentional and not definable
from &,V, and -. 0 is a term, and if ú1 and t2 are terms, so are t\, (t, f ú2), and
(t1 x t2); and ú1 : tz is an atomic sentence. AII atomic sentences are sentences,
and if A and -B are sentences, so are - A, AkB, AV B, A) B, A: B, A-+ B,
O *- B, (Vr)Ar, and (lr)Ar, where r is a variable not occurring in A and Ar is
the result of replacing some term in A wherever it occurs by z.
16 Arithrnetic
We study theories of various logics. Theories are deductively closed sets of
sentences (of the above language in the present case). Different deduction relations
are thus possible, which are described by the axioms and rules of different logics.
Meyer used .RQ, a quantified version of the well-known relevant logic ,8.
Definition 2.2. The releuant logic RQ is given by all universal closures of the
following axiom schemata and rules.
Axioms:
(1) (A - B) - ((B - C) - (A--+ C))
(2) A--+ ((A -- B) -- B)
(3) (AkB) -- A
(4) (AkB)-- B
(5) ((A , B)k(A-- c)) .- (A.- @Aq)
(6) A--+ (Av B)
(7) B --+ (Av B)
(8) ((A - C)k(B-- c)) -- ((A v B) --+ c)
( e) (Ak(B v c)) --+ ((Ak,B) v (A&c))
(10) -- A --+ A
(11) (A --- A) --+- ¡
(r2) (Vr)Ax--+ At (ú any term)
(13) (vx)(A-- B)--+ ((Vø)A + (Vr)B)
(14) A --+ (Vr)A (r not free in A)
(15) (Vu )(A v B) --, (Av (Vr)B) (r nor free in A)
(16) ((v,')A&(vr) B) --. (vr)(AkB)
Rules:
(i7) If A and B are theorems so is A&,8
(18) If A and A --+ B are theorems so is B.
To obtain the logic RMq add the axiom scheme A --+ (A --- A).
The logic r? (the sentential fragment of RQ) is an important relevant logic. A
logic is said to l¡e releuanú iff, whenever A -- B is a theorem of the logic then A and
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B share an atomic sentence in common. Relevant logics were studied extensively
by Anderson and Belnap in [1] as well as by many others; and were proposed as
serious rivals to classical (two-valued) logic as a logic of natural reasoning, which is
arguably relevant at least in its sentential fragment. Every valid argument of .r? is
a valid argument of classical logic, but not vice-versa. With a language and a logic,
we can now specify arithmetical theories, in this case Meyer's relevant arithmetic
R#. Rff is similar to classical Peano arithmetic, called here Pff, save that in
several places material implication ) is replaced by the strong implication -r used
by all the usual relevant logics.
Definition 2.3. The arithrnetic Rff is given by:
logical axioms and rules are those of RQ,
arithmetical axioms:
(#1) (Yr,y)(r : a ë *' : a')
(#2) (Vr,A,z)(x:y --+ (r: z --+y: z))
(#3) (V")(- z':0)
(#4) (V')(z*0:r)
(#5) (Vr,y)(x * y' : (r I u)')
(#6) (Vr)(r x 0:0)
(ff7) (Vr,a)@ x u' : (r x y) + r)
Arithmetical rule of mathematical induction (RMI): If f'0 and (Vz)(Fr --+ Fr,)
are theorems, so is (Vø)Fr.
For the arithmetic RM#, add the logical axiom scheme A ---+ (A --- A). For the
arithrnetic" R## and RMfff , add to Rff and RMff respectively Hilbert's rule
0: if F0, FI,F2... are all theorems, so is (Yr)Fr. For classical Peano arithmetic
Pff, take as logical axioms and rules those of classical quantification theory, and
replace ---+ and e' in (f 1) , (#2) and (RMI) by ) and : respectively. For classical
standard arithmetic P##, add rule Q to Pff.
To the extent that ,R captures a more plausible account of implication than
classical logic does, as argued by Anderson, Belnap and many others, then it is
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arguable that Rft gives a closer account of 'natural' arithmetic than classical Peano
arithmetic Pff does. This does not 'deny' Pff: it is an interesting system like many
another, not the least because the Gódel incompleteness theorems can be proved
of it (see below).
Definition 2.4. An arithmetical theory is (negation) consistent tf for no sen-
tence A is both A anà - A provable, else (negation) inconsistenú; and nontriuial iÎ
not every sentence is provable, else triuial.
Proposition 2.5. (Meyer) Rff is nontrivial.
Proof. The argument uses the three-valued logic ,RM3 with values {F,B,T},
the two element domain {0,1} of arithmetic modulo two, and an interpretation
function 1 assigning terms to elements of {0,1} and sentences to elements of RM3.
Set 1(0(")) : n mod z, I(+) - * mod 2, I(x) : x mod 2. For any terms
tt.,tz,, set 1(r1 +tz) :1(+X1(ú1),,1(tr)),1(ú1 x tr) : I(x)(1(ú1), I(t")), and r(ti) :
(1 +/(¿1)) mod 2. Set 1(t1 -tr): Bif l(tr): I(tz),else 1: r'. For nonatomic
sentences, set 1(- A) : T, B or f' as I(A) : F, B or ? respectively. Order
{F,B,T} bv F < B ( ?; and then set I(AS¿B): min{1(,4),/(B)}; set 1(,4v8) :
max{I(A) ,1(B)}; set I(A -, B) - 1(- Av B) fi IØ) < I(B),, else 1(A ---+ B):
I(- AkB); and set I((Vz)Fr): min{y: for someterm ú, I(Ft):y}. It is now
a straightforward, if lengthy, argument to verify that all theorems of R# take one
of thevalues {B,f}, Butsince0mod2+Lmod2, 1(0:1) :F. Hence Rff\s
nontrivial. !
Meyer makes the point that this argument relies only on methods which are fini-
tistic in Hilbert's sense. In particular, the quantifiers can be treated by establishing
that I((Vr)Fr):I(F0&F1), which is a standard argument in the metalanguage.
Thus r?f enjoys an advantage over classical Peano arithmetic Pff : that its non-
triviality can be established by finitistic methods. Yet as Meyer pointed out, all
primitive recursive functions are representable in Rff, which is thus subject to the
Gódel incompleteness theorems also. But this is not really a puzzle. The explana-
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tion is that relevant and other paraconsistent logics turn on making a distinction
between negation inconsistency and triviality, the former being weaker than the
latter; whereas classical logic cannot make this distinction. For what the present
author's intuitions are worth, these do seem to be different concepts. Thus for
Rff, negation consistency cannot be proved by finitistic means by Gódel's second
theorem, whereas nontriviality can be shown. Since Pff collapses this distinction,
both kinds of consistency are infected by the same unprovability.
Indeed Rff can do even better; for consider any 'false' equation tt : tz, i.e.
one which reduces by calculation to 3(") - 0(-) where these are classically dis-
tinct natural numbers. Then a simple modification of the above proof using
modulo(max{m,n} + 1) instead of modulo 2, shows that ú1 : úz is not a theo-
rem of Æf. ,Rf has thus greater security of calculation than Pf. If there is
negation inconsistency in Rft, it is along way away, contained. Meyer uses these
conclusions to call for a revived Hilbert program based on relevant rather than clas-
sical logic: since there exist finitistic proofs that various undesirable conclusions do
not follow in relevant arithmetic, mathematics based on relevant logic cah escape
the limitations of Gódel. The Hilbertian point of view is not, however, taken in the
present work.
One might also wonder whether there is the prospect of the nontriviality o1 Pff,
and hence its negation consistency, via a proof that Pff c R#. Needless to say
such an argument would be nonfinitistic by Gódel 2, but it might be interesting
nonetheless. This is the golrlmn problem for Rff. It turns out that if R# were closed
w.r.t. the rule: if A and A ) B are theorems so is B, then P# C r?f . Recently
however Meyer has shown ihat this rule fails for Rff. Meyer has expressed some
dissatisfaction with -Rf because of this result, but it seems that it makes Rff aII
the more interesting.
This is not a book about relevance, however. The point of view might be
described as paraconsistent, insofar as that implies an interest in nontrivial incon-
sistent theories.
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2. Nonclassical Logics and Their Theories
We proceed to a more systematic approach to inconsistent theories. In order
to show that inconsistency can be contained in a deductively rigorous way, it is
necessary to set out some of the theory of models. In this section we define theories
and the semantical notion of an assignment. In the next section we bring in the
notion of a domain and thus a model. Models are best thought of as devices for
controlling the mernbership of theories; only secondly are they what theories are
about. Theories define their own 'aboutness', regardless of domains of interpreta-
tion. An analogy is with the values of a many-valued logic, which are in the first
place devices for controlling membership of theories. We begin by extending the
Ianguage of tire previous section, so as to deal with a broader range of applications.
Definition 2.6. The language.C has the following components:
(1) a collection of names or atomic terrns, for example names for some or all
the rational numbers, or integers, or rational numbers, or real numbers, or
hyperreal numbers or other mathematical entities. Normally these names
are taken from the entities themselves, i.e. self-naming. For each theory the
collection of names must be specified.
(2) a collection of n-ary term-forming operators, for example from among
*, X, -,1,-t,',( , , ), and possibly others. If. t1,...,ú,, are terms and o
is an n-ary term forming operator, then oúr, . . . , ú,, is a term. Term-forming
operators are also called function symbols.
(3) a collection of n-ary primitiue predicates, for example from among :, (, e and
possibly others. If ¿r,. ..,tn ale terms and F is an n-ary primitive predicate
then Fú1 . . . ú, is an atomic sentence.
(4) a collection of n-ary sentential operators. The general purpose negation sym-
bol is -, but -r (open set intuitionist negation) and r (closed paraconsistent
negation) are sometimes used; also sentential operators &, V, l,:, --+) €.
Nonclassical Logics and Their Theories 2I
(5) uariables r,U,z¡ and possibly others; and quantifi,ers (V ) also written ( ),
and (i ). These form nonatomic or complex sentences in the usual way. It is
stipulated that no term is a variable and that only theories containing just
closed sentences are considered.
Definition 2.7. A logic,L is a set of sentences closed under uniform substi-
tution and under a consequence relation l-¿, sometimes written F¿ if the logic is
semantically specified. The subscript is dropped if it is clear what logic is intended.
Definition 2.8. An L-semitheory (of logic .[) is a set Th of closed sentences
satisfying: if A € Th and AIL B then.B eTh. An L-theoryis an -L-semitheory
also satisfying: fi A e Th and B e Th then AkB e Th. If Th is an -L-theory
and A €Th then we write lrn A, dropping theTh when no confusion will result.
An tr-semitheory Th is --inconsistent if for some A both A e Th and - A e Th
(similarly for r and r, inconsistent for short); else Th is --consistent (consistent
for short). This prime if, whenever a disjunction AV -B is inTh at least one of
the disjuncts is too. Th is incomplete if for some sentence A neither A nor - A
is in ?å, else ?å is complete; and Th is triuial iÎ Th: f , else nontriuial. Th js
zero-degreeor ertensionalif none of its members contains occurrences of --- or <--+.
Most of the theories in this book are extensional. If Th ÇThz, ïve say Lhat Th2
extends or is an extension of Th.1.
Logics and theories in this book are determined by specifying (1) u lattice,
complete in the lattice-theoretic sense) (2) a definition of the operats¡ - (or -r or
r-), and a definition of the relation F or the operator ---+ or both, on the lattice,
(3) a subset V of designated values, closed upward under the order on the lattice,
(a) an assignment function 1 : language L ---+ the lattice.
In more detail
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Definition 2.9. An RM3-theory is determined by
(1) The lattice whose Hasse diagram is
That is, AU B : lub{Á, B} and An B : glb{A, B}
(2) For --+ and -,
TBF
Set of designated values V : {B,T}.
I : L --+ {F,B.,T} is a partial function satisfying
(4.1) If A is an atomic sentence and 1(A) is defined, then 1(A) € {4 B,,T}
(4.2) r(AkB) : r(A) À r(B)
(4.3) r(Av B): r(A)u r(B)
(4.4) I(-A):-r(A)
(4.5) I(A---+ B): I(A)-- r(B)
(4.6) /((Vr)F'c) : glb{y : for some term t, I(Ft) : A}
















Such a function 1 is called an RM3-assignment. A semitheory Th is then
determined by the condition Th :df {A: I(A) € v}; and if V is afilteron RMJ
then 7l¿ is a theory. One says that I determines Tl¿. If Th is the RM3-theory
determined by 1, then A holdsinTh and I if I(A) € V. The logic RMJ is the set
of sentences which hold in all such I (".g.all instances of A -- A), together with
the definition: A I B :df for all I,if I(A) € V rhen 1(B) e V.
For P3-theories, make only two changes (") B -- B : T, (b) -B : ?. This
is often signalled by changing - to r. Such theories are complete and generally
Nonclassical Logics and Their Theories
inconsistent and nontrivial. The logic P3 is defined in the same way as RMJ above
For J3-theories, (a) change the letter 'B' in PJ to 'ly'' (for 'neither'), (b)
change - to -r, (c) r1ú : f', (d) v : {?}. These theories are consistent and
generally incomplete. The logic J3 is generated as above.
For PJL-theories, use the lattice
N
F
Also, (u) -?:--ly' : F, -F:-B :T (- is used for negation here since it is
'neutral', but note that P3 and J3 are sublogics), (b) A -r B :df T if A < B
else A -, B: F, (") v : {B,T}. This generates theories which are in general
both inconsistent and incomplete. The logic PJ4is defined as above.
For the next few chapters RM3-theories are mostly used. While theories of
other logics are interesting and have different properties from RM3-theories, many
of the interesting functional questions are invariant w.r.t. changes between the
logics. P3 and J3 theories are used in the chapter on differential calculus. PJ4-
theories are used in the chapters on inconsistent continuous functions and on linear
equations.
A simple result is the following
Proposition 2.10. (Extendability lemma) Let fi and Izbe RM3-assignments
in the same language, and 7å1 and Th2 be the extensional theories generated. If
the atomic sentences holding in I are a subset of those holding in 12, and the
negations of atomic sentences holding in 11 are a subset of those holding in 12, then
Th2 is an extension of Th1, i.e. Th C Thz.
Proof. By induction on the number of occurrences of {-,&,v}. Note first




atomic sentence then (a) if It(A): ? then Ir(A) € {B,T}, (b) if I{A): B
then I2(A): B, (c) if Ir(A): f' then Ir(A) € {48}. The inductive argumenr
shows that (a)- (c) hold of all sentences. (Base clause:) Already defined to be
true. (-clause:)(a) If Ir(- A): T then Ir(A): F, so by inductive hypothesis
(c), Ir(A) € {f,B}; whence Ir(-¡¡e{8,?}. The cases (b) and (c) are similar.
(&clause:) (a) If I{Ak,B): T then Ir(A): Ir(B):7; when ce I2(AÇB) e {8, T}.
The cases (b) and (c) are similar. (Vclause:) (a) If I{(Vx)Fr) : T then for all
terms t, I{Ft):T; so by inductive hypothesis (a) for all terms t, I2(Ft)e{B,T};
whence I2((Vr)Fx)e {B,T}. The cases (b) and (c) are similar. !
Note that the proposition fails for theories containing --+. The result is applied in
many places in what follows. A frequent strategy is to take a consistent complete
classical extensional (zero-degree) theory and extend it by adding extra atomic
sentences which were assigned ,F in the old theory. This amounts to choosing a
new RM3-assignment in which the extra atomic sentences and their negations are
all assigned B. The Extendability lemma then ensures that the new theory loses
none of the sentences of the old.
Definition 2.1L. A theory is functional iff,1or all terms t1,t2, if tt : tz holds
then for any atomic sentence Fú1 containing ú1, Fú1 holds itr Ft2 holds, where Ft2is
like Fúr except for replacing f1 in one or more places by ú2. A theory is transparent
if the same condition holds except that f'ú1 can be any sentence (not restricted to
atomic).
Now notice that the Extendability lemma does not ensure that an inconsis-
tent extension of a functional theory must itself be functional, and similarly for
transparency. One cannot add classically false sentences to a theory willy-nilly and
expect to remain functional. For example, if 0 : 2 is added to classical natural
number theory without also adding 0*1 -- 2+I, i.e. 1 : 3, then functionality fails.
And even if functionality were ensured, if - 0 : 0 is not also added then trans-
parency fails (since l- 0:2 and l- -0:2 but not F -0:0). Functionality and
transparency coincide for classical consistent complete theories, but not for RMJ,
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P3, etc- It is a desirable characteristic for mathematical theories to be at least func-
tional if not transparent, for then equality means something so to speak. In some
later chapters it is seen that transparency is not as important as functionality, but
also that even the latter can be relaxed in a controlled and reasonably-motivated
way' From now on for several chapters, unless otherwise stipulated, we deal with
.RM3-assignments and their associated theories.
Definition 2.L2. An assignment is prerefl,exiae iff for all terms ú1 there is some
term ú2 such that tt : tz holds; and reflexiae iff for all terms t, t : ú holds. An
assignment is norrnal iff (i) reflexive, and (ii) h : tz holds iff t, : ú1 holds, and
(iii) if tt: tz and t2: ús hold so does tt:ts.
Proposition 2.13. (1) An assignment 1is transparent ifffor all terms t1,t2,if
tt: tz holds then for all atomic F, I(Ft): I(Ftz).
(2) If 1 is functional and prereflexive then I is normal.
(3) If l is prereflexive andTh is an equational theory, then 1is transparent ifi 1is
functional and for tt,tz, if F ¿1 : úz then for all t, I(h - t) I(tr: ¿¡.
Proof. (1) ,? to -L is a straightforward induction on the number of occurrences
of {-,&,v} in sentences. tr to,R: suppose for some tt,tz, and atomic F,I(Ft) I
I(Ft2). If one of Ffi and Ft2 does not hold then the other does so that f is not
functional and thus not transparent. Otherwise, if both Fú1 and Fú2 hold then one
of -Ftt and -Ftz does not hold and the other does, and again 1is not transparent.
(2) Let Ú be any term. By prereflexivity, there is a term 11 such that l- t : tr.
Byfunctionality, t:t holds iffú: ú1 holds, so l- ú: ú. Alsobyfunctionality,
tr:tz holds \fftr: ú2 holds and f2: úr holds \fftr: ú2 holds. Hence if tr: ¡,
holds then ú2 : úr holds. Finally, again by functionality, if tt : tzholds then ú1 : l,
holds \ff tr: ú3 holds; so if ú1 : úz and tz: tz hold then tt: tz holds. Hence 1 is
normal.
(3) Let I be prereflexive and Th an equational theory. If 1is transparent then
certainly 1is functional, and bV (1) if l- ¿r : tz Lhen for all t,, I(h - t) I(tr: ¡¡.
conversely, from (1) it suffices to prove that if F h - ú2 then for all atomic -F,
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I(Ftr) -- I(Ft2). Clearly it suffices to prove for just one replacement of fi l:y t2
since an obvious induction then proves it for more replacements. Thus Fl1 has
one of two forms, t(tt) -- t or t : t(tt), and Ft2 has the corresponding forms
t(t2): t or t: t(tz). That is it has to be proved that 1(t(t1) : ú) : I(t(tz): t)
and /(f : ú(¿r)) : I(t : t(tr)). Now by functionality, prereflexivity and (2),
l- ¿(¿1) : ú(úr)i hence if l- ¿r : úz then by functionality l- ¿(¿r) :t(tz).Hence by the
condition of the theorem, 1(ú(ú1) -t):I(t(t2):¿). The other case is similar. tr
A simple result is the following
Proposition 2.14. (Term elimination) Let Th be a transparent extensional
theory determined by 1. For any terms tlrt2in L,let \ N t2 iff ú, : f2 holds inTh
or f 1 and t2 are the same term, and let L' be any sublanguage of 4 containing just
one term from each =-equivalence class and agreeing with / on function symbols
and primitive predicates. Let Th' be the theory determined by the assignment 1'
which is the restriction of 1 to L'. Ther- the restriction of Th to L' : Th'.
Proof. By induction on the number of occurrences of {-,&,V}.
(Base:) The atomic sentences of ?å in the weaker language have the exact values
they have in 1'.
(- and & clauses:) Straightforward.
(V clause:) (V1.1 :) If I((Vz)Fr) : T then /(f'f) : T for alt t in L. Hence
I(Ft): ? for all ú in L', so I'(Ft): ? for every t in L,, so I'((V')Fr):7.
(V1.2 :) Conversely, if I'((Vr)Fr) :7 then I'(Ft): ? for every t in L,. Since ?/¿,
is transparent, for every t in L, I(Ft): ?; so I((Vr)Fr): T.
(V2.1 :) If /((Vz)f r): B, then 1(Fú) € {8,7} for every tin L, and for some ú1,
I(Ftt): -8. Hence I(Ft) : I'(Ft) e {8,?i for every t in L'. But also t1 x fu for
some 12 in L', and I'(Ft2) -- I(Ftr): I(Ftt): B; so I'((Vr)Fr): B.
(V2.2:) If I'((Vr)Fx): B, then for all I in L',1'(Ft) e {8,?}; and for some t1
in L',I(Ftr): B. But for all t2in L there is some fuin L'such that ú2 = ú3 and
I(Ft2): I(Fts): I'(Ftt) € {B,T} with also /(Fú1) : B; so rhar 1((Vr)Fr): B.
The cases (V3.1) and (V3.2), when 1((Vr)Fr) : F, are similar. !
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Note that the last proposition fails if 'transparent' is weakened to 'functional':
suppose that while h --tz holds, for some atomic F I(Ftù: T but I(Ftr): p.
Then the choice of f1 rather than t2lor L' affects whether (1r) -p, holds in 1,
and Th', but the restriction of Th to L' is unaffected.
3. Models for Number Systems rvith Arithmetical
Operations
We proceed to the notion of a model, and then study various arithmetical
operations.
Definition 2.L5. A model is a pair (D,I) where D is a set and 1is an as-
signment which also (1) assigns to every name a member of D, and is onto D so
that every member of D is named; (2) 1 assigns to every n-ary function symbol
an n-ary partial function on D; (3) the assignment to complex terms is given by
I(ftt. . .tn) : IU)Q(|I) . . .I(t")); (4) 1 satisfies: f1 : Íz holds iff I(¿1) and I(r2)
are defined and equal. These have the effects that 1 is normal and functional. A
model (D,I) is transparent iff I is transparent, inconsistent (incornplete) itr the
associated theory is inconsistent (incomplete). A model is an extension of another
if the associated theory of the first is an extension of that of the second; and infi,nite
iff D has an infinite cardìnal, else f,nite.
For example, consider the class of finite transparent models described in the
first section of this chapter, in which all (extensional) sentences of the classical
standard model for the {+, r.} arithmetic of the naturaì numbers hold (see [22]).
Take names for all the natural numbers {0,r,2,...} (". usual we can let these be
the natural numbers themselves); function symbols are {*, x}. The domain is the
integers modulo nt, i.e. {0, 1,. ..,rn - l}. For every name ú, set 1(l): ú mod zn;
and set 1(+) :1 mod r¿ and 1(x): x mod m. This determines 1(t) for every
term ú. Finally set 1(ú1 :tz): B \f l(tr): I(tz), else 1(ú1 :tz): F. In [27] these
are called RM3^ and it is proved that they determine theories which are inconsis-
tent, complete, nontrivial, c.,,-inconsistent, cu-complete and decidable. It is also well
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known that the classical integers mod rn permit a definition of additive inverse,
minus n, as (-n) mod rn :df m-n mod milnmod rn I 0 and 0 otherwise; and
thus subtraction as n1(-modm)n2 :df nr(*mod m)((-n2)mod rn). So adding
to the model names for all negative integers and setting /(-):-mod zn deter-
mines 1(ú) mod m for all integer terms ú in the {:, -, x } language. If as before
I(tt:tz): B if 1(ú1) : I(tz) else 1(ú1 - tz): F, then the Extendability lemma
can be applied to conclude that every sentence of the classical consistent complete
(zero-degree) theory of the ring Z of integers holds. Also clearly the conditions of
Proposition 2.13 are satisfied so the model is transparent.
Summarising,
Proposition 2.16. There are finite irrconsistent complete transparent models
in which every sentence of the classical consistent complete theory of the ring of
integers Z holds. ¡
It is worth noting that in these models it is not in general true that if A holds
and A f B holds then B holds. In particular, (A& -A)k((Ak, -A) ) B) might
hold while B does not, e.g. if A is 0 : 0 and B is 0 : 1. Thus, as is characteristic
of inconsistent nontrivial theories of paraconsistent logics, the rule D,9 in the form
(if A holds and -A V B holds then B holds) fails in these models. But this does not
irnply any loss of classical information; since clearly for any A and B, if Ak(A) B)
holds, and also holds back in the classical standard model of the integers, then B
holds (because by a well known argument DS hotds for any consistent complete
theory).
An application of the term elimination lemma (Proposition 2.14) is that since
these inconsistent models for Z are transparent, their simple terms can be cut down
to {0, 1,..., m - I}; and then the assignment I(h - tr) : B \tr I(t) : 1(úz) else
I : F, has exactly the same sentences true as the assignment with names for all
integers, in their common language.
Moving to division and the theory of fields, it is well known that finite clas-
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sical arithmetic modulo a prime p allows a definition of the unique multiplicative
inverse n-r of every number n + 0 in {0,1,..., p - Li, and thus division via
ntlnz :df nt(x mod *)(";t). These can be described by the classical transpar-
ent assignment with I(l): /mod p, and I(tt:tz):T if l(tr): I(tz) else 1: F;
and all the classical postulates and consequences of the theory of flelds hold. For
example, the following postulates, which axiomatise the classical theory of fields,
all hold (see [50], p.130).








(9) (r,y,z)(x x (y + z) : (r x y) + (x x z))
(10) -0 : I
Changing to 1(ú1 - tz): B tf I(tL): I(tz) and applying the Extendability lemma
gives:
Proposition 2.L7. There are finite inconsistent transparent models in which
every sentence of the classical theory of fields holds. !
This cannot be strengthened to the conclusion that all the theory of the field
Q of rationals with names for all of them holds: not every integer has an inverse
defined, those with /(l) : 0 do not whereas all but 0 itself do in classical Ç. This
suggests a general difficulty in inconsistently extending fields, which proves to be
the case. In the next chapter it is seen that this can be achieved in infinite fields
modulo an infinite prime.
These structures give a solution to the following problem, raised by Graham
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Priest. One wants postulates such as the Cancellation Law ([a], p.2)
(")(-r: 0 ) (A,")(* x y : :x, x z ) A : z))
to hold when moving from the classical theory of rings to the classical theory of
integral domains and fields. But inconsistent fields such as the above have both
-0 : 0 and (y,")(0 x y :0 x z: 0) holding. Yet one does not want to detach
every A : z or the theory is uninteresting. But one does want to detach U : z for
those r classically not identical with 0 (in Q or ,R say). However, in the inconsistent
fields mod p, while both -0 : 0 and (y,r)(0 x A : 0 x z: 0) holds, still U : z
cannot be detached (e.g. obviously not F 0 : 1). This is another symptom of
the general undetachability of I. But also, if ú :0 does not hold classically, then
(y,")(t x a : t x z ) y : z) holds; and then if ú x tt : t x f2 holds classically,
tt: tz can be detached (all by the Extendability lemma).
A useful general result proved by Dunn in [11] is as follows.
Proposition 2.18. (Dunn) Let A be an algebra (D,ot,...,on) where the o;
are operations on D. Let A' be a subalgebra of A and å be a congruence from .4
to A'with h(r): r for all x \n A'. Then the classical equational theory Th of. A
with names for all elements of D can be extended to an inconsistent transparent
theory ?å2 using the assignment /(ú) : h(t) for all names l, and I(t, : tz) : B iT
1(¿r) : 1(ú2) else l(tr: tz): F.
Proof. That Thz is an extension of 7h1 follows by the Extendability lemma
from the fact that if lt : 12 holds classically then clearly 1(ú1) : I(tz), so that
I(tt:tz):I(-tr:tr)--B.But also condition (3) for transparency in Proposition
2.13 is evidently satisfied, so Thz is transparent. D
This can be applied to the {+, r.,/} congruence from the non-negative ratio-
nals into itself given by À(z) : 1 if (classically) " I 0 and å(0) : 0, to give an
inconsistent transparent nontrivial extension of the classical {+, *, /} theory of the
non-negative rationals with names for all of them. But the attempt to bring in the
negative rationals and subtraction while retaining all classical laws and functional-
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ity, wrecks the theory: there needs to be an additive inverse -n Tor each n; but if
classically distinct elements rlt,Ttrz are identified inconsistently, then by functional-
ity they should have the same additive inverse, so that nt - nz - rr1- n1 holds. If
the usual classical laws also are to hold then r¿t-rlt: 0 also holds. But division by
0 is prohibited, so division by nt - n2 must similarly be undefined by functionality
again. But division by nt - flz is permitted in the classical theory. The interac-
tion between subtraction and division is the problem here, and it strengthens the
suspicion that it is not so easy to inconsistentise fields.
4. Surnmary of Further Results in Arithmetic
These are proved in [27] or [41]
Proposition 2.19. RM3^ can be axiomatised by: RM#, plus l- 0 : m
plus l- 0 : f ++ 0 : 1 for every I in {0,1,..., rn - I}.
Proposition 2.2O. In Rff, l- (0: nr o0 : rr) ++ 0 : gcd(n1,n2'), where
Ao B -df - (A---+-B) ar.d gcd(n1,n2) is thegreatest common divisor of n1 and
Tl'2
Definition 2.21. RM(2n + 1)* is the result of replacing RMJ as background
logic in RM3* by the logic RM2n+I (see [27]) RMJI :df ìo¡mRMJ*.
RMu :df )"u^,,RM(2n + 1)-.
Proposition 2.22. RMu is inconsistent, incomplete, nontrivial and
ø-inconsistent. Its extensional part is complete, and identical with the zero de-
gree part of RM3a. Any inconsistent zero-degree extension of the zero-degree
part of Rft is complete. Not all inconsistent extensions of Af are extensions of
RM#. The nontheorems oT RMu are recursively enumerable. Problem: is RMu
decidable?
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Definition 2.23. LRQ is the logic axiomatised by dropping the distribution
axiom (9) from ,BQ (Definition 2.2). LR# is then formed by adding the Peano
postulates (#1)- (f7) and ruIe RMI (Definition 2.3) to LRQ.
Proposition 2.24. Distribution is not provable in LRfi, but is provable in
any inconsistent extension of LRfr. Problem: is every extensional instance of
Distribution provable in LRff?
1
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CH,A'PTER 3: MODULO INFINITY
The Classical Denumerable Nonstandard Model of
Natural Number Arithmetic
The classical consistent complete denumerable model of the natural numbers,
{0,1,2,...}, of order type ar, is also called the standard model of classical Peano
arithmetic. This contrasts with the (classical consistent complete denumerable)
nonstand,ard model. As is well known the latter has a domain of order type
a + q(u* + c,l), consisting of an initial block isomorphic to {0, I,2,. ..} (called the
finitc natural numbers), with succeeding blocks of numbers (called the infinite nat-
ural numbers) isomorphic to the integers (order type tr* at*r), the blocks themselves
being densely ordered (order typ" ry). Both models verify exactly the sentences of
classical standard arithmetic P## (see Definition 2.3) in their common language.
In this chapter we consider consistent and inconsistent theories which arise from
the nonstandard model.
Given a finite (natural) number n"¿) arry infinite number can be uniquely rep-
resented as the sum of a multiple (possibly infinite) of rn plus a unique natural
number between 0 and m - I. This gives a natural definition of modulo rn for all
infinite numbers. Hence the {*, -, x } modulo models of Chapter 2 car_ have added
to them names for all nonstandard infinite numbers.
Classical nonstandard numbers are constructed in such a way that first order
properties of the standard natural numbers continue to hold. One such property is
that the modulus of any number can be taken w.r.t. any nonzero number:
(Vrn,r)(-m : 0 ) (1y,2)(r : zrn + Ak1 < y < m - l))
That is,
(Ynt.,r)(-m : 0 ) (ly, z)(r : zrn + ykQu)þa I y + I : rn)))
Hence in the nonstandard model, for any infinite numbers m and r, there is a mul-
tiple of m Lo more than m - I below u. This evidently allows a consistent complete
34 Modulo Infinity
modeÌ modulo inflnite rn with functions {+, t}, as well as additive inverses and
subtraction. AIso there are plainly inconsistent versions given by I(t1 : tz): B
if ú1 mod m : tz mod rn else 1 - F , and by the Extendability lemma all of the
classical consistent complete {*,-, x} theory of the integers Z continues to hold
in the inconsistent models.
An interesting subclass of these structures arises from the facts that inflnite
numbers can have infinite divisors and that infinite primes with no divisors save
themselves and unity exist. (Proof: Add to classical Peano arithmetic Pff the
axioms (r)((ly)(r *A : p) > (" : 1 V r : p y - (12)(r x z : p)), i.". p is prime,
and -p :I,-p:2r-p - 3,.... Everyfinitesubset of axiomshas aclassicalmodel
so by the compactness theorem the whole theory has a model. But p is not one of
the finite numbers.) Now noting that 'r divides y' is definable as (=z)(r x z : A),
we have that the well known theorem of standard number theory that
(r,y,p)((prime p & p divides r x y) ) (p divides r Vp divides y))
holds also in the (classical) nonstandard numbers, and thus for infinite primes p.
(See [a], p.19, Theorem 9.) But this is equivalent to saying that if x x U : 0 mod p,
then r : 0 mod p or y: 0 mod p. It follows easily that classical modulo infinite p
is an integral domain and obeys the Cancellation Law (r, A,z)(-r:0 ) (r ry -
r x z ) a : z)). (See [+], p.5, Theorem 1.) The usual argument ([4], p.41) can
then be applied to show that every r + 0 in mod p has a unique multiplicative
inverse r-1 modp. (Proof: The products c x 0,2 x 1,...,, x (p - 1) are all in
{0,-.. ,p - 7 } since (x mod p) is an operation; but they are all distinct by the
Cancellation Law. Exactly one of them must be l therefore, and z-r :d/ the
unique y such that ø x y : 1 mod p.) Further by the Cancellation Law, if two
numbers have the same inverse then they are identical. Classical mod infinite p
is thus a field, and r(l mod p)y :df x(x mod p)(V-t mod p). Its 'natural' order
type is evidently a + rl(.* *cu) -f c..'*, with a last member p - I and a final block of
order type o*. That is, the final block i. {...,p -2,p - l}.




A number is finite iff its additive inverse is in the final block.
(p-t)lZ and ((p- l)12)+ 1 are additive inverses in the same block (Benham),
as are l(p-t)lz and ((p -3)12) +3)1,..., and l(p-(2"+t))12 and ((p-
(2n*I))12)*(2n+1)1, and [(p *(2n+I))12 and (p *(2n+I)12)-(2n+I))
etc.
The multiplicative inverse of any finite number save zero is defined and
infinite.
2-1 is (n + I) ¡2, and (p - 2)-t : (-2)-t : (p - I) 12, which are in the same




Now we move to inconsistency. Take names for all members of the classical
nonstandard model (naming themselves). If ú is a name, then set I(t) : ú mod p,
set 1(*) - * mod p and similarly for {-, x, l}. Note that l(l'l.lt2) is not defined
rf. I(t;t): 0; but this never happens if f2 is a nonzero finite number. The terms
2-r )3-1,. . . can be used as names for the reciprocals of the natural numbers, and
the terms fi x trt for all finite names t1rt2 can be used as names for all the rational
numbers. The assignment 1(ú1 : tz) : B if. I(tr) :1(ú2) else l(tt : tr) : F,
determines an inconsistent theory. By the Extendability lemma this is an extension
of the classical theory of the integers; and also of the integers modulo p so that all
the sentences of the classical theory of fields hold. Also it is not difficult to show
that it is transparent. Hence we have a strengthening of the results of the previous
chapter (see also [28] and [3a]):
Proposition 3.1. There exist infinite inconsistent transparent models modulo
an infinite prime in which hold all sentences of the classical consistent complete
theory of the field of rationals Ç, with names for all the rationals. ¡
Inthesetheories l- -0:0, sincel(0:0) : B - I(-0:0). A different
construction of {*, x } arithmetic enables that to be avoided, with inconsistency
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being confined to the infinite part of the diagram, and has some consequences for
Fermat's Last Theorem. Choose an arbitrary infinite number m and for domain D
take D : {0, 1,2,...}U{" : rn 1r 12m-1}. If f is aname, set 1(ú) : til ú is finite
else set I(t) : f mod rn+rn. (In other words shift ú mod rn along by m to get 1(t).)
Set 1(11 + tz) : h I tzif both are finite, else 1(11 +t2) : ((¿r + ú2) mod m) + m.
Set 1(t1 ,tz) --fixt2 if both arefinite, else 1(11 xt2): ((ú, " ú2) mod m)+m.
Set 1(ú1 : tz) : T if. 1(¿1) : I(t2) and both are finite, set 1(f1 : tz) : B if
1(¿1) : 1(f2) and both are infinite, else set I(t, : tz) : F. Call this model and the
associated theory ¡/S¡/.
Proposition 3.2. Every sentence holding in the classical standard and non-
standard models of the natural numbers holds in NSI/. ¡/S¡ú is transparent.
Proof. If A holds in standard arithmetic then it holds in the classìcal nonstan-
dard model. An inductive argument on the complexity of the term ú1 shows that
if út : ú2 holds in the nonstandard model then 1(ú1) : I(tz).
(Base:) Let f1 be any name. If tr is finite then if tt : tz holds then 1(f1) - tt :
tz: I(tz). If ú1 is infinite then 1(ú1) : fr mod rn+rn: fz mod rn+rn: I(tz).
(*clause:) If ú1 is tz * t+ then if both ú3 and úa are finite then 1(ú3 + t+) : ts * U -
h -- tz : I (tz). Else, if one of ts,ta is infinite then also ú2 which : ls * úa is infinite.
Hence I(t"+tn):* * (¿e*Ía) mod Tr¿: nù f ú2 mod *: I(tz).
(xclause:) Similar. But if 1(¿r) :1(ú2) then tt:tz holds in 1ú^91/, so lr/,5/ú is an
extension of the classical standard and nonstandard models.
For transparency, by Proposition 2.13(1) it suffices to prove that if tt: tz
holds in I[Sl/ then for all atomic F, I(Ftl): I(Ftz). Now f1 : úz holds iff
/(úr) : I(tr), so it must be proved that if I(tl) :1(ú2) then for all atomic -F,
I(Ftr): I(Ftz). Again it suffices to prove this for just one replacement of ú1 by
ú2, so let .Fl1 be ú(ú1) : l¡ and Ft2 be t(t2) : ¿3 (the case where Fl1 is h : t(tt)
is similar). Now note that if 1(úr) : I(tz) then ú1 mod m : tzrnodm. (Rea-
son: if ú1 is finite then certainly ú1 - tz, while if ú1 is infinite then 1(tr) :
rn I h mod m : I(tz) -- m * f2 mod m) so that since the addition is ordinary ad-
Inconsistency tnt)l
dition of nonstandard numb€rs, ú1 mod rn : úz mod ra.) But now the functionality
of the classical modulus construction ensures that ú(ú1) mod rn : t(tz) mod rn and
so that m + t(t1) mod rn - m I t(t2) mod m. If t(tl) is finite then /(ú(út)) :
t(tr) : r(r1) mod m : t(tz) mod rn : t(tz) : I(t(tz)), and if ú(tt) is infinite then
I(f (ú1)) - m * ú(ú1) mod rn : n'¿ + t(t2) mod rn : I(t(tz)) again. !
N.9N is interesting because it contains a'pseudo-zero', the least infinite number
rn (and a pseudo-unity m * 1 as Richard Benham pointed out). That is, for any
nonzero t, I t x n'¿ : m, andfor any infinite t,l t + m : t.
Now since rn is apseudo-zero, n'r3 * m3 : rn3 holds, that is I (m x m x m) *
(rnxmxm): (mxmr*), a counterexample to Fermat's Last Theorem @LT')
in this structure. At the time of writing, F LT seems to be a good bet following
Andrew Wiles' argument, though Wiles has indicated that one case remains open.
The situation can be analysed as follows. Neither F LT nor -F LT can be expressed
in the present {+, x} language, since the capacity to express exponentiation fully
is absent. However, each instance of both FLT and - FLT can be considered in
the language, since one can write, for example, (xrrx) + (yyyV) : zzzz. Thus,
if any one of these held in a model for Standard Arithmetic, then F LT would
be false; and if any one held in a model of Peano Arithmetic, then FZ? would
be unprovable in Pf. This motivates the introduction of the symbols'FLT'and
'-FLT'into the language, where the former is evaluated as the minimum of the
values of its instances (that is semantically the quantifier V is treated as generalised
conjunction), and the latter evaluated as the maximum of its instances. More
exactly, the value - F LT is the maximum of the values of all equations of the
form (z times itself n times) * (y times itself n times) - (z times itself n times),
where rrA,z are nonzero numbers and n exceeds 2; while the value of FLT is
the RM3-complement of the value of -FLT. Now by the construction of 1úSl/,
(m x rn x m) * (rn x m x rn) : In x mx rn has the value B in,¡/.91/,so -F LT is B
or T in ¡/^9¡/, and thus holds in I/Sl/. The following definition is now necessary.
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Definition 3.3. For any subset S of. L, the Routley * oL S,
S* :df {A:-A does not belong to .9}.
The Routley * operation is important in the semantics of relevant logics, and
is used in several places in this book. It is known that if Th is an inconsistent
RM3-theory determined by an assignment 1, then Th* is an incomplete theory
determined by taking .I and changing only the set of designated values V : {7}.
Proposition 3.4. F LT is true iff -F LT is exactly B in 1/SI/, and iff neither
-FLT r'or FLT is in l/^9N'; and FLT is false iff -FLT is 7 in ¡úS¡/, and iff
-FLT is in l/^9N* and FLT is not in ¡/S¡/..
Proof. That -FLT is B in I/.91ú iff neither -FLT rror FLT is in.ðy'Sly'*,
follows from the well known fact that both A and -A are in an RM3-lheory ?å iff
neither A nor -A are in T h* . Now by an uncontroversial argument of Tarski, Ftr?
is false ifffor some finite t,A,z not classically identical with 0 and n not classical
identical with 0, I or 2, xn * A" : z" holds in classical Robinson arithmetic. Hence,
if -FLT is exactly B in l{.91/, then there are no such finite t,U,z,n, and thus
FLT is true. Conversely iÎ FLT is true then there are no such finite r,y,z,,n to
raise the value of -FLT to 7 in ¡/S¡tr, and -FLT is exactly B. For the second
part of the proposition, FLT ís false iff these finite r,A,z,n exist, 1ff -FLT isT
in,¡/.9I/. But also it is well known that A is ? in Thitr A is in Th* and -A is not
inTh*. So -FLT is ? in ¡/.9¡rr iff -FLT is in l/Sl/* and FLT is not in,ð/SÀ/..¡
Unfortunately, the job of proving -F LT to be ? in 1/.9I{ seems to be no easier




1. Order and Equality without Function Symbols
So far, we have only been considering equational theories, that is, theories
whose only primitive predicate symbol is :. We have been looking at how function
symbols such as * and x behave inconsistently in such theories. In this chapter a
second primitive predicate < is added to :, interpreted as 'less than'. In the first
section, function symbols are omitted. The main result of this section is as follows.
There is a well-kno\ryn metatheorem of classical model theory to the effect that the
theory of dense order without endpoints is N¡-categorical, that is, that all classical
models of that theory of cardinality No are isomorphic. We see that this breaks
down for RM3-theories, given a natural extension of the notion of isomorphism of
modeis to the more general case. It follows that the classical metatheorem depends
on the assumption of ciassical logic. Such is not always the case: various other
results in this book are invariant with respect to changes in background logic away
from the classical case. In the next section, function symbols are re-introduced and
several results about these are summarised.
The following axiomatises the classical theory of dense order without endpoints
(see e.s. l22l).
(1) Irreflexivitv (")(- r < r)
(2) Asymmetry (r,y)(, 1y )- y < r)
(3) Transitivity (r,y,")((, < yka < z) > r < z)
(4) Comparability (z,y)((- r : yk - r { V) > y < ")
(5) Exclusiveness (r,y)((r:y) (-" < Ak-y <r)k(r 1y)- x:y))
(6) No endpoints (z)(ly,r)(, < ykz < r)
(7) Denseness (r,A)@ < a ) Qz)(r 1 zkz < y))
(8) Mixing (r,y,z)(r:A ) (y < z) r < z)k(z <y ), <ù))
It is well known that all classical models of cardinality Ne of these axioms are
isomorphic. To compare with RM3-models, a definition of isomorphism is needed
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which reduces to the usual in the classical case. The following seems adequate at
least where every element of the domains is named.
Definition 4.1. Two models (Dt,It) and (D2,12) are isomorphic iff there is a
1-1 correspondence f : Dt --+ Dz such that for all names ttr...tn,tn+t,,...t2n, iÎ
Ir(t.+t): f Q{tl)) and ... and l"(tr"): f U{t")) then for all atomic F, Ffi...tn
holds in 11 iff Ftn+t...tzn holds in 12.
Proposition 4.2. There are nonisomorphic -RM3-models of the theory of dense
order without endpoints.
Proof. For both models, take as names the rational numbers Q. For (Dt,It)
set D1 : Q; set fi(f) : ú for all Í; set l1(tt : tz) : T rf h : úz else h : F;
and set Ir(tt < t") : T if h ( úz else h : F. That is I is the classical (and
so RM3-) model of the {:,<} theory of Q. For (D2,12) set Dz: the integers
Z; set Ir(t¡ : the integral part of ú; set Ir(tt : tr) : B iÍ I2(tL) : 1z(úz) else
Iz: F; and set Ir(tt <tz): B if I2(tL) < Ir(t") else 12 : F. By the Extendability
lemma, 12 is an extension of ,I1 and so (1)-(8) above hold in 12. But there is no
1-1 correspondence between Z and Q which preserves atomic sentences of fi and
12, since any correspondence eventually reverses the order on some elements. D
This shows that the proof of No-categoricity is not invariant with regard to
background logic, but depends on the special properties of classical logic. Note
also that 12 is transparent; since if ú1 : f2 holds then clearly for all atomic
F, I2(Ftr) : Iz(Ftz), then use Proposition 2.13(1). The discreteness postulate
(z)(19)(r < yk(z)((r < zk N y < z) ) y : r)) also holds in 12 which shows that
discreteness and denseness postulates can be jointly satisfied inconsistently.
2. Order and Equality with Function Symbols
There are many such models and theories with different properties. These are
studied in [34]. Summarising those results:
Order and Equality With F\rnction Symbols 4t
(1) Primitive symbols {:, (, *, -, x }; names for all the integers; domain D :
finite integers modulo rn of Chapter 2; I(t): ú mod m; I(1,-, x) : (*, -, x) mod
m; I(fi:tz): B if l(tt):1(ú2) else I: F; and 1(ú1 .tz): Bilh 1tz
else 1 : F. AII sentences of the classical consistent complete theory of the ring
of integers Zhold includingthe Sum Law (ø,y,2)(r <y ) r+ z <y+z) and
Product Law (r, A,z)(x < y ) (0 <, J r x z < y x ")). Functionality and
hence transparency fail: tt, : tz holds iff t1 mod m : tz mod rn; but ú1 mod rn :
ú2 mod rn plus h 1 tz do not ensure t2 1 fu since ú2 might be too large. The
equational subtheory is transparent.
(2) As for (1) but with 1(ú1 . tr) : B if 1(ú1) 3 I(t") else 1 : f'. These are
transparent but not all sentences of the classical theory of Z with names hold, e.g.
in mod 3, I(2 < 4) : f' because not 2 mod 3 ( 4 mod 3: 1.
(3) As for (1) but with 1(ú1 a tr) : B all terms t1,t2. These are transparent
and all sentences of the {:,(,*,-, x} theory of. Z wilh names hold, but at the
cost of triviality in the {<, +, -, x} subtheory.
(a) Primitive symbolr {:, (, *, X, /}. Take the two-element model with names
for the rationals at the end of Chapter 2 Section 3 and add 1(ú1 a tz) : B if.
1(¿t) I 1(ú2) else I : F. This is transparent and extends the classical consistent
complete arithmetic and order theory of the nonnegative rationals.
(5) Primitive symbols {:,(,*,-,*,1}; names for all the real numbers; D:
{0,1,...,p- 1}; for any term f set 1(t):0 if¿ < 0 or ú ) p- 1 else 1(t) :
the greatest integer ( ú; set l(tt : tr) : B if. I(tr) : I(tz) else 1 : fl; and
set 1(ú1 a tz) : B i11(¿t) < 1(12) else I : F. The theory is transparent. The
{:, <} subtheory extends that of the classical consistent complete real numbers,B,
including the continuity schema ([50], p.31). The {:, -f , -, X, /} subtheory extends
the classical theory of fields. Also Sum and Product laws hold. It is not known
whether all classical consequences of field axioms + (t)-(S) * continuity scheme
hold.
42 Order
(6) {:, (, *, -, x,l}; names for all real numbers; D : modp; I(+,-,x, f }
are mod p; set I(t) :0 if ú < 0, 1(¿) : the least whole number > t if 0 < t I p-2,
else 1(ú) : p-I;set.I(ú1 - tr) : B if. I(tt) : I(tz)else 1 : F; and set 1(ú1 1 tz) : T
if 1(¿1) < I(tr), I(tt<tr): B if I(tL): I(tz) else 1: F. These are transpar-
ent, and the {:,<} subtheory extends that of classical A, and the {:, +,-,x,1}
subtheory extends that of classical fields. But Sum and Product laws fail, and in
different moduli. (Sum law: in mod 2 or mod prime p>3, p-2 < p-1 holds but
(p-Z) + 1 < (p-t) * 1 does not hold. Product law: in mod p ) 3, 1 < p-l and
0<p-lareboth?but1(1 x(p-t) <(p-1)r(p-1)) : I(p-t<1) :F.
Finally, inconsistency can be isolated to subtheories containing one primitive
predicate and not the other, while retaining transparency. In mod p, both the
following are transparent:
(7) I(h-tz): Bfil(tr): I(tz)else.I: f',and I(tt <tr):T if /(¿1) < I(t")
else I : F.
(8) I(tt:tr):Tif. I(tr): I(tz) elsel - F, andl(ú1 .tz): B\l




As noted in Chapter 1, there have been calls recently for inconsistent calculus,
appealing to the history of calculus in which inconsistent claims abound, especially
about infinitesimals (Newton, Leibniz, Bernoulli, I'Hospital, even Cauchy). How-
ever, inconsistent calculus has resisted development. There seem to be at least two
reasons for this. First, as we have seen, the functional structure of fields interacts
with inconsistency to produce triviaiity even in the purely equational part of the-
ories, in a way which normal paraconsistentist contradiction-containment devices,
such as weakening ex contradictione quodlibet, do not prevent. Stronger theories,
including set membership, terms of infinite length, order, limits and integration,
are then infected with the same triviality. Second, the functional structure of in-
consistent set theory remains difficult to control, and seems to require sacrifice of
logical principles in addition to, and more natural than, ECQ.(See Meyer et.al.
[29], Slaney [53], but also below Chapter 14.) But unless there are distinctive in-
consistent theories of the order of strength of classical analysis, then the claim that
the history of the calculus supports paraconsistency is undermined. Inconsistency
might well instead be a symptom of confusion.
This chapter extends inconsistency to the case of inconsistent equational the-
ories strong enough for a reasonable notion of differentiation of polynomials, in
order to show that inconsistency does not cripple such an equational differential
calculus. It turns out to be instructive to begin not with an inconsistent theory but
with an incomplete consistent (intuitionist) theory; which can be seen to have some
similarities with, and advantages over, the well-known intuitionist theory Synthetic
Differential Geometry (SDG). It also has the advantage of showing how incomplete
theories are just as amenable to treatment by these methods as inconsistent theo-
ries are. In section 2 a congruence relation is defined on the noninfinite hyperreal
numbers, and the algebra of equivalence classes so obtained is shown to have the
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structure of a nilpotent ring. This allows the functional properties of the incom-
plete theory to be defined in section 3. In section 4 the calculus of polynomials is
described and results on incompleteness, nilpotence, Taylor formulae, polynomial
differentiation and continuity are obtained. These are compared with SDG, and
the similarities, advantages (mostly simplicity) and limitations of the comparison
are discussed. In section 5 it is shown that a small change allows a very similar
inconsistent theory to be defined. Section 6 deals with integration, and in the final
section, various further directions are sketched. On the basis of these results it is
argued that the fact that the same functional structure can underlie inconsistent,
incomplete, or classical theories suggests that the functional aspects of mathematics
are more important than squabbles at the sentential level over ECQ, inconsistency,
incompleteness, eúc.
2. A Nilpotent Ring of Hyperreal Numbers
We begin with the usual classical arithmetic of the field of hyperreal num-
bers .R*, with operations {*,-, X, l}. A"v hyperreal number has a representation
H+r+d where -FI is an infinite number, r a real number and d an infinitesimal,
the reciprocal of an infinite number. If two hyperreal numbers r)y are at most
infinitesimally distinct, we write r x y.Thus any infinitesimal = 0. The subfield
of real numbers is called -r?. For each nonzero u in -R*, the binary relation =r is de-
fined by :x1 xr xz:dr @tlr) is at most infinitesimally different from (r2lr); that
is (qlr) x (r2f r), that is (q-'2)lx is infinitesimal, written (21 - rr)1, r 0. For
fixed z ihis is an equivalence relation on -R*, as is easy to verify. It is not however a
congruence. F'or example if (r1- *r)l* is infinite w.r.t. 13, then 11 Nr z2 does not
ensure (rtl*r) xr (r2f ¡3)- However, if ø is any infinitesimal á, then a congruence
on the noninfinite hyperreal numbers, w.r.t. the operations {*, -, x}, is obtained;
as well as an associated ring of equivalence classes. So, fix á; then we can define:
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Definition 5.1. Let .9 be the set of noninfinite hyperreals, that is of the form
r I d where r is any real number and d any infinitesimal (possibly 0). Then
D :df {d e S : for some positive integer k, dk 16 = 0};
S- :df ,S with d restricted to D.
Proposition 5.2. The relation =ó is a congruence on ,9 and on S-.
Proof. Let (r1 adr) x6 (x2*dz), that is ((rt+ dr)-(*r+d2))16 x 0;
and let (rr + d") =6 (ro* ds), that is (("r + dz) - (*n+ da))16 x 0. Then
(((" + d') + ('. + d.)) - (("r+ dr)+(*n+ dn)))16 = 0, that is
(("' + d') * ('. + d')) M ((r, + dr) + (*n* dn)).
The subtraction case is the same. For multiplication note that (u r *dr) x6 (r2td2)
iff 11 : s2 and fi16 = d2/ó. Now
(("' +d') x ('.+ d')) - ((rr+ d2) x (ra+dn))16
- (*t*" - rzrq I r3d1 - xsdz I xtdz - rzdq. * dds - d2d4) I 6.
The frrst pair of terms cancel. The second pair are È since multiplication by a
real number does not disturb Ai, so their difference is infinitesimal. Ditto the other
two pairs in the sum, so the whole sum is infinitesimal. This shows that tó is a
congruence for {*, -, x} on ^9. For S-, suppose that
d,l'16 x af'ld = d!, 16 x df^ 16 x o
The infinitesimal part of (rr + dr) + ("r + d3) is (d1 1d3), and
lc1*È¡
(d, * dr¡kt+ks ¡6 : t (k,, * kt)dl'+u-'o;
i=0
16.
But each term of the sum = 0 so the whole sum is; and so (rr*dt)t(".{d3) is in
,5-, as is obviously (rz*d2)*(ra¡dn).Subtraction is similar. For multiplication
("t + dt) x (". + dt): (rtr"I rldsl rsdt * d1d3). Now
0 x rfi!" x r3dl'æ drcff"(È"È'),
so each term of the sum is in S- ; so the whole sum is as in the proof of the addition
case above. !
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Note that the proof of congruence breaks down for the case of division, for
example if all z¿ are 0 and dt - dz : ds. It follows from Proposition 5.2 that the set
of equivalence classes under ryó form a ring (call it .R) w.r.t. the induced operations
{*, -, x }. Denote the equivalence class of any element r * d by [r * d]. n has the
following properties.
Proposition 5.3. (1) For any real numb€rs n1, rz,lrtl:lrz]iff 11: ar.
(2) For anyinflnitesimals d1 ,d,2,if [rl] : IOZ]: [0] then [d,] x [dr] : [0].
(3) For any nonnegative integer ,b, there is some infinitesimal d with [dÀ+1] : [0]
but not [du] : [0].
Proof. (1) If 21, 12 ate real, then not (21 - *r)16 = 0 unless rt: 12.
(2) Let di: d?16 and' d|: d716. By hypothesis, di = 0 = di. But
d,Ld2l6 -- (aia1¡t")''' : (oî)''' (o;)''' ,
which is infinitesimal if di and di are.
(3) Consider 62 ,6,6t/z ,6r/3,, . . . , etc..
Proposition 5.4. For any infinitesimal ó and any positive integer fr, there is
an infinitesimal d such that dÈ+r /á is infinitesimal while dk l6 is infinite.
Proof. Let d: ó(/"+1)/i"(å+z). Now
dk+t l6 - 5(k+r)2/k(rc+z) ¡5 - 5$2+zk+r)lrc(*+z) ¡5(k2+2k)/(k2+2k) - 61/(k2+2È) = 0
But,
dk l6 :6k(k+r)/k(k+z) f 6 : 5\+r¡¡1*¡z¡ f 6$+z)/(k+2) _ 5-r/(*+2) _ Il6rl&+2)
which is infinite
Definition 5.5. ,o :df [0]; and, for all positive integers k,
Dr:d,f {V): [dt+t1 : [0] and not [dÈ] : [0]].
Note that {ldlt d is in D} : Ual n@r).(For D see Definition 5.1.)
Proposition 5.6. For all positive integers k, (1) there is a [d] in D¡ such that
for all [d1] in D,ldt), [d*] : [0]; and (2) there is a [d] in D¡ and u [dr] it D¡,¡2
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such that not [d1] x [dn] : [0].
Proof. (1) Let dbe 611k. Now dß/ó: 1 not = 0. But dk+tf 6: I.6rlk = 0.
Hence [d] is ìn D¡. But also, for any infinitesimal d,1, ù.dkl6 : dt N 0; so that
ld'l xldÈl :[0].
(2) Let d be ó(/"+1)/È(*+2) as in Proposition 5.4, and let fibe6l@.\.Now by the
argument of Proposition 5.4, [d] is in D¡. Further,
ú : 6ld,k : 6f 6(k+r)l(k+2) - 6rl(k+2) .
So
a\k+z) ¡O : 6(k+2)/(k+z) l6$+2)l(k+2) _ I not = 0;
and ¿\k+3) ¡A : 6(ß+3)/(ß+2) f 6Ø+2ll$+2) :6r/(*+z) r 0.
Hence d1 is in Dn+z.Finally, (dñk)16:1not = 0; so that not [dr] * ldrl: [0]. D
Definition 5.7. An element d ol an algebra is nilpotent of degree k iÎ dk+l : 0;
and strictly nilpotent of degree lc iÎ dk+r : 0 but not dk : 0; and an aigebra is
(strictly) nilpotent of d,egree /c if it has (strictly) nilpotent elements of degree fr.
Proposition 5.3(1) shows that ß has a subfield isomorphic to the real numbers
-t?. This field of equivalence classes will also be referred to as .R. Now in IR we can as
usual write [r]fr for [rß] and drop the multiplication signs or use dots. Proposition
5.3(3) shows that ,R is strictly nilpotent of all degrees. Proposition 5.3(2) is relevant
to the comparison with SDG in section 4. While all elements of D¡ go to zero on
being raised to the k + lst power and not for any lesser power) Proposition b.6
shows that these elements fall into two classes: those whose kth power multiplied
by any nilpotent element goes to zero, and those whose kth power has a nonzero
product with some nilpotent element. This is also ¡elevant to section 4.
3. An Incomplete Theory
This section specifies an incomplete model based on the three-valued intuitionist
logic J3. In the following section theorems of calculus are proved in it.
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Definition 5.8. The theory CJ is specified by:
(1) background logic -/3 (Threevalues {4¡,¡,?} with V: {7}. See Definition
2.e.);
(2) names for all noninfinite hyperreal numbers;
(3) term forming operators {*, -, x };
(4) the single binary relation :;
(5) sentential operators {-, &, V, *};
(6) Two sorts of object language variables, each with several sorts of associated
quantifiers
(6i) variables t, ro¡ tt¡ . . .and two associated pairs of quantifiers (V e -R),
(f e ,n) and (V € ,?), (3 e ,R), and
(6ii) variables d,,d,s,d4.,... and associated pairs of quantifiers (V € D),,
(f e D) and for every positive integer /c, (V e Do), (l e Dt);
(7) {),=,<-+} are defined in the usual way, (Er.x € R)(Fr) is defined as
(l ø € fi) (Fu&(Vro € A)(Frs--+ x: ro))i
(8) The model (D,Il is specified by
(8i) D : IR
(8ii) For every name t, I(t) : ltl
(8iii) 1(+, -, x) are the corresponding ring operations on -B
(8iv) For any terms t1,t2, set I(t1 : tz): 
" 
if 1(úr) :1(f2), set
I(tt: tz): N if 1(¿r) I l(tr) but the hyperreal number (h-t2)16
is noninfinite, else set 1(11 : tz) : F.
(9) For every quantified sentence of the form (V u e X)Fu, 1((V u e X)Fu) :
glb{a : for some term ú, 1(t) is in X and I(Ft) : y}; and 1((3u) Fu : /uó{the
same set), where u is any variable and X is ,R,r?, D or D¡;
(10) C J is then {A : I(A) - r}.
The model just described is transparent. (This follows from the facts (1) that
tt : tz holds itr 1(¿r) : I(tz), and hence (2) that if ¿r - 12 holds then /(Ftr) :
I (Ft2) for any atomic ,F. The latter then serves as the base of an obvious induction
for all F.) This means that there is full functionality for calculation, so that
advantage can be taken of facts about nilpotence such as F 62 :0 for simplifying
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calculation. Elimination of 'second order' terms in a series has looked attractive
from as long ago as Newton. The theory C J \s intuitionist in the senses
(i) that -/3 is three-valued intuitionist logic, and (ii) that C J is incomplete: since if
I(6:0) : ¡ú then 1(- ó:0) : f., so that neither l- ó: 0 nor l-- 6:0, although
l--- ó : 0 & - 67/2: 0. Finally note that the wholly classical two-valued theory
of IR can be obtained by takin1 I(t, - tr) : T iÎ I(tr) : I(tz) else 1 : F. This
shows that classical two-valued model theory can be obtained as a special case.
4. Incornplete Differential Calculus
In this section it is shown that Taylor's formula and polynomial differentiation
laws hold in C J. A definition of limits can be given, and it is proved that every
function is continuous. It is shown that the theory has some similarities with a
corresponding part of Synthetic Differential Geometry, and the dissimilarities are
outlined.
Definition 5.9. A functional expression (abbreviatedto function) is the result
of replacing any term or terms inside any term, by variables. A function with
no remaining names denoting infinitesimals is called a real function. If / is a
function with a single free variable u (possibly occurring more than once) then
this is indicated bV /(r). If u1 and u2 ã1€ variables of any sort, then f @t + rr)
is the result of replacing u by ut I lsz throughout; and if h,tz are any terms then
/(¿r + ú2) is the result of replacing u by tt I tz throughout. Similarly for - and
x. (Etrt,...,rt" € r?) is defined as (Etr1 € ,?) . ..(Er.r¡ € A). (See Definition
5.8 (7).)
Proposition 5.10. If /(z) is any real function, then for all positive integers k,
F (Vz e R) (8h1,..., rr Ç R) (Vd € nù (fþ +d): f (") + rtdl_ ...-lrr,dk).
Proof. If /(r) is a real function, then by the polynomial laws of -R*, for any term
t, I(f(t)) is identical with I(to+tú+...Itntn), where the Í; are names denoting
real numbers. This is clear because identities are not destroyed in passing from -R*
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to IR. So we may restrict attention to functions of the form to * tp I .. . * tnr"
where the ú; are names for real numbers so that ihe 1(ú;) are in ,R. We abbreviate
these functions by Ði=o t¿r' . Then for any such /(r) and any term ú from r? and
any termdwith 1(d) insome Dr, f(t *d) is tottt(t+d) +...+t"(t+ d)'. So
IU(t+d)) : 1(¿o)+(1(ú1))(1(¿)+f1a¡;*... etc. The operations on the right hand
side of the last expression obey the polynomial laws, so that sum can be computed
using the binomial expansion. If n 3 k, the nilpotence of the element d does not
affect this expansion, and (a) below follows by normal arithmetic.Iln > ft, those
terms of the binomial expansion of I(f (t * d)) which contain [do*t] as a factor are
identical with [0]. So 1(/(t * d)) computes to
r(,o+,,,+ + t*{) +' ((å (î) ,,"-') ,) * *' ((å f 'r) ,r,--) r) (o)
Hence by the assignment rules for quantifiers




The next part of the argument, for uniqueness, uses the postulate that the 1(ú¿)
are real. We need to conjoin t" (É) the following:




-) ({t, : *r*r)k...k(to : *rù),
where the t; are a relabelling of the coefficients of (a). Eliminating quantifiers to
appropriately assigned terms, we need to prove that:
k
l-(Vdrnr) f (t + d.) : f (t) tlt¡¡¿di - k!=, (t¿: t*+¿) (r)
i=l
If the consequent takes the value 7 then ('y) holds by ihe tables for ---. If the
consequent does not take the value T then there are two cases: either (\) t¡: ¡t*
does not hold, or (ii) some other t; : t*+¿ does not hold.
(case i:) If tr: ú2¡ does not hold, then 1(ú¡) I I(t"*).Now since /¡ and t2¡ are
real, (ú6 -trn)16 is infinite, so 1(ú¡ -tzr): F. But by Proposition 5.4, there is some
infinitesimal hyperreal number d such that dkl6 is infinite; hence (tk - t2k)dk l6 is
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But the latter is infinite w.r.t. 6. So in IR,
IU(t+d))+I /(¿) + Dtr+,do
i=1
k
But also in A*,
r$+d)-
But in r?*,




is infinite. Hence the antecedent of (f) i. F and (,y) holds by the table for --+.
(case ii:) Otherwise, let i be the least integer for which t¿ -- t*+¿ does not hold
Then choosing the same d, in ,R* we have
/(ú) + Ðto*,dn : (t; - t*+;)d'f higher powers of d
k
i=1
But the first term is infinite w.r.t. 6 il dk is. So, as in case (i), in ,R,






is infinite. Hence again the antecedent of (f) ir F and so (.y) holds. E
Consider the case k : I. Then for any fd) in D1 and any real ú,
I fþ +d) : f(t)+t1d,for sometermf1 with 1(ú1) in r?.
Definition 5.11. A function 9(z) is called a deriuatiue of f(x), if for any d in
D1 and anyt with 1(f) in.r?, l- f(t+d): f(t)+d.g(t). If gþ) is aderivariveof
/(r), it is also denoted bv f'(").
It is clear independently from classical real number calculus that there is always
at least one derivative for each real function /(r). So we have:
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Proposition 5.12. (Taylor Formula) For any derivative f'@),
I f(t+d): /(¿) + d.f'(t); or F (Vr e Ä)(V de Dt)(f("+d)-- f@)+d.f'@))
Definition 5.13. An n-th degree polynomial in the ind,eterminate r rs any
function of the form ús *tfi + . . . + tnrn, where the Ú; are names, that is DT=o t¿r''
Proposition 5.14. (Polynomial Differentiation) If / is any polynomial of
the form DT:o t¿r" with real coefficients f; and /'(r) is any derivative of /, then
l- (Vr e R)(f'(r) : ÐL, it;ri-l).
Proof. From the Taylor formula, l- (V r e ,R)(/(r + d) : /(t) + d.f'@)) where
1(d) is in D1. Hence IU(t + d)) :1(/(ú)) + I(d).IU'(t)) for any term ú with 1(ú)
in -R. But 1(/(t+d)) :1(DLoti(t+ d)'). As in Proposition 5.10, this computes
ro 1(fþo t¿ti) + (r (rL, (;)t'r'-') .r(d) + (r (X=,(;)r¡n-') tt#l) { higher
powers of d. Since I(d,') --1(d3) : ... : [0], all of these can be dropped. Thus we
have
rff(t+ d)) : 1(/(¿)) + (/(d).1(/'(¿)))
and also
So since subtraction is one of the congruence operations,
:1(/(f)) + (rra¡ rÉrl),,"-'))
r(d).ru,þ)): r(d).r (å f l)',,'-')
But since 1(d) is in Dr and 1(ú) and 1(ú¿) are in -R, this can only happen if
But f was arbitrarily chosen from.R. Hence F (Vz e R)(f'(r) : Ðl=, it¡r'-l) tr
Definition 5-15.
(1) f'E/(") :tt:df (vd€ D)Uþ+d): ú,v(ldr € D)U(t+d)-h:dt))
(2) / is continuous at t:df frgi/(") : f (t)
(3) / is continuous :d/ (V z € A) (/ is continuous at z).
ru,(t)):, (å (î),,,,-')
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A definition of one sided limits can be given, but that is not done here because
of the following proposition. (See also Chapter 6.) It is also noted that in the above
definition of limit, the case where not l- Í(t) : ú1 does not arise, as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 5.16. For every real function /(ø), F / is continuous.
Proof. It has to be proved, for every real term ú, that:
l--(vd e D)u(t+d): /(¿) v(ldr e D)(Í(t+d,)- Í(t) -- dr)).But itfollows
from Proposition 5.10 that F (V d € Dk)U(t +d) : /(¿) + tñ+...+t*dk). 11
not all the real t¿ ate:0, then I f(t+d,) - f(t):td+...1t*dk.It is obvious
that raising the RHS to the power k is not (considered as a hyperreal number)
infinitesimal w.r.t. á (since its first term is not); while raising the RHS to the
power k + t is infinitesimal w.r.t. á (since each term is). Hence the RHS is in
D¡. Thus F (ldl € D)U(t + d) - /(¿) : d1). The result follows by disjoining the
alternatives and universal generalisation. ¡
Synthetic Differential Geometry (SDG), as expounded in Kock [18] (see also
Bell [3]), is likewise an incomplete theory, with neither ó : 0 nor - á : 0 holding.
The theory of [18] has nilpotent elements of all degrees, while the theory of [3]
concentrates on D1. Neither proceeds from a construction on the classical hyperreal
numbers, nor uses three valued model theory. In these theories, also, every function
is continuous. The method of obtaining derivatives from the Taylor formula as in
Proposition 5.I2 is similar to that in [18], and is a variant of the usual classical
treatment. Like SDG, Propositions 5.10 and 5.14 use the calculatory advantages of
nilpotent elements, since these ensure that higher order differentials can ultimately
be ignored.
The case r:0 of Proposition 5.10 is Axiom 1'of [18], with the proviso that r?
in Proposition 5.10 is replaced by the whole domain there. If however ,t? is replaced
Ïty IR in Proposition 5.10 then it fails, as follows. Choose any dlin Dl and let /(z)
be the function d1r. Then certainly l- (3r e Ä)(V d e Dr)(f (d,): /(0 1zd)), the
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ø in question being d1. However, this r is not unique: for any other d2in D we
have l- (V d e Dr)(d.d2 - d.dr: 0) while not [- dt : dz; so that the antecedent of
(V d € nt)U@): /(0) +d.d2) '--+ d1 : dz holds while the consequent does not hold'
Indeed, / could even have a noninfinitesimal coefficient, l@) : (r * 6)r say. For
then the coefficient fails to be unique, since F (Vr € ,t)((5 +6)d:0: (5+26)d)
while not l- 5+ó:5*2ó. Thus the present theory is atheory of functions with
real slopes as in classical nonstandard analysis.
The essential difference with SDG is that the D1 part of the domain is postulated
in SDG to contain elements dt,dz such that not l- dtdz - 0, while in the present
model this is not so (Proposition 5.3(2)). Correspondingly there faiis the SDG
Cancellation Principle (V d e D:)(d.tl: d.tz) --+ ú1 : t2; lor example when 1(¿r) : [ó]
and 1(ú2) :1261then the antecedent is 7 and the consequent is N. However, the
Cancellation Principle holds for cases where the difference between 1(f1) and 1(f2)
is infinite w.r.t. ó if they are different at all, such as the real numbers. For example,
I (V rp2 € AX(V d e D1)(d'q: d-rz) -+ 11: a2).
The failure of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) is of interest. The account of
[18] links it to the holding of the Cancellation Principle and the continuity of every
function. Howeve¡ in the present theory it is rather independent of the functional
part of the construction, since the latter can also produce a classical two-valued
model (end of section 3). The same point pertains to the inconsistent theory of the
next section. This does not show that the 'correct' description is that of classical
logic, however; to the contrary it suggests that functionality is mathematically prior
to sentential logic.
SDG in [i8] uses the mathematical machinery of Cartesian closed categories,
which is considerably stronger than that of equational theories. On the other
hand there is some simplicity in presenting the ideas of incompleteness, nilpotence,
differentiability, limits, continuity eúc. within the framework of nonclassical model
theory. AIso, the present approach permits investigation of similar theories with
different nonclassical background logics (see section 5). Another point is that while
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[18] maintains that SDG is an essentially geometric treatment of analysis, it is
interesting how close one can get to SDG with resources merely from algebraic
number theory and model theory.
5. Inconsistent Differential Calculus
Definition 5.17. The theory CR is obtained by changing the definition of
CJ h the following ways (1) background logic is RM3 with elements {fl B,T}
and designated elements V : {B,f}, Q) I(tr: tr) : T if h: úz considered as
hyperreal numbers, else 1(ú1 - tz): B if l(tr): I(tz), else 1(ú1 :tz): F.
There are a number of other options here, for example background logic P3
(this inconsistent theory can be called C P; see next two chapters), or dropping
the first clause of (2). The latter produces a transparent theory, whereas C R is
functional but not transparent. (Proof of functionality: By inspection , tt : úz holds
itr 1(¿1) : I(tz).But [] is a congruence, so if 1(ú1) : I(tz) then /(ú(ú1)) : 1(¿(¿r)).
Hence if ¿(¿1) : fs holds then /(f(tr)) : 1(¿r), so that l(t(tr)) : I(tz), and so
t(t2) : f3 holds. Disproof of transparency: I 62 :0, but while I - 62 : 0, neither
l- - 0 : 0 nor I - 62 : 6'.) This means that on the one hand calculations
using the advantages of | 62 :0 can be carried out, while on the other hand one
does not have to submit to l- - t : t for any term ú, an improvement on earlier
chapters. The loss of transparency does not appear a serious disadvantage: while it
changes the logical properties of the theory, particularly which theories it extends,
it does not affect calculation. Now it can be shown that the main Propositions of
the incomplete theory can be reproved for the inconsistent theory.
Proposition 5.18. If /(r) is any real function, then for every positive integer
k, F-(Vu e ,R) (Et*r...rk€Æ)(V d,eD*) (f{r+ ù:f@)Iri.+...+r*dk).
Proof. The proof that 1(/(ú + d)) computes to (a) as in Proposition 5.10, is
identical. To prove uniqueness, we need to prove (f ). If the consequent of (7) is ?,
then (7) holds. And for real coefficients l¿,/¡a¿, one never has 1(l; :t*+¿): B.
56 Calculus
Hence consider the case I(t;: t^*.¡: F. Then 1(ú;) + I(t*+¿). But also
(t; - tr+;) ló considered as a hyperreal number is infinite, since the numerator is real
and nonzero. Hence as in Proposition 5.10, for some d with [d] in D¡, do(t, - tr+r)16
is noninfinitesimal. So /(dtf¿) + I(ditk+i), and the antecedent of (r) ir F as re-
quired. E
Proposition 5.19. If / is any polynomial of the form fl=o ú;ø' with real
coefficients f¿, then F (V r e R)(f'(x) : DL, it;xi-t).
Proof. Similar to Proposition 5.14. ¡
Proposition 5.20. For every real function /, F / is continuous.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 5.16.
To repeat an earlier point, inconsistent calculus is not being recommended as
superior or truer, though its nilpotent elements have some of the calculatory ad-
vantages of SDG. The aim is only to show that it exists, that inconsistency permits
a reasonable amount of calculus without collapse, and hopefully that inconsistent
theories can be of mathematical interest
6. Integration
This can be done in a similar way to the classical nonstandard account in
Keisler [17]. The theory following is not much more complex than Keisler's; but on
the other hand nilpotent elements appear not to convey any particular advantage,
unlike in the case of differentiation. If there are any advantages at all, they may be
that nilpotent elements allow 'smearing out zero' and a theory of delta functions
as in Chapter 7.
Definition 5.2L. (Keisler) Let /(r) be a real function on an interval I. An
area function for / is a two placed function A : R x r? --- l? satisfying (i) Addition
Property A(a,b) : A(o,c) + A(c,ö) for all a ( c 1 b in z, and (ii) Rectangle
!
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Property ^(b- a) < A(a,b) < M(b -ø) for all a 
( b\nI, where m:rninf onI
and M : max f on L The finite Riemann Sumlb" f (r)Lr is defined to be:
b
D /(r)¡' :df f(r6)a'r -t f(r1)Lx * ... * f@"-')ar * f("")(b - rn),
a
where Ar is any positive real number, n is the maximum integer such that
a|n\.r ( ó, and ro: dt tt : t * Ar,...rtn: r ln\,t. The inf'nite Rie-
rnann sum lb" f (x)dn, where dr is any nonzero infinitesimal, is the nonstandard
natural extension of the finite Riemann sum. Intuitively, it is the same sum as the
finite sum except that there are an infinite number of terms, that is n becomes the
largest hyperinteger such that ø t nd,r < ó. The defi,nite integral of f from a to b
rb
J" f {*)a* 
is the standard part of the infinite Riemann sum.
That these are well deflned follows from the next Proposition
Propositi on 5.22. (Keisler)
The infinite Riemannian sum is always a finite hyperreal number.
The definite integral from ¿ to b is independent of the size of the (nonzero)
infinitesimal dr.
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Moving to C R, functional expressions can be generalised to any string in which
r is the sole variable, with the proviso that the interpretation ,I(string) is a partial
function on the domain and /(strine(¿)) : 1(stringXf(r)) Now it is clear that
(1)-(5) above hold for all infinitesimals d or dr, so in particular they hold for all
infinitesimals d such that not lcn d: 0. But passing to CR preserves functional
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equality for functions restricted to such infinitesimals, provided that reference to
hyperintegers is restricted to the metalanguage (infinitesimals such as ó2 behave
like zero in virtue of I 62 : 0 plus functionality). Hence we have
Proposition 5.22. (1)-(5) of the previous proposition hold of CR.
Further aspects of integration, such as indefinite integrals, the Second Funda-
mental Theorem, etc. can be dealt with in a similar way. In the special case of
polynomial integration antiderivatives are easy to find directly, and so (1)-(5) can
be verified directly.
7. Conclusion
The inconsistent theory here can be regarded as yet another approach to the idea
of an 'infinitesimal microscope' (see [17],[54],[55]). A microscope with 'resolving
power' ó can be said to be a theory which inconsistently identifies with zero and one
another all quantities which are infinitesimal w.r.t. ó. One is unable to distinguish
between quantities below this 'order of infinitesimality' or 'order of relative identity';
they have all one another's properties in common.
Further directions in which these ideas might be developed include inconsistent
superreals (see [55]), inconsistent polynomial rings in one or more indeterminates,
and introducing set membership (see Chapter 10). Finally, perhaps the present
theories satisfy some of the inconsistent intuitions of the classical analysts; but
even if not, inconsistent theories should be investigated.
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CHAPTER 6: INCONSISTENT CONTINUOUS
FUNCTIONS
l-. Introduction
The idea that motion or change is an inconsistent process has, as is well known, a
Iong history. Recent nice work by Graham Priest [46] suggests that an inconsistent
account of motion and change is at least possible. It is a further matter whether
it is true; and despite Priest's arguments, there does not seem to be a compelling
reason for rejecting the existing consistent account from classical physics, which is
mathematically both simple and elegant. Priest argues that the classical account
has it that motion is being in different places at different times; whereas what he
wants is an intrinsic account of motion according to which an instantaneous state
ought to be unambiguously change or nonchange, independently of its (distance)
relations to other states. Against this, one is inclined to argue that the relations are
nonetheless present; that an account in which the relations alone carry the change
is therefore inevitably simpler; and that being in different places at different times
is surely necessary for motion, and more importantly (at least given a positive
definite metric) sufficient as well.
As part of his account, Priest appeals to the Leibniz Continuity Condition
(LCC). This condition is that whatever holds throughout an interval holds at its
limits, and there is evidence that Leibniz held it. Now there is a technical problem
with the principle as thus stated. Since any strictly monotonic continuous function
takes throughout any interval values less than its value at the right hand endpoint
of the interval, then applying the LCC gives that the function takes a value both
Iess than and equal to itself at the endpoint. But since any point is the endpoint
of some such interval, the function is both less than and equal to itself at all points
(and greater than itself at all points as well, since whatever is greater than itself is
less than itself as well, by symmetry).
Now, while Priest appeals to the LCC, not much of his account depends on it,
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I think. On the other hand, the LCC should not be dismissed too quickly. The
above problem depends on applying the LCC to the relation 'less than'. But not
so much harm ensues if the LCC is applied only to equations, as we see in this
chapter. In other words, it can be argued that the correct sphere of application
of the LCC is at the fundamental level of being expressed by the basic physical
Laws of Nature, and laws and boundary conditions of dynamical systems, since all
of these are expressed in functional-equational form. Indeed, the application of the
LCC to at least some discontinuous functions has the consequence that they can
be treated as inconsistently continuous, in a manner outlined in this chapter; and
that the natural logic arising from them is closed set logic.
The LCC serves to motivate the following account; however it is stressed that the
theory stands independently of the LCC. We are concerned here with a special case,
namely certain functions which from a classical point of view are not everywhere
differentiable, but which can from an inconsistent point of view be regarded as
having continuous derivatives. We see that the inconsistent derivative of such
functions is continuous, given a natural extension of the meaning of the latter.
Differentiating these in turn leads to delta functions, and in the next chapter an
inconsistent account of these is proposed.
2. Functionality
Consider the continuous function g(ú) : lcú for all real numbers ú ( 0 and
g(t) : k2t for all ú > 0, where k1 and k2 are classically different real numbers.
The usual story about its derivative is that g'(ú) : frr for all f < 0, and g'(t): k,
for all ú ) 0, but that 9'(0) does not exist; since the left hand limit of g(6t)l6t
as óú --- 0- is k1, while the right hand limit as óú --+ 0+ is k2, and k, I kr.
Inconsistently, however, there is no particular reason not to allow both - lq : lcz
and also li : kz. The latter lt : lcz would ensure both that LH derivative:Rl{
derivative so that g is differentiable at t :0, and also that the derivative function
is continuous at ú :0 and thus continuous everywhere.
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Considering then the 'derivative function' /(f) : frr for all ú ( 0 and f (Ð : k2
for all t ) 0, we have that /(0) : kr and /(0) : lc2; and, since / is a function,
also k1 : lcz at ú : 0. For this to amount to an inconsistency, it must also be that
- h7 : k2 at t: 0. So a first consideration should be that enough of the arithmetic
of the real numbers holds in the space of values of / at ú : 0, that - lq : kzholds.
One might insist that a necessary condition on any account which represents the
oddity of what is happening at t : 0, be that - kt: k2 represents the norm., with
kt : kz an extra abnormality at t : 0. (Even the orthodox account recognizes
abnormality after a fashion, in that declaring that g' does not exist at ú : 0 is a
kind of incompleteness.)
It is known, however, that if kl : k2 where classically these are distinct real
numbers, then there follows by purely {1,-, x,/} substitutions in classical real
number identities, the undesirable conclusion that any real number a is identical
with every other real number ó. (Proof: let - kt : lq - kt. Substituting k2
for k1, kt - lq : Icz - kt. Classically, LHS: 0; so 0 : lcz - Iq. Classically
((kr- k1) x (ô - a))l(kz- kt): ((k, - ft') x (ó- "Dl(k, - ftr). Substituting in
LHS, (0 x (ó - "Dl(kr- k') : ((kr- k') x (b - a))l(k, - kr). Classically LHS : 0
and RHS - þ- c, so 0 - b- ø. Classically ¿* (b-"): a* (ó-o), so substituting
0 for ô-¿ in LHS, a*0: a-l(b-ø). Classically LHS: ¿ and RHS: ó, so ø: ó.)
Hence whatever is happening in the space of values of / at ú : 0 has a reduced
functional structure compared with that of the full field structure at ú other than
zelo) or else the value space would have no structure at all at t :0. The latter in
turn would make it impossible to distinguish at t :0 between an inconsistent jump
from k1 to fr2 and an inconsistent jump to any other k3. One of the advantages of
the present account is that this distinction can be sustained to a fair degree.
In the above argument, once one gets to 0: lcz - Æ1 , if one then allows 'scale
changes' by multiplying by a real number c, then one gets 0 : (k, - kr) x c which
spreads rapidly to a : ö. So it is reasonable to say that the value space at I : 0
lacks a multiplicative structure. But as we see there is no particular reason not to
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allow the extra additive consequences of 0 : kz - kt
A natural account exploits the fact that for any real number r there is a
uniqueinteger ø and aunique realnumber bsuch that r : a.llez -krl *ó and
0 < ó <lkr- k1l. So it is proposed to take the map å. : R --+ [0,|fr, - k1l) with
h(a.lk2 - kt I * b) : b; and then aI t : 0 to identify real-valued quantities c and d
if å.(c) : h(d). This produces 0 : k, - k, and k1 : kz among other things. One
can think of the space of values of / as undergoing an 'instantaneous slip' from
k1 to le2 at t :0. Another analogy is for an 'instantaneous cylindrification' of the
value space, in which the whole positive and negative axes are wound respectively
clockwise and anticlockwise around the finite halfopen interval [O,l¿, - krl).
Now the halfopen interval [0, 1fr, - fttl) has a natural additive structure, defined
by a!'b :df h(a*b), the latter f being real number sum. It is known that *' so de-
fined is a function on [0, lkr-ktl). This makes å an additive group homomorphism,
and it is seen later that in the inconsistent theory holding aL t :0, functionality of
{+, -} is preserved. Coming at it from another direction, let ø ry b :df ¿ - ó is an
integral multiple of lk2 - kt l, where ¿ and ó ¿,¡:e real numbers. It is not difÊcult to
prove that 3 is a congruence w.r.t. addition ([a], p.1a8). Hence the map h : r --+
(the unique ó such that r ry ó and 0 < ó < lk, -k1l) takes the additive group of
real numbers to the additive group on [0, lk, - ktl) with o. +' b :df h@ * ö) and
-'a :df lk2 - k1l - a.
It is obviously important that therebe at least somefunctions such as {*, -} irt
the value space of the derivative function; otherwise it has no structure save identi-
ties and their denials. Quite a lot is definable in the additive group, for example all
integer multiplications. Howeve¡ the corresponding definition of unrestricted multi-
plication fails of functionality, and so multiplication is left 'undefined' at I : 0. (In
the next section this is dealt with logically using incompleteness.) This looks bad
only if one forgets the origin of differentiation in the gradients of a scalar field, or
quantity spaces or phase spaces. There, one might insist, congruences of difference,
or metrical distance on a quantity scale, are absolute. This defines 'twice, thrice,
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. . . the distance'on the difference as absolute. On the other hand, expansion or con-
traction of the value space by multiplying quantities by an un-unitted real number
is merely a scale change and not a quantity change. That arithmetical laws might
be different from time-to-time is easier intuitively to attribute to quantity spaces
than to (apparently) universal real numbers. But it is not really an extra problem
to deal formally with the value space of / as real numbers, rather than unitted
quantities as here. One simply treats the situation formally as here, forgetting the
implicit units following the values of g,, g' and /.
3. Logic
To make this logically more precise, a language for describing the value space
at various I and a background logic are needed. In the following it is convenient
to think of the variable f of diferentiation as ranging over times in accord with
dynamical systems. It is seen later that the topology of the dynamical system
described by the inconsistent function /(ú) provides its own logic.
Take as a language names fo¡ all real numbers, term forming operators
{*,-, x,l}, and a single binary predicate :. As background logic take the
Iogic PJ4 (Definiiion 2.9), with four valuer {r, N,B,T} and designated values
V: {8,?}. An additiue term is one containing no occurrences of { x,l}.Atomic
sentences are assigned values by a function 1 : L x Time -* {r, N,T, B} in accor-
dance with
(1) For any time ú other than 0 and any terms tt,tz, I(tr: tz,t) - T il h: úz is
true in classical real number theory, else 1(11 : tz,t) : F.
(2) [f ú1 and t2 are both additive terms then
(2.1) I(tr: tz,0):T il]'l_: tzis true in classical real number theory; and
(2.2) I(tr: t2,0) : B \f h and ú2 are classically distinct real numbers but
h(tr): h(tr), while l(tt: tr,O) - F \f h(tr) I h(tr).
(3) If ú1 and t2 are not both additive terms then /(ú1 : ú2, 0) : Iy'.
Values for all nonatomic sentences and a corresponding theory for each I are then
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determined as in Definition 2.9.
Proposition 6.1. 1 determines a functional theory at all times.
Proof. It is obvious that this is so (relative to the functionality of the classical
theory of the real numbers) at times other than ú : 0, since the quantity space
(space of values of /) behaves identically with the real numbers at those times. So
suppose time: 0 and let ú1 - ú2 hold. That is I(t, : ú2,0) € {B,T}; and so by
construction of 1 both ú1 and t2 are additive. Therefore any atomic sentence Fú1
is additive itr Ft2 is additive. As usual it suffices to prove the proposition for only
one replacement of t1 by t2. If neither ,Fú1 nor Ft2 is additive then neither hold
by construction of 1. If both are additive then let Fúr hold and be of the form
¿(ú1) : ú3, so that Ftz is ú(¿2) : ls. Now since l(ú1) : ús holds , h(t(tr)) : h(tz).
But since tt:tz holds, h(tr): h(tr).So by the fact that *'and -'are functions
on [0, lkr- krl), h(t(tr)): h(t(tt)); and since the latter : h(tz), Fú2 holds. lf Ftr
does not hold, then å(ú(ú1)) # h(t"); whence by å(t1) : h(tz), h(t(tr)) I h(t"),
so that Ft2 does not hold. The argument is similar iî. FtL is ú3 : ú(ú1). Hence I
determines a functional theory at time: 0 also. D
Proposition 6.2. The inconsistent zero degree theory determined at I : 0
extends the additive part of classical.real number theory (-R").
Proof. By induction on the number of occurrences of {-,&,V} in an additive
sentence A, that (i) if A is true in -8. then 1(4,0) :7 and (ii) if A is false in r?"
then 1(,4,0) e {F, B}.
(Base:) Clear by construction of /.
(-clause (i):) I1 - A is true in.B. then A is false in.R.; so by inductive hypothesis
(ii) 1(,4,0) e {F,.8}, so I(- A,0) : ?.
(-clause (ii):) If - A is false in l?. then A is true in .R.; so by inductive hypothesis
(i) 1(,4, 0) : T, so 1(- A,0) : F e {F, B}.
(&clause (i):) If CkD is true in,B. then both C and D are true in -R. so by
inductive hypothesis (i) I(C,0): I(D,0) : T, so I(CkD,0) : ?.
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(&clause (ii):) H CkD is false in r?. then one or both of C, D is false in -R.. Let C
be false. By inductive hypothesis (i) I (C ,0) € {4 B}, so that I (C kr, 0) € {F, B} .
(Vclause (i):) I1 (Vr)Fr is true in r?" then Fú1 is true in R" for every name út. By
inductive hypothesis (i) I(f.úr) : T, so that I((Vz)Fr,0):1.
(Vclause (ii):) If (Vx)Fr is false in.R. then f'ú1 is false în R. for some name 11.
By inductive hypothesis (ii) I(Ft1,0) e {F,B}, so that 1((Vø)Fr,0) € {F,B}. !
Summarising, the theory describing the value space of / and g' is consistent
complete R" at times other than ú : 0. At f : 0, the theory in its additive part
is inconsistent, complete and contains .8.. In its nonadditive part it is incomplete,
and overall it is functional. The additive part of -R. holds at all times, and at the
singularityf :0 theextraadditivepropositions 0: frz -ltr,kr: lez,kt*1 : lczll,
efc. hold, making things inconsistent at that time.
Consider any continuous function g(f ) with the property that at all but a finite
set {l¿ : I I i S n} of times/points g is differentiable; and that for all the f ¿, left and
right derivatives are defined (but classically unequal). This determines'a closed-
set topological space on the real numbers whose boundaries are the singletons {ú¿}
and whose closed sets have the basis [--, tt], [út, tz], . . . ,lln-r,tnl,lt.,*-]. So one
can identify the derivative function g' with a map from the set of times with the
closed set topology to (the set of PJ!-lheories of L x lhe real numbers), with the
following two provisos:
(1) if {t} is not a boundary then 9'(l) : (R., the classical derivative of 9 at ú);
(2) if {¿}isaboundarythen g'(t): (?å¿,thelefthandderivativeatl),whereTh¡
is the additively inconsistent multiplicatively incomplete theory described above.
Note that it would be equivalent if the right hand derivative were used instead;
since in Thr,LH derivative: RH derivative. The continuous function g can itself
be regarded as such a map, which shows that there is a proper generalisation here.
For g, in which there are no boundaries, the closed set topology is just {r?,4};
and for aII t, g(t) : (R., the classical value of g at ú). For any such function g, g
is differentiable at t if g'(t) is defined; which it is at every t, so g is differentiable
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everywhere and its derivative is g'. Finally, a function is continuous at ú if the LH
limit at ú : the RH limit at t : the value of the function at ú. But this holds for
g' at aIl ú. Hence g/ is continuous and g has a continuous derivative.
It might be wondered whether the derivative g'(0) should contain information
about whether g is increasing, decreasing, or stationary at f : 0. This would
seem to need an absolute distinction between positive and negative values of the
derivative at t : 0; though since such a distinction could be programmed, no
doubt there is functionality at some level. But in any case it isn't clear that
there are straightforward intuitions about whether g is increasing if according to
its LH derivative it is increasing but according to its RH derivative it is decreasing.
(Stationary?) Perhaps the only cases where intuition gives a lead are when g is
increasing according to both LH and RH derivatives, or decreasing according to
both. But this conception already imports classical LH and RH neighbourhoods of
ú : 0. Thus one might say that the inconsistent account describes the 'magnitude'
of the rate of change of g, an 'instantaneous slip'from k1 to lc2; while the direction
of change, where it is meaningful at all, is a matter of neighbourhoods.
A function 'defines its own logic' in that it is associated with a closed set topol-
ogy which constitutes a paraconsistent logic (see Chapter 11). The propositions of
the logic are closed sets of times at which various additive atomic equations hold.
The negation of an additive proposition holds at the closure of the set-theoretic
complement of times at which the proposition holds) so an additive proposition
and its negation hold at the boundary. Multiplicative (nonadditive) propositions,
however, hold only on open sets and thus fail to hold at the boundaries, as expected.
The composite open-closed-boundary-space is a Boolean algebra with open set (in-
tuitionist) and closed set (paraconsistent) subalgebras or sublogics, which describe
the values of multiplicative and additive propositions respectively.
bl
CHAPTER 7: THE DELTA FUNCTION
1-. Introduction
In Chapter 6, differentiating the function 9(¿) : kú for all ú ( 0 and g(t) : kzt
for all ¿ > 0, where ,t1 and lc2 ate classically distinct real numbers, Ied to the
inconsistent continuous function /(¿) : g'(t): kr for all ¿ ( 0 and f(t) -- k,
for all ú > 0. If a dynamic system is described by g(t), then the derivative takes
an instantaneous jump at ú : 0. That it is instantaneous rather than taking an
infinitesimal amount of time, is represented by the inconsistent continuity. The
aim in this chapter is to differentiate one step further, frnding /'(ú). The new
derivative can naturally be thought of as (k2 - lcl).A,(¿), where A(ú) has the two
properties (i) A(ú) : 0 for all t 10, and (tt) /: A(¿)dú 
: 1. Property (ii)
means that at constant times the integral recovers the precise amount of the j,t-p
from fr1 to k2. The delta function occupies an interesting niche in the history of
mathematics. Long regarded as problematic but useful in elementary quantum
theory and quantum field theory, it was eventually'solved' in Schwartz' Theory of
Distributions; but at the cost of a considerable increase in complexity, as well as
an increase in the size of the function space for quantum mechanics.
One can produce an account of something close to the delta function within
classical nonstandard analysis. Considering the f-axis (the real line) and its value
space as augmented by infinitesimals and their reciprocals the infinite numbers,
one can draw a triangle with base 2ó and height 1/6. The area of this triangle is
(basexheight)/2 : 1. The triangle is described by the function At(¿) :0 for all Ú
with lúl ) á, A, (t): (t162).t+(t/ó) for -ó < ¿ < 0, and A'(¿) : erl62)i+(tl6)
for 0 ( t < 6. The slopes of the sides are If62 Tor -6 < I < 0 and -1/ó2 for
0 < ¿ < ó. Property (i) for the deltafunction, namely A(ú) :0 for all t +0, is not
quite right here. But it is nearly right, since A1(ú) :0 for all realt + 0. Property
(ii) for A1 follows straightforwardly from any reasonable account of the integral as
an area function, given the area under the triangle as described. This account of
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the delta function differs from Robinson's approach in nonstandard analysis, which
is more like a nonstandard account of the theory of distributions, in keeping with
Robinson's operationist attitude to infinitesimals. But it is a reasonable account
all the same.
Nevertheless, it is possible to exploit inconsistency to give an account where
A(¿) : 0 for all nonzero ú; and which more reasonably gives an instantaneous
account of the change in /(t) from fr1 to k2. Furthermore it is possible to give sense
to the idea that the rate of change is different in an instantaneous jnmp from k1 to
k2, from an instantaneous j.t-p from fr1 to k3.
2. Functionality
In Chapter 5 the reciprocals of infinitesimals were avoided because they give
problems with functionality. But these problems are not quite so insurmountable. It
is shown in this chapter that a construction can be given wherein total functionality
fails but some partial and reasonable control of functionality remains. Further, the
area of failure of functionality has a reasonable motivation. In turn, this leads to
an inconsistent account of the delta function.
First, introduce the concepts of 'the bandwidth of zero' and 'the representative
of. zero'. In Chapter 5 certain infinitesimals were inconsistently identified with zero,
while others were consistently nonzero. One can think of zero as 'smeared out' over
the range or bandwidth of the former. A positive infinitesimal ô is taken as the
bandwidth of zero, and ó2 is taken as the representative of zero. The idea is that
all and only those numbers infinitesimal w.r.t. ó are inconsistently identified with
zero, while ó2 represents zero for the purposes of multiplication. The bandwidth of









names for every hyperreal number finite or infinitesimal w.r.t. 1/ó2, that is
names for all numbers z such that r.62 is finite or infinitesimal
term-forming operators {*, -, x, l}
If ú is any name then 1(ú) : [t]
1(*) and 1(-) are addition and subtraction on the set of equivalence classes
of numbers finite or infinitesimal wr.t. lf 62
For multiplication, if ú1 and t2 are terms with [ú1] : [0], then 1(ú1 xt2):
I(t2xtr) : [the representative of zerc.t2]:162.1"2l. (Note that here x is the
term forming operator and . is multiplication between hyperreal numbers.)
If neitner [út] : [0] nor ltrl : [0] then: (4.4.I) if not both ([ú1] is infinire
and [ú2] is infinite), then 1(ú1 x t2):ltr.t2l; else (4.4.2) if both [ú1] and [ú2]
are infinite, then I(t1x ú2) is not defined.





The notion of infinitude of equivalence classes is well defined in that every
member is an infinite hyperreal number. Similarly for middlesized and infinitesimal
numbers. Addition and subtraction of numbers finite or infinitesimal w.r.t. ll6,
remain noninfinite w.r.t. \f 62, so there is no need to restrict these operations.
Division and reciprocation are set aside for a while.
Proposition 7.2. (1) For any term l, l- f x 0 : 0 iff ú.6 is infinitesimal. (2) If
f is noninfinite, then l- f x 0 : 0.
Proof. (1) l- lx0:0 ifr I(t x0:0) e {8,?} itrI(tx0) :1(0). Now
I(tx0) :[62.t]and/(0) :[0].But[á2.ú] :[0] itró2.úisinfinitesimalw.r.r. ó,rhar
is itr 62.t16 is infinitesimal, iff ú.ó is infinitesimal. (2) If I is noninfinite then ú.ó is
infinitesimal; then apply (1). !
Thus the use of a representative of zero does not disturb the 'nullifying' property
of multiplication by zero of noninfinite numberc (e.g. reals). Similarly some but not
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all infinite numbers with names in the theory are nullified by zero. For example, let
H be the name of the infinite numbe¡ which is the reciprocal of 62 in the classical
hyperreals,ret Hl be the name ol2f 62,Iet H2 be the name orrf 6, and let H3be
the name of lf 6z/s. All these names occur in the theory since É11ó2 is finite. But
l- fI x 0 : 1 and l- H1 x 0 :2 andl H2 x0 : á and F Ërs x 0 : 0, (though not
I H2 x 0 : 0, since á/ó is not infinitesimal).
As was seen in Chapter 5, multiplication of noninfinite numbers by noninfinite
numbers is functional. But this is not in general true of multiplication of noninfinite
numbersbyinfinitenumbers. Forexample, l- 5: b*ó2 and I H: H+6, but not
l- 5 x H : (5*ó2) x (H +ó2) nor even l- 5 x H : (5+ 62) x H. This is because
[(5 I 6r).f1] : [(5.f1) +(6r.H)]: [(5.f1) +1]+ [5.ã], so rhat 1((5+ 6"), H) +
1(5 x fI). Multiplication is however perfectly well-defined in the theory. The failure
of functionality at this point does not seem particularly troublesome or bad. It is
related to resolution of the smearing of zero, in that multiplication of the zero
difference between two numbers by a sufficiently large infinite number can produce
a nonzero (though possibly still infinitesimal) difference. We also have:
Proposition 7.3. If 1(¿1 x ú2) is defined, then it is noninfinite w.r.t. rl6";
similarly for addition and subtraction.
Proof' Names are restricted to numbers which are noninfinite w.r.t. I162. The
sum and difference of any such numbers are likewise restricted; while multiplication
is defined only when at least one number is finite, and the product of a finite number
by one noninfinite w.r.t. 1162 \s likewise. ¡
Reciprocals and division can be added to the theory, for example by setting
1(¿-t) : [ú-t] for all ú such that neither ó.ú nor 6lt is infinite (e.g. alI reals, á1l2,
5-tlz, etu.)- This gives I(t x ¿-t) : [¿.¿-t] : [1], thus l- ú x ú-r : r. However
reciprocation is not everywhere functional. Fol example, let ú1 - á and tz : 6 + 62.
Then F tt: ú2;but (tr'-t;')16: ttr.tit(tr- tr)16: (á2+á3)-r.5zl6: Ile+62)
which is not infinitesimal, so that not l- l¡1 : úr 2. Reciprocation of small enough
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nonzero numbers thus 'unsmears identity'. As usual, however, reciprocation is
functional on the middlesized numbers: if l- ú1 :tz and both are middlesized; then
since (1,I - t;t)/6 : çtrt2)-r.(t, - t)16 and the latter is infinitesimal, so is the
former.
Summarising, the theory is functional for {+, -}; and functional for multipli-
cation where it is desirable, on middlesized numbers. Elsewhere, identities are
unsmeared by multiplication by large enough numbers. Multiplication by zero nul-
lifies middlesized numbers, as well as all infinitesimals and some infinite numbers.
Multiplication of zero by big enough numbers unsmears the zero to produce a
product which is at most middlesized, and which depends on the size of the infinite
number. There is no biggest infinite number but there is a biggest order of size, in
that numbers infinite w.r.t. Il62 do not exist.
The latter dependency can be exploited in an account of derivatives of incon-
sistent continuous functions.
Definition 7.4. a(t) is the function from {r : r is hyperreal and r.62 is
noninfinite) to itself; with the property that A(ú) : 0 if t : 0 does not hold, else
A,(t) : 17.
To find the area function for A in DR, draw at zero a rectangle of base zero
units (that is a vertical line abov e zero) with height 11. Take the infinite Riemann
sum over the interval [4, ö] including 0 w.r.t. the partition determined by the
infinitesimal dt : 62. The contributions of all terms for which A(ú,) : 0, are
obviously zero. The only nonzero contribution to the infinite Riemann sum is the
area of the line of height H at t: 0. The area of a line of finite height is, naturally
enough, zero: base x height : 0 x noninfinite number : 0. But the area of a
line of infinite length can be nonzero: 0 x Ë1 : 62 x H : L Clearly also, this is
the magnitude of a unit instantaneous jump in an ìnconsistent continuous function.
Thus A(l) can serve as the derivative of such functions, and conversely the integral
of A is the instantaneous one unit jrl-p. Should the instantaneous jnmp be from
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lc1 to lc2, there is then a natural measure of the magnitude and sign of the rate of
jrr-p in (k2 - frr).4(0), that is (fr2 - *r).H. Note also that the A-function can be
translated r units along the ú-axis by A,(ú) :df L(t + r).
This method of integration doesn't work with the area functions of Chapter b,
since there resolution of the ú-axis below the order of magnitude of ó2 is forbidden.
So one can say that the normal area functions of C R apply until the function jumps
instantaneously, and then its derivative is in a different space D-R where Riemann
sums are taken w-r.t. partitions of size 0, that is 62. Needless to say, it is not
claimed that this is the 'right' account of the delta function, only that it is an
account' Also, it is not apparent how to go on to differentiate delta functions in
turn by these methods, but then there appear not to be any meaningful intuitions
about that anyway.
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CHAPTER 8: INCONSISTENT SYSTEMS OF
LINEAR EQUATIONS
1. Introduction
The existence of the inconsistent case of a system of linear equations (or for that
matter any system of constraints, not necessarily linear) has been known for a long
time, but there has been no attempt to analyse its structure. There would seem
to be good reason to do so, if only because the state of affairs might arise in a real
life control system (see sections 3 and 4). Using the methods developed so far, it
is possible to say something about the structure of solutions to such cases; though
it must be confessed that in the end the situation remains less than satisfactory.
2" The Inconsistent Case
Consider a system ,9 of n linear equations in s unknowns Í1, ...¡fr" having
an n x s coefficient matrix Mc : [ø;¡] and an r¿ x (s + 1) augmented matrix
Ma: lMc,B), where B : collh...,bnl is the column vector of constants. The
usual story is that ^9 has a solution iff the row rank r of Mc: the row rank of
Ma, and,S has a unique solution iff in addition r : s. We concentrate mostly on
the first of these, looking briefly at the second later. Clearly r ( rowrank(Ma),
since every row ol Mc is part of a row or Ma. But if r < rowrank(Ma), then
elementary row operations on Ma wlII produce an equivalent matrix with zeros
everywhere below row r except in column s + 1. This corresponds to the equations
0 : å"+r ,0 : br+2r. . . ,0 : b, where one or more of the br¡¡ are nonzero. This is
an inconsistency, so that it is impossible to satisfy ,S below row r. Hence ,9 has no
solutions. (See e.9. Perlis [44], Birkhoff and Maclane [4].)
But if there were inconsistent arithmetics in which 0 : ó,+r ,0 : b,+2,. . . could
all hold, then there would be no particular reason why all of the equations of ,9
could not hold simultaneously. So we can begin by informally postulating structures
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in which 0 : ó"+r,0 : b,+2,... hold inconsistently, that is where - 0 : ó"+1,
- 0 : b,+2¡ -. . and a reasonable amount of classical real number theory also hold.
The distinctive role piayed in S by the column vector of constants motivates
the following definition, particularly part (3).
Definition 8.1. (1) A matrix M is row reduced if (a) every leading entry of a
nonzero row is 1, and (b) every column containing such a leading entry I has all
other entries zero.
(2) M is in row echelon form (REF) if also (c) each zero row comes below all
nonzero rows' and (d) leading coefficients begin further to the right as one goes
down.
(3) An augmented matrix Ma - lM.,B] is in wealc row echelon form (WFÙEF) if
Mcis in REF.
Thus M¿ in WREF might look iike
MaI:
when deleting the last column produces a matrix in row echelon form
It is obvious that any matrix regarded as an augmented matrix can be trans-
formed to one ìn WRBF using elementary row operations, and that some sequence
of operations on an augmented matrix M a sttffi,ces to reduce its coefficient matrix
M c to its unique REF. Further, M a arises from a consistent set of equations j ust in
case there are no rows with a nonzero only in the last column. Note that the usual
process of determining a basis for the rowspace of M a considered simply as a matrix
(rather than as an augmented matrix arising from a set of equations) goes beyond
WREF to produce RtrF in Ma, that is a 1 in row r * I (where rowrank(Mc) : ,)
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dealing even with the consistent case, so we deal with WREF's. These diverge from
REF's only when rowrank(Mc) < rowrank(Ma), that is when ^9 is an inconsistent
set of equations.
The rowrank of Mc can be read off from any WRtrF row-equivalent to Ma,
as the number of nonzero rows discounting the last place. The rowspace of any
matrix in WREF is identical with that of its unique REF. It does not seem to
be determinate whether one should say that the rowrank of. Ma is the number of
nonzero rows in the WRtrF, or the generally lesser number of rowrank(Mc) +I.
The latter is favored by the classical treatment of linear algebra, but the former
has certain advantages in inconsistent situations.
In general more than one sequence of elementary row operations suffices to
reduce Mc to REF. If and only if ^9 is consistent, exactly those sequences of row
operations reduce Ma to REF. If S is inconsistent, just those sequences of row
operations reduce M a to WREF. Furthermore, each such sequence produces a
unique vector of constants in column s + 1 with at least one nonzero entry below
row r. However, the rowspace spanned by the first r row vectors of a WREF of
Ma is not unique. For example, consider
Ma2 :
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While first interchanging the first and fourth rows then performing the same oper-
ations gives the WRtrF
Ma4:
where the rowspace spanned by the first three rowvectors is different in Ma3 from
Ma4. Nonetheless, two aspects are determinate.
(") Given a selection of r linearly independent rowvectors, reducing just these
to REF uniquely determines the constants ó"..,.1 ¡br!2t... lower down (since in
the coefficient matrix Mc every row lower down than row r is a unique linear
combination of earlier rows, and this linear combination carries the ó"1¿ along
with it).
(b) There are only a bounded number of selections of r linearly independent
rowvectors from the rz x (s -|- 1) matrix Ma.
So we can think of an augmented matrix reduced to WREF as containing two
parts: (i) the first r rows, spanning a (classical) r-dimensional vector subspace of
V,+t(F), and constituting a consistent set of linear relationships between the vari-
ables 11 . . . r" which can be satisfied in some classìcal (s - r)-dimensional solution
space (which is exactly how one would say it in the case where r: rowrank(Ma),
see [4], p.169); plus (ii) a set of propositions of the form 0 : br+r¡} : b,+2,... to
be satisfied conjointly in an inconsistent arithmetic. (It is also desirable that these
parts interact.) And furthermore there are a bounded number of consistent solution
spaces and each determines a unique set of inconsistent arithmetical propositions.
So one can informally define a solution structure for a set S of n linear equations
in s unknowns to be a finite collection {C¡} where each C, has two interacting
parts, a classical (s - r)-dimensional solution space, and a structure in which a set












solution, then, would be a vector of constant values for z1 . . . z" satisfying the set
of relationships of the consistent solution space (that is, lying in one of the (s -
r)-dimensional classical solution spaces), and interacting with the corresponding
inconsistent mathematical theory. In the case where ^9 is consistent, these reduce
to the classical definitions of solution space and solution, since the second part of
the definitions covering inconsistency becomes inoperative.
The situation would be less flexible if it was permitted to go beyond WREF to
REF for Ma by reducing all or even any of the 0 : b,+; to 0 : 1 by multiplying by
(ó"+t)-t; and even less flexible if one then cleared all other places in col[ó1 ...b^].
Aside from mathematical interest, at least one good reason for disallowing this is a
functional one. Division by ze¡o remains functionally chaotic despite all attempts to
do so inconsistently. But if division by zero is disallowed, then division by anything
equal to zero, such as b,+rt.. . , ought also to be disallowed, on pain of failure of
functionality. That is, when 0 : ó,+r holds then (ó,a1)-1 should be undefined. But
it is (ö,a1)-r which is needed to be the multiplier to red.uce 0 : ó"+r to 0 : 1, or
to 0 : b,¡2 fot that matter. That is to say, when dealing with inconsistent sets of
equations, reduction to WREF is correct and preferred to REF, while there is no
disagreement in the consistent case. A slight problem arises because in arriving at
a wREF, multiplication by (ó"*r)-t might have been used in reducing Mc to REF
and it might seem that even this move should be disallowed. Against this it seems
fair to say that in reducing M c to REF one is remaining within the consistent part
of the solution space, so one is entitled to use (ó,+r)-t with its classical meaning.
3. Control Theory
Modern control theory describes control systems in terms of a (column) vector u
of inputs, a vector ¿ of inner states, and a vector y of outputs. A plant functioning
stably can be described as a linear transformation (matrix) M representing the
laws governing the plant, and transforming input into output in accordance with
y(t): M-u(t), where I is the time variable. A more detailed analysis of such plants,
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incorporating feedback and the state vector r, is standardly given by supposing
four matrices A,B,C,D with the two relations r(ú + 1) : Ar(t) -l Bu(t): and
A(t) -- Cr(t) + Du(t). However, it is not necessary to incorporate those relations
at the present stage.
An unexpected and persistent change is postulated in the output. Since the
change is significant and nontransient, it can be regarded as originating from a
change in the physical laws of the plant described by M. This leads to a distinc-
tion between the matrices MoId and Mnew. Mold (the original M) is responsible
for the predicted value of the output, ypred; and Mnew is responsible for the ob-
served value of the output, yobs. Mold was known when the plant was functioning
correctly; Mnew is unknown but its result yobs is known through observation.
One can now define a machine to be malfunctioning \ff yobs I ypred, otherwise
wellfunctioning.
A standard situation in modern control theory is to determine from an observed
stream of outputs yobs(ú) what is the nature of the linear plant, Mnew, responsible
for them. The approach taken here is different. There might be a real-time prob-
lem: the problem of keeping some control before Mnew is ascertained, let alone
rectified back to Mold. So one wants to see if there are ways of operating the plant
(modifying the st¡eam of inputs) under the anomalous conditions without complete
shutdown or explosion.
Applying ideas from earlier in this chapter, one would like to form a model of
the malfunctioning plant which exploits inconsistency to represent quantitatively
the discrepancy between ypred and yobs. A desirable constraìnt would be that
the inconsistency disappears when the plant wellfunctions. Accordingly) one can
form the augmented checlcmatrir for a plant, consisting of a core which is Mold,
an extra column which is yobs, and a bottom row (checkrow) which is the sums
of each of the columns except lhat the RH cell is Dypred. Subjected to trref, it
can be shown that the RH corner entry is zero if yobs : ypred. When the corner
entry is nonzero, it is a parameter which identifies an inconsistent mathematical
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environment which can be represented in a software controller. There are a number
of options for the way in which input can be modified by the controller with the
aim of eventual wellfunctioning.
That is, the controller forms an inconsistent model of the nature of the mal-
functioning plant. A desirable behaviour for malfunctioning plants is that, under
the influence of the inconsistent controller, the plant eventually becomes wellfunc-
tioning simply by means of modifying the input. This proves to be possible. On
the other hand, among plants which are not eventually wellfunctioning there can
be defined several types.
(") A plant cycles iff yobs(t) : yobs(f * k) for some ,b and all ú (or all ú after
some appropriate ú6).
(b) A plant is persistent iff yobs(¿) : yobs(t * fr) for all k and all ú (after
some appropriate ú6). Note that it is possible to have a malfunctioning but
persistent plant, i.e. in which yobs(t) remains constant but never equals
ypred(ú).
(") A plant is bounded iff no component of yobs(ú) ever gets more than a fixed
number fr from zero, for all f. A plant may be bounded without either
cycling or persistence.
(d) A plant is defined (operationally) to explode iff some component of yobs
exceeds a predetermined bound (in software simulations it has been taken
to be 10000).
For a plant which does not eventually wellfunction, any of the above behaviours
(u)-(.) is a substitute in which functioning is not too degraded, so all of these
behaviours are more desirable than explosion.
AII of the above behaviours have been observed in software simulations
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4. Applications, Problerns and Special Cases
An application might be a machine with a range of sensor inputs, controlled by
a system of simultaneous equations. Supposing that one sensor becomes faulty, and
begins returning a value zero for a particular variable, the matrix might go incon-
sistent and become impossible to invert to find stable settings. In the circumstance
one does not want chaos, and it might be that the best fault-tolerant software is
one which rides with the contradiction until things are straightened out.
There is no problem about the logical aspects of solution structures for incon-
sistent systems of simultaneous equations, as is clear from previous chapters. But
functionality is more than usually problematic. The difficulty is to find a theory in
which all the ó¡a¿ are identified with zero and their inverses undefined. The obvious
manoeuvre is to go to an additive group as in Chapter 6, undefining all multipli-
cation but integer multiplication. The worst case here would be trying to satisfy
jointlg say, 0 : zr and 0 -- 2, since there is no greatest common integer divisor for
a single base equation. Unfortunately, the worst case looks to be the typical case.
Nevertheless, there are a number of special cases which are more tractable.
(1) If the field F over which the vector space is constructed is the integers
modulo a finite or infinite prime, then there is no problem in taking the greatest
common divisor of the b,-,.;. From the base 0 : ó,+; all the others follow, and the
vector or vectors in the solution space are readily represented in the inconsistent
arithmetic. Needless to say if the b,¡; are relatively prime then the base is 0: 1,
which is bad if one remains with integers. But one can be lucky and avoid total
collapse of functional structure when they are not relatively prime, which might
serve to avoid total degeneration of information in a control system. (Birkhoff and
Maclane treat the consistent case, see [a], pp.aO-aa.)
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(2) If the field is .Ê, and there is only one 0 : b,+i, and in the additive
group on the interval [0, ó"*t) the vector relationships of the first r rows of the
WRtrF can be represented, then combined with a judicious change of scale to
expand that interval, this might be a practical proposal for control systems. Also,
it appears fairly straightforward to separate several inconsistencies into several
'logical dimensions' or 'logical subspaces' (with logical projectìon operators) in each
of which only one inconsistency holds. This option is available and usefui whatever
one does to superpose the inconsistent substates. If such logical separation could
correspond, or be made to correspond, to relative causal separation of subparts
of the control system, then reasonable control might be achieved for each of the
separately inconsistent subsystems, or at least the area of lack of control isolated
(always a paraconsistentist ideal).
(3) The role of computers as engines of empirical arithmetic can't be overlooked.
Supposing that it is decided to input all data in the data-type integer (which is by
no means impossible if a judicious choice of scale size is made), then for example
Pascal comes with built-in maximum and minimum integers, just as in the finite
inconsistent case. (e.g. Maxlnt : 32767, -Maxlnt : -32768, Maxlonglnt :
2147483647.) The inconvenience of small numbers compared with floating-point
numbers might be outweighed by increased control over inconsistent situations.
There might be no reason to switch on the fault-tolerance module until inconsis-
tency manifests itself. But even floating-point arithmetic is finite (and inevitably
'approximate', that is approximate to something called a real number). Empirical
arithmetic exists, and all computer calculations are carried out in it. So there does
not seem to be anything wrong in principle with integer representations of a prob-
lem. (If there is a difficulty it is with how finite human brains can imagine that
finite output represents something infinite, a real number.) But if integer represen-
tations are always OK for a control system, then perhaps there is no real difficulty
in always exploiting their inconsistency-tolerance.
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(4) A different style of solution is to associate the rows below r with incon-
sistencies in different dimensions in the state space of the plant: 0 : ó,-.,r-1 gm,
0 : b,+z volts, . . . and the like. Thus inconsistency in one dimension of the phase
space ought not to affect consistency or inconsistency in an orthogonal dimension.
This approach is still in an early stage of development.
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CHAPTER g: PROJECTIVE SPACES
1. Introduction
A common construction (following more-or less that of Birkhoff and Maclane
[+]) of the projective plane Pt(F) over a field F, begins with the 3D vector
space V"(F) and then'identifies'nonzero triples of members of F, (*r,rr,r.) :
(*\,r'r,r!) if for some nonzero a e F and for all i < 3, r; - ar'r. The equivalence
classes so formed are the points of. P2(F). The lines of P2(F) correspond to, or
'are', planes in I/3(F); that is seús of solutions ("r, rz,rz) of linear homogeneous
equations Da¿r¿:0 where eacha¿ € fl and not all a;:0. One can then identify
lines by (or'identify'lines'with') the triples of coefficients (a1,az,as)i noting that
iÎ a I 0, then al a;x¿ : 0 determines the same set of solutions as ! a;r,; : Q, st
that the projective line whose coefficients are (a1 )a2,a3) is identical with the line
whose coefficients are a(alrazraz).
In order to keep track of the source of the triples (*r,*r,r3) in this con-
struction, the notion of homogeneous coordinates is introduced. Again the
terminology is somewhat anomalous: Birkhoff and Maclane (p.275) for exam-
ple speak of homogeneous coordinates of points as the triples (*r,rr,z3) 'with
the identification' (r1,r2,xs) : a(x1,r2,r3) when a f 0. With the same
'identification', triples (41, az,az) are homogeneous coordinates of lines. One
can then proceed to define'(*r,rrrr3) on (or,or,ca)'to mean Do¿r¿: 0;
'(r1,12,r3) is a point' or 'P(rr,:L2jr3)) to mean '(lor, a2,as)((r1jiL2)iL3) on
(orror,¿s))'; '(¿r, azras) is a line' or'L(r1,r2,:13)'to mean,(lor, a2,a3)((t1):r2,r 3)
on (a1 ,az,az))'; and '(a1, az,az) contains (*r,*r,23)' to mean ,(rr,rr,r3) on
(ay,a2,a3)'. The familiar duality is easily seen to follow, whereby the transfor-
mation (:,P,tr,on,contains)--+(:, L,P,contains,on) preserves true sentences.
However, if (21, rzr:Ls) and (4r1, o,x)2,ax:3) are distinct triples then they are not
literally identical homogeneous coordinates. One should speak rather ol clifferent
co-ordinates of the same point, with the recognition that qu¿ representations of
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the one thing, a point, they behave congruently w.r.t. its properties. Similarly,
triples (*r,*",23) and (ar1,o'r2,ar3) are not literally identical if they are distinct
members of the one equivalence class, a point. There should then be an explanation
of this common bú literally false terminology; and of course one which does not
disturb the entirely correct orthodox account in terms of equivalence classes just
given, but rather augments it. In this chapter an explanation is offered in terms of
literal inconsistent identities.
First the case of inconsistent vector spaces is considered. In section 3 incon-
sistent projective planes are constructed, in which homogeneous coordinates are
inconsistently identified. It turns out to be easier to inconsistentise projective
spaces than vector spaces, as the example of the projective plane over .R shows.
In section 4, projective planes over consistent and inconsistent fields modulo an
infinite prime are constructed. In these the usual projective duality holds for a
strengthened set of concepts which contains 'finite, and ,infinite' as well.
2. Vector Spaces
Take background Iogic RM3, and consider any one of the finite inconsistent
fields modulo a prime p with names for all the integers, of Chap ter 2. Call it f',
and construct the theory vt(F) as follows. Add as terms all triples (tr,tr,ú3) where
the ú; are terms from F. Take term-forming operators * and . (the latter usually
suppressed) for vector addition and scalar multiplication. The domain D has all
triples from {0,1,..., p-1}, and the operations of vector addition and scalar multi-
plication on the usual classical vector space constructed on the finite classical field
modulo p. Set I((tr,tz,tr)) : (ú, mod p,ú2 mod p,ú3 mod p); set 1(+) :s1¿r.¡.r1
vector addition mod p and set 1(.):.lur.ical scalar multiplication mod p. This
induces as in Chapter 2,
I ((t r, tz, ts) * (t., t r, ta)) : 1(+ ) (1( (t r, tr, h)), I ((t4,úr, tu) ) )
and I(t.(tt,tr,tr)) : I(.)UU), I((tr,tr,tr))).
Finally set 1((11, tz,ts): (tn,ts,tu)): B iÎ I((tr,tz,tz)): I((ts,tu,úu)), else 1: f-.
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Now, for example, l- (0, 1,2): (p,p+l,p*z) k, - (0,1,2) : (p,p*I,p+z),
as well as l- (0, 1,2) : (p+1).(0,f,2) k, - (0,1,2) : (r+1).(O,t,Z¡, and
l- (0, 1,2)+(0, 1,0): (0,2,2) & -(0, r,2)+ (0, 1,0) :(0,2,2), and
F -(0,7,2):(0,2,2), but not F (0,1,2):(0,,2,2).
Proposition 9.1. V"(F) is transparent
Proof left to the reader.
Proposition 9.2. All first order extensional sentences of the classical theory
of vector spaces hold in V"(F).
Proof. Consider the classical finite vector space mod p; that is the above
structure modified so that there are only a finite number of names {0, 1, . . . ,p - r},
and 1((Í1,tz,ts) : (tq,úu,úu)) : T iÎ 1((¿r,tz,ts)) : I((tn,fu,úo)), else 1 - F.
As is well known this satisfies all the axioms for vector spaces and their classical
consequences. Add the infinite number of names {p + t,.. .} and all complex
terms generated by the term-forming operators. For any new term f or (ú1, tr,ts)
set 1(f) : ú mod p or l((t1,tr,t")) : (ú, modp,ú2 modp,ú3 modp) respectively.
Obviously the addition of the extra names makes no difference to the value of the
sentence not containing them, since they map congruently onto existing names (or
appeal to Proposition 2.14). Change the model so that I'(term1 - term2) : B ifr
I'(term1) :I'(termz). By Extendability (Proposition 2.I0).,1'extends I. Bú Il
determines V=(F), so all extensional sentences of classical vector space theory hold
in V3F. tr
It is also obvious that I/3(.F) extends the classical theory of the integers. In
addition it is clear that this method of construction of inconsistent vector spaces
suffers the same limitations as inconsistent fields, because any limitations on the




Proceeding to projective geometries over these structures, add to the do-
main D the equivalence classes [(r, y,z)] of triples from {0,1,..., p - I}, where
l(*,y, z)l: lta(r,y,z)l: l(tor,uy,uz)l for all w + 0, the last three products being
mod p. These equivalence classes form a classical projective geometry in the usual
way. This can be described in the classical structure (D,I) where I((tr,tz,h)):
[(f(¿t), I(tr),f(¿r))]; and /(term1 : term2) : T iff /(term1) : I(termz) else 1 : F;
and with'point','line', 'on', and 'contains'defined in the usual way (see above this
section, for a more full description see below this section). Notice that in lhe lan-
guo'ge only the hornogeneous coordinates (t1rtz,ts) appear as terms, the equivalence
classes l(tt,tr,ú3)] do not appear. This is where the distinction between objects of
the space and their names is being made: coordinate systems are naming systems,
a natural view from elsewhere e.g. differential geometry. (Nonetheless it is appro-
priate to take the long term view that this distinction should be blurred, so as to
be dealing with mathematical structures and objects with inconsistent properties.)
However this l fails to reflect the origin of the úi as natural number terms and the
(tr,t",f3) as being inconsistently identified with certain (tn,tr,,Í6) in the underlying
vector space. In addition, the aim of representing homogeneous coordinates in terms
of inconsistent identifications is not realised. There are (at least) two structures in
which these aims can be more adequately realised.
For both of these structures, it is useful to introduce two new sets of metalin-
guistic variables rrtrtr,t. . .and c, arte2r. . . ranging over names and {+, -, x, /}
compositions of them, to reflect the differing roles of points and lines in the pro-
jective geometry. If 11,r2rz3 âre any such terms, introduce 'P(rr,:121r3)i intended
to mean'(*r,rr,r3) is a point'. Also, if atta2¡û,3 â.r€ any such terms, introduce
the predicate'L(a1,az,az)' intended to mean '(or,orra3) are the coefficients of a
line'; and the two relations'(rr,rr,r3) on (or,or,ø3)'for,The point (rr,*r,r3) is
on the line whose coefficients are (a1, az)a3))) and'(a1, az,as) contains (r1,r2,r3)'
for'The line whose coefficients are (a1 ,a2,a3) contains the point (r1,r2,r3)'.
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These predicates and relations are still only syntax, so it is necessary to specify
the interpretation function for sentences containing them, and for identity sentences
as well. Only then can the resultant theory be judged as a projective geometry. As
I just said there are two ways to do this. The first way is as follows.
Set 1(P(r1,rz,xs)) : B i|[(1("r), I(r"),1("3))j is a point in classical projective
geometry on the domain else 1 : F; set I(L(a¡az,az)) : B if. [(1(rr), I(o"),1(rr))]
is the coefficient of a line in the domain; set 1((r1, r2,,rr) on (ø1 ,a2,as)) : B
if 1((ø1, rz,rs)) is a point and 1((a1, az,az)) is a line and ! airi - 0; and set
1((ot, a2)a3) contains (*r,rr,rr)) : I((*r,xz,rs) on (ø1, az,az)). And then for
identity sentences set /(terml : term2) : B il l(term1) :I(termz), else I: F.
(The specification is somewhat roundabout for the case of finite geometries, but it
is adequate and has the merit of permitting easy generalisations where the domain
is not finite.)
This model produces an inconsistent projective geometry (see below); but a
second structure, which confines the inconsistency in a more sensitive fashion, is
as follows. Let the interpretation of 'P'r'L'r'on', and tcontains' be classical,
that is change B to T in the interpretation of these predicates. This obviously
ensures that the first order sentences in the {P,Lron,contains} language which
hold are exactly those of classical finite projective geometry mod p, including the
characteristic (2, y)((LrkLy) > (=")(Pz k z oî r þ. z on v)), i.e. any lines have
a point in common. (It needs identity to state 'exactly one'.) But also continue
with /(terlrìl : term2) : B if /(term1) : I(te.mz), else I : F. This has the
effect of confining the inconsistency to identity statements between what from the
traditional point of view are homogeneous coordinates, and it is only from that
source that inconsistency arises. This then is the promised account of identifying'
homogeneous coordinates: homogeneous coordinates are inconsistently identif,ed,
and disidentified just when they are coordinates of the same classical equiualence
class.
This structure is a projective geometry in the sense that all extensional first
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order sentences of projective geometry hold (by Extendability). There seems to be
some difference as to what is the mark of a projective geometry, or what constitute
the propositions of projective geometry. Birkhoff and Maclane ([4], p.275) have a
simple account: any two distinct points are on a unique line plus duality, both of
which hold in the inconsistent structures. Coxeter's ([9], p.230-1) is less simple, but
his axioms are still first order, so must hold in the first order classical structures,
so in the inconsistent structures. Both inconsistent models above are transparent
(proof omitted). Summarising,
Proposition 9.3. There are inconsistent transparent theories in which all
sentences holding in classical projective geometry hold.
This has been done here for the finite projective geometries, but it can also
be done for P2(R), the projective plane over .R. For all triples of real num-
bers ø1, 12¡rs take the equivalence classes Í(*t,rr,"r)] : l(.*r,wr2ruxs)l and
set 1(ø1, rz,rz) : [(rt, xz,rz)l and then give the same conditions on 1 as above.
The point is that this does not collapse from functionality limitations en incon-
sistent -R, because the functional language {+,-, X,/} is discarded in moving to
the projective language {:, P,,L,on,contains}. This example is discussed further
in Chapter 10 in connection with ìts topological aspects. It is not necessary to
have an inconsistent fleld to start with. The example shows this, but also note
that inconsistency in the base field is irrelevant to the construction of the flnite
geometries above.
4. Projective Geometry Modulo Infinity
This section uses the type of construction of the previous section except that
consistent and inconsistent fields modulo an infinite prime are used. In these struc-
tures the usual projective duality results can be strengthened to a language con-
taining 'finite' and 'infinite' when these are suitably defined. Sylvester's Theorem
is also considered.
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There are both consistent and inconsistent projective structures over the
fields modulo an infinite prime p. For both, for any terms ty,t2,t3 let
I((tr,tr,ts)): [ú, mod p,,t2 rnod p, t3 mod p)], where the equivalence classes are
equal in the domain just when their members are a multiple mod p of one another.
The consistent case is the same as for modulo finite p, with l(P(ryr2,rs)): f
if (r1, r2.,rr) is a point in the domain projective space, else 1 - F; etc.; and
I(term1 - term2) : T \f /(term1) :I(termz), else I : F. The two inconsistent
cases change 7 to B respectively (a) for all atomic sentences, or (b) for all identi-
ties only. Both are transparent, and (b) confines the inconsistency to the effects of
the inconsistent identification of homogeneous co-ordinates as before. Now some
definitions are needed.
Definition 9.4. In either consistent or inconsistent theories, a point is infi,nite
if it is identical only with points having at least one component r; which is an
infinite nonstandard number, else finite. Similarly for lines.
An infinite line is not the same thing as a line at infinity, which does not appear
in the present account. Problem: which inconsistent identities are needed to get
ir?
Proposition 9.5. There are finite points and lines, and infinite points and
lines.
Proof. For finite points and lines, consider the equivalence class of any triple
all of whose components are finite. For infinite triples, consider (1, -1,r) (any
z), that is (1, p - 7,r). If (1, -\,r) were finite, then for some finite t1,t2,t3
l- (1, -1, r) : (ú1 ,tz,tz).That is, for some k < p- 1, [k(1, -l, r)] : [(tr, ú2, ú3)]. So
in particular k. - | -- tz which is a finite number. Hence fr must equal -ú2. But
it was seen in Chapter 3 that the additive inverse of a finite number is an infinite
number (in fact p - tz), so ,b is an infinite number. But then the first component
Æ.1 is equal to 11 which is thus infrnite, contrary to the supposition that ú1 is finite.
Hence (1, -1,r) is infinite, either as a point or as the coefficients of a line. !
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We recall that the first order duality principle for projective geometry is as
follows: if .9 is any sentence in the language {:,p,L,on,contains} and s, is the
result of interchanging 'P' with 'L' and 'on' with 'contains', then s holds iff s,
holds. In the present consistent and inconsistent models there is an extended
duality principle, that the same interchange preserves 'holds' in a strong language
also containing 'finite' (and a fortiori'infinite'). This might be described as an
invariance theorem for 'finite' and 'infinite'. For this, the word 'finite' has to be
included in the object language with an appropriate semantic interpretation, so for
any number terms t1,t2,t3 whose moduli are not all zero, set /(Finit e(fi,t2,t")) : T
if (úr, tz,ts) is finite, else 1 - F. This obviously induces an interpretation on
'infinite' -df '- finite'. Let S be a sentence in the language with ,finite' added,
and let,9'be the result of interchanging'p'with ,L, and,,on'with,contains'.
Proposition 9.G. (Duality) .9 holds iff.g, holds.
Proof. By induction on the number of occurrences of {-, &, v} to prove that
1(S) :1(^9').
(Base:) Atomic sentences are of the form p(term), tr(term), Finite(term), terml
on term2, terml contains term2, and terml : termz. But by inspection of 1,
in all the models /(P(term)) : I(L(term)), and /(terml on termz) : /(termr
contains term2). Nor do these reversals have any effect on identity or finitude:
/(term1 : term2) holds independently of whether they are points or lines, and
1(Finite(term)) is similarly independent.
(- cl.ur"') If 1(S) : 1(S') then 1(-g) : 1(-S,).
(& clause:) Similar.
(V clause:) If 1(Sú) : I(S't) for all terms ú then I((r)Sr): 1((u )S,r). ¡
This proposition can be applied after the next one. Let (ay,az,az) be the
coefficients of a line tr where all of I ("0) l0 mod p.
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Proposition 9.7. If tr is finite then every point on ,[ is infinite.
Proof. If ,L is a finite line and P were a finite point on it then for some
(or.,or,ø3) and (rr,*r,r3) where all the a¿ and :x,¿ ale finite, none of the ø¿ is
classically identical with 0 mod p, at least one of the z; is not classically identical
with 0 mod p, and ! o,¿r; : Q. But this is impossible since the sum of products
would be a frnite positive number. n
Proposition 9.8. If P is a finite point satisfying the same conditions as tr in
the previous proposition, any line containing P is infinite.
Proof. By applying duality. tr
Note that these break down for any of the following triples/lines/points:
(rr,0,0) on (0, az,as) and (0,a2,0) and (0,0,43); (0,rr,0) on (ø1,0,¿s) and (ø1,0,0)
and (0,0, ¿s) etc. Say that a pair of points determ'ine a line if both are on it, and
that a pair of lines intersect in a point if both contain it. Then,
Proposition 9.9. Every pair of finite points determine an infinite line; every
pair of finite lines intersect in an infinite point.
Proof. The first part follows from the previous proposition; the second part
follows by duality. fl
While a finite point can only be on inflnite lines, an infinite point can be on
finite lines. Can an infinite point be on both finite and infinite lines? Can an
infinite line contain only infinite points?
Finally in this section we consider Sylvester's Theorem. This says that for any
positive integer n, if n points are not collinear, then there exists a line through
exactly two of them. Sylvester's Theorem holds in classical Euclidean geometry.
But it is known that it fails in the classical finite projective planes modulo p.
(Reason: In mod p,let n: p2 +p+l.These p2 lp* 1 points are not all collinear;
else some line has p2 +p { I points on it, whereas lines in this geometry have only
p + I points on them. But there is no line containing exactly two of them; since
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again every line has p + | points on it, while the p2 * p + 1 points exhaust the
whole space.) But this argument breaks down if p is an infinite prime, provided
that n is restricted Lo f,nite positive integers, because then n cannot be chosen to
b" p' I p * l. So the question is whether Sylvester's Theorem holds for either
the consistent or inconsistent projective geometries modulo infinite p? However, if
n is allowed to be unrestricted, that is any nonstandard integer as well, then the
above argument goes through and Sylvester's Theorem breaks down. Of course this
nonstandard version of Sylvester's Theorem (for any finite or infinite n collinear




Quotient constructions are a natural place to find inconsistent structures. In
this chapter, aspects of the quotient construction in topology are considered. This
requires the introduction of the primitive binary predicate € into the object lan-
guage. It is seen that there is an interaction between the topological properties of
the space from which the quotient topology arises, and the functionality of a natu-
ral class of inconsistent models and theories associated with them. A special case
of quotient constructions is the ubiquitous practice in topology of joining, cutting
or pasting, coming under the terminology of identification'. Similar points apply
as in the previous chapter. It is suggested on the basis of the present chapter that
there is no problem about taking this terminology literally in an inconsistent frame-
work. It is a convenient way of signalling the identiflcation relationship between
two spaces, to see one as an inconsistent functional extension of the othêr, or for
that matter an incomplete cut-down.
Let (X,,O) be a topological space where O is the collection of open subsets of
X, let ,B be an equivalence relation on X, let Xl-R be the induced quotient set,
let P be the induced projection P : X --+ XlR, and let Q be the induced quotient
topology on Xl-R (that is, Q:dT {S _c XIR: P-l(S) e O}). It is not difficult to
find inconsistent transparent structures which take this data into account.
To see this, let the language have as terms (i) all members of X, (ii) all subsets
of X including the null set A, (iii) the constant term O. As before t,t1,t2,... are
metalinguistic variables ranging over terms; as well, S, Sr, Sz, . . .are metalinguistic
variables ranging over terms which are subsets of X. There are two binary pred-
icates i:,€Ì, and all sentences of the form f € ^9 and S e O are stipulated to
be atomic. The set of sentences is the usual closure under {-,&,V}. Now given
(X,O,,R) define a model by:
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(1) I(t): P(t): [f] for all terms t in X-
(2) 1(S) : P(S) : P(Ë(S)) for all terms S ç X, where
R(S) :¿¡ {r : (ly)(Axyky € s)}.
(3) I(tr: tz) : B if 1(ú1) : I(tz), else 1 : F.
(4) I(t e .9) : B if 1(t) is in 1(.9), else 1: F'.
(5) 1(^91 : ^9r) : B if 1(.9r) : I(Sz), else 1: F.
(6) /(S e O): B if 1(S) is open in 1(O), i.e. 1(^9) e I(O), else /: ,F'.
This produces an inconsistent extension of the classical consistent complete theory
of the topology of (X, O), and it is straightforward to prove that 1 is transparent.
One could also have added into the object language terms for describing the con-
tents of X l,R and its topology, but the results following do not depend on the theory
containing descriptions of the behaviour of XlR, so it is better not to complicate
the issue (but it is a direction worth pursuing elsewhere). The behaviour ol XIR
has to be taken into account metalinguisticaily in the statements and proofs of the
propositions following, needless to say. AIso, the term-forming operations {n, U}
could be included in the object language connecting subsets of X or members of
O, and an interpretation induced with /(S1 U ^92) : /(St)U 1(Sr) and similarly for
lì, but this is not done here.
A more sophisticated model confines the inconsistency to those statements
which from the classical point of view are 'really' false. Keeping (1) and (2) as
before let
(3') I(tt:tz):T ifúr: t2inX,I(tt:tz): Bilh+t2inX but 1(¿1): I(tz),
else 1: F.
(4') 1(te .9) :Tif úis amemberof S, I(f € S) : Bif t isnot amemberof 
^9
but 1(l) is in 1(S), else 1: f'.
(5') 1(^91 :^9r) :?if .9r: Sz as subsets of X,l(.91 :.9r) : B if .9r I 52 but
/(St) :I(Sz),else1:F.
(6') 1(S e O):7if S isopen inO,1(S e O): Bif S isnot openin O but
1(S) is in 1(O), else 1: F.
This ÄM3-theory fails transparency if there is even one pair t1,t2 in X with
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Rti2 and ú1 not identical with t2 \n X : for then we have I(t, : t2) : fi :
I(-tt:tz) and so both tt : tz and - tt : tz hold; so that if the theory were
transparent -úr : úr would hold contradicting I(h: tt) : T. But the theory is
functional: an atomic equation holds iff it is true when interpreted in the classical
theory of the equivalence classes in Xl-R, and the latter is certainly functional. This
chapter shows, hopefully, that transparency is not a particularly strong desidera-
tum.
The class of theories considered in the rest of this chapter is obtained by taking
(1), (2), (3'), (4'), (5') and replacing (6') by:
(6") 1(.9 e O) : T iÎ S is open in O, else 1(^9 e O) : p. (One could also have B
instead of ? without affecting the following results.)
Given the data (X,o,r?) a unique structure satisfying (1)-(6") is induced, so it is
named M(X,O,R),, or M for short. The following results show that the function-
ality of M(X,,o, R) is related to the (classical) topological properties of (X, o) and
the properties of -r?.
Definition 1o.1. The projection map P : (X,o) - (xlR,O) ir said to be
openiff for any^9 ç x if S is open in o then P(^g) is open in e. (See Kelley [16],
p.e4.)
Proposition 10.2. If M(X,O, R) is functional then P is open.
Proof. If P is not open, then by Kelley [16] Theorem 10 p.97, there is a subset
S ç X open in O such that fi(S) is not open in O. Now 1(,S) : P(S) : p(Ë(S)) :
1(A(S)). Hence 1(.9 : ,q(S)) : T or B, that is
.9: A(S) holds in M (o)
Now .9 is open in O, so
SeOholdsinM (p)
Further, Ë(.9) is not open in O, so
1?(.9) € O does not hold in M (r)
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But (a), (B) and ('y) are jointly incompatible with the functionality or M
Definition 10.3. O+ : df {S ç X
O+ - {S g X : P-1(P(.9)) is open in O}.
P(.9) is open i" 0Ì; that is
In general O+ is not a topology, which perhaps accounts for its neglect: while
X and A are in O+ and O+ is a closed under arbitrary unions, it is not always
closed under finite intersections. However, the properties of O+ are related to the
topological properties of (X, O) and the functionality of M(X,O, R) as we will see.
One observation to make is that in general neither O C O+ (see Proposition 10.5)
nor O+ Ç O (see example following Proposition 10.11). Either of these can obtain
without the other, however, as can O : O+ (for example if O is the discrete or
indiscrete topology), in which case O* is a topology.
Proposition 10.4. If O : O+ then M (X , O , R) is functional.
Proof. Note that if.t1,,t2 are terms in X and tt: tz holds in M then substitu-
tions of t2 for f1 into atomic contexts are always functional: [tr] : [ú2] implies that
([11] isin[.9] itr[¿r] isin[s]). Henceif Misnotfunctional,theremustbesl,^92of
X such that in M, Sr: Sz and $ € O hold but Sz € O does not hold. If Sr € O
holds and o : o*, then 51 is in o+. So by definition of o+, p(Sr) is open in e.
If .91 : 52 holds in M, then P(.91) : P(,Sr). Hence P(Sz) is open ]n e. But if
Sz € o does not hold, then 52 is not open in o. rf o : o+ and Sz is not open in
o, then .92 is not in o+. But this is incompatible with p(sr) being open in Ç. ¡
Proposition 10.5. P is open itr O ç O+
Proof. L to R: Let P be open and let S be in o. since p is open, p(s) is in
8; ro ^9 is in o+ , by definition of o+. .R to tr : suppose p is not open. Then for
some S ç X, ^9 is in o and P(.9) is not in Q.Bv the latter, S is not in o+; that
isnotoco+. !
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Proposition 10.6. Il M(X,O, R) is functional, then O+ C O.
Proof. suppose not o+ C o; that is for some s c x,,s is in o+ and s is not
in o. If ,s is in o+ then P(^9) is in Q, so that p-t(p(s)) is in o. Thar is,
P-r(p(s)) € o holds in M. (o)
Now note that P(S) : P(P-t (P(S))). (Reason: [ú] is in p(S) itr ú is in p-l(p(S))
itr [f] is in P(P-1(P(S))).) Hence, 1(S) : I(e-r(p(S))). Thar is,
P-l(P(s)) : S holds in M. (p)
But since ,S is not \n O,
S e O does not hold in M (r)
However (o)., (þ) and (7) jointly imply that M is not functional.
Proposition 10.7. M(X,O,R) is function al tfr O : O+.
Proof. L to R If M is functional, then by proposition 10.2, p is open. So by
Proposition 10.5, o ç o*. By Proposition 10.6, o+ ç o; hence o : o+. R to L
is Proposition 10.4. D
Obvious examples of inconsistent functional theories, then, are those arising
from the discrete topology on any X and any R; since for these o : o+. (Reason:
Q: {s c xlt: P-l(s) is in o}. But every p-t(,s) is in the discrete topology
o, so every s in xlÆ is in Ç. Thus if .g is in o, then p(^9) is i., g. Hence p is
open.) Again, if fi is the identity relation, then for any (X, o), (xlï,Ç) is just
an isomorphic copy of (x,o); so that M(x,o,R) is functional. we see presently
that there are functional theories for other topologies.
Definition 1o.8- A space (x,o,R) is R-discrete iff for all r in x, if there is
ay in X with r ly and Rry then the singleton {r} is open.
Æ-discreteness is a kind of relativised discreteness, for example all spaces with
the discrete topology are r?-discrete for every Æ. Another property is:
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Proposition 10.9. If (X, O,R) is -R-discrete then p is open.
Proof. Let (x, o, R) be -R-discrete and ,5 be open in o. By Kelley [16] Theorem
10(b) p.97, it suffices to show that A(.9) is open in o. Let s1 : {r in .g : (ly in
X)(Rry and r I y)j and let Sz: S -,9r. Then.91 U^92: S and,S1 O^g2: I
and r?(^92) - Sz. Now Ã(S) : ,?(^9r) U r?(Sr) : R(,9r) U.gz. But ^91 C A(,S1).
Therefore, r?(^9) : (A(Sr) -.9r) U,9rU,Sr: (A(.9r) -,Sr) U^9. Now for alls in
fi(Sr), there is some y Á x with Rry and r I y; "o by r?-discreteness {r} is open
in o. Hence for all r in r?(,s1) - st the same is true. Hence r?(,sr) - ^gr, as the
union of all these {c}, is also open in o. But Ã(s) : (A(sr) - ^9r) U,s, and ^9 is
also open in O; so ,R(.9) is open in O. tr
The converse of Proposition 10.9 fails, see example at the end of the chapter.
The two main theorems of the chapter are the next two, which show that the pres-
ence or absence of Hausdorffness for (X, O) is relevant to the connection between
.R-discreteness and functionality.
Proposition 10.10. If (x, o) is a ?2 space, then M(x,o, R) is functional only
if (X, O) is A-discrete.
Proof. Let(X,O) beT2,let rbeinXandsuppose (fy)(Rxy andø lA). It
suffices to prove on the supposition of functionality that {r} is in O. Since (X,O)
is 72, there are disjoint,51,52 in O such that r is in 51 but not 52 and y is in Sz but
not,91. Now since -rBuy, p({y}): P({*,y}); so P(Sr): P(Szu {"}). Therefore,
p-t(p(s2)) : p-t(p(sru {"})) Bur o+ : {s c x : p-1(p(s)) is in o}. Hence
52 is in o+ itr Szu {"} is in o+. By functionality, o : o+. Hence ^gz is in o iff
s2 u {ri is in o (both sides of o : o+ are used here). But s2 is in o, so s2 U {r}
is in o. But ,S1 is in o, so 51 n (Sz u {"}) is in o. ^91 and ^gz are disjoint, so
51 ¡ (S2 u {"}) : ^9r tl {'} : {r} which is thus in O. ¡
This proof needs all the resources of the hypothesis, in particular the Hausdorff
condition that the separating open sets be disjoint, as the next Proposition shows.
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Proposition 10.11. There is a space (x,o,,R) such that (X,o) is 7' but
neither T2 îü -R-discrete, while M(X,O, R) is functional.
Proof. Let X: {0, I,2,...}, let @ : {cofinitesubsets of X} U {A}, and let
-R: {(1,2),(2,t)} u {\r,"): z in X}. Now it is well known rhar (X,O) is ft bur
not 72. Also, it is not -r?-discrete; because 1 is in X and Rr2 and I + 2 while {1} is
not cofinite so not in O. It remains to prove lhat M is functional, that is O : O+.
(") o ç g+ : This holds iff P is open, iff .9 is in o implies p(.g) is in e, iff s is
in O implies P-l(P(S)) is in O, iff S is cofinite implies p-l(p(S)) is cofinite. But
S c P-1(P(S)), so if S is cofinite so is P-1(P(S)).
(b) o+ ç o : Let s be in o+. Then P-l(P(s)) is in o and so is cofinite. Thar
is, P-r(P(S)) - X - {*r,.. .,rn}. Now there are two subcases:
(bi) Neither 1 nor 2 is in P-l(P(S)). Then P-l(P(S)) : S and S is cofinite as
required.
(bii) Both 1 and 2 are in P-l(P(S)). (Since .R12 there can,t be one without
the other.) But then,S - X - {*r,...,rn,I} or,S : X - {rr¡...,trn¡2} or
s : X - {tt ¡.-.,rn,i,2}. whichever, ,s is cofinite. Thus for either (bi) or (bii),
^9 is in O as required. tr
An example of a space which is ?2 with open P but neither functional nor
-R-discrete (thereby showing that open P is weaker than functionality and .R-
discreteness even given Tz) is obtained from the earlier example of the projective
plane over -R (see Chapter g end of section B). Let X : the sphere 52, let o be
the usual topology on 52 which isT2,let Rry iff z : y or (r,y) arc an antipodal
pair' Then Xll? constitutes the projective plane and Q is the usual topology on
it. Note that .9 is open in O iff .9' is open in O, where ,S, is the set of antipodes of
members of S. But Ë(S) : S U ,9'; so if S is open A(.9) is open. That is, p is an
open map. But (X, O) is not rB-discrete; no singleton is an open set. Ilence neither
is M functional.
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P open ;O C O+
Problem: Under what conditions if any does -R-discreteness imply functionality?
There would also seem to be further directions to explore in this general area. Are
there further conditions relating ?r to T2 to functionality? what of rs spaces?
The non-?s space with the indiscrete topology (any X,r?) is of course functional.
Introducing an additional coarser topology Q- C e on xlr? has connections with
these concepts; for example, it is known that p is open only if e- : e. The
open closed duality can presumably also be exploited. The aim of this chapter,
however, has been to show that there is interaction between aspects of inconsistent




CHAPTER 11: CATEGORY THEORY
(with Peter Lavers)
1. Introduction
It was claimed in Chapter I that the broad abstraction principles encountered
in category theory look interestingly close to inconsistency. Foundational problems
in category theory are well-summarised in Hatcher [15] pp.255-260, though he does
not consider paraconsistency. The situation seems to be somewhat similar to that
in the foundations of set theory, which is hardly surprising. A distinction can be
made between large and small categories, the lbrmer being categories which, were
they set-like, would contain so many sets that they would have to be proper classes
(such as the category of sets). These tend to common, as Hatcher points out.
The problem is that natural tendencies to abstraction lead one to want to consider
several such categories as a category, and functors between them as morphisms of
the category. The impuise to do so is normal category-theoretic thinkiirg, but it
appears that NBG set theory cannot make sense of it. Again, functor categories are
categories whose objects are functors (between small categories perhaps) and whose
morphisms are natural transformations between the functors. These appear not to
be accommodated in a natural way within, say, NBG. Yet such constructions can be
natural, apparently parallel to other acceptable constructions, and even required by
the spirit of category theory. Needless to say several theories have been forthcoming
to place the situation on a consistent footing, but these seem mostly to have various
ad-hoceries, as with the more familiar case of set theory. At any rate, just as with
set theory, the case for an inconsistent foundation for category theory, to allow
adequately for its powerful abstraction principles, looks at least to be worth proper
investigation.
However in this chapter we concentrate on a certain kind of category, namely
toposes. It is well-known that set theory gives rise to Boolean algebra. It was
realised by Lawvere, Grothendieck and many others that set theory could be weak-
102 Category Theory
ened in a natural way to produce a broader class of category-theoretic structures,
toposes; and that these stand to intuitionist logic, that is the logic of open sets,
as sets do to classical logic. This brilliant theory proved to have many aspects.
In quantification theory for example it was seen that toposes yielded a natural
logic which could be described as higher-order intuitionist type theory. This is not
surprising given that set theory also can naturally represent type theory, but the
topos-theoretic representation is structurally deeper.
Most of this chapter is concerned with the propositional aspects of topos logic.
Specifying a topological space by its closed sets is as natural as specifying it by
its open sets. So it would seem odd that topos theory should be associated with
open sets rather than closed sets. Yet this is what would be the case if open set
logic were the natural propositional logic of toposes. At any rate, there should be a
simple 'topological' transformation of the theory of toposes, which stands to closed
sets and their logic, as topos theory does to open sets and intuitionism. Further-
more, the logic of closed sets is paraconsistent. This is essentially the message of
Goodman's [13], though we disagree with his pessimistic conclusions, paiticularly
concerning implication (see this chapter, section 4). There are, in fact, a number
of different paraconsistent logics of closed sets, depending on different definitions
of theoremhood and deducibility.
In section 2, we define paraconsistent algebras corresponding to closed set logic.
In section 3 we show that a simple duality transformation of topos theory and its
t-semantics will produce such paraconsistent logics. In section 4 it is shown that
there is a reasonable implication operator on these dualised toposes which produces
a corresponding reasonable implication operator on the logics. This operator can
also be defined in toposes, which shows that even toposes allow additional rea-
sonable implications to the usual intuitionist implication. In section 5 we sketch
quantification theory to show that intuitionism has no special claim on the quan-
tificational aspects of the theory. The topological duality of intuitionist and para-
consistent sentential logics, as well as implication on the latter, is also considered
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in Mortensen and Leishman [40]
2. Closed Set Logic
Definition 11.1. Paraconsistent algebras are distributive lattices with a maxi-
mal element Tr, a minimal element ,F and a complement operation r. We suppose
for convenience that these are specified by equational theories, with the order (
defrned in theusual way as a 1b:df añó: ø, equivalentlyaUó: ó. In addi-
tion, paraconsistent algebras satisfy the condition that a lJ b : Tr itr ra l) b : b,
equivalently iff rø I b : î-a.
These ensure the following further properties of paraconsistent algebras.
(i) a t) ra : Tr.
(ii) rral) o.: at equivalently rra O ¿ : rra, that is rr¿ ( ø.
(iii) r(a fì b) l rau rb.
(i") r(a Cì ra) :17.
(") r(øUó) n(røUró):r(øUó); that isr(øUå) < ratrb.
("i) In general a(1ra f F, and in general al)rra f rra, i.e. not a ( rra; but
these can be equal e.g. when a : Tr or a : F.
Any closed set topology determines a paraconsistent algebra when r¿ : the clo-
sure of the set-theoretic (Boolean) complement of the closed set ø, U and ¡¡ are
set-theoretic union and intersection respectively, Tr : the whole space and F :
the null set.
In the next two sections we deal with a propositional language, closed under
conjunctions A, disjunctions V, and paraconsistent negations r. Implication --- is
not included at first but is considered in section 4. In section 5 quantifiers are
added.
Definition 11.2. A paraconsistent ualuation is a function I : language --+ P
assigning atomic wffs to members of a paraconsistent algebra P and matching A
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with f-ì, V with U, and negations r with paraconsistent complements r
It is natural to define the consequent relation At,. . . , A. I B, where lhe A¿
and B are wffs, to mean (vI)(glb{I(A,) ,1 < i < n} < I(B)). There are a num-




A:dr (v1x1(A) : rr);
(2) + A:df (v1x1(A) t F);
(3) 
= 
A:df (VIXI(A) € D) where D is some proper fitter, e.g. (V1)(1(A) > ¿)
for some t + F.
Corresponding to each of these there are definitions of theoremhood w.r.t. all
paraconsistent algebras. If we take a paraconsistent valuation with 1(A) : some
non-null non-universal closed set a, then 1(,4ArA) : the boundary of a I F. If
also 1(B) : F and Th : {X : I(X) + F},then both A., rA e Thbur B ø Th.
(Alternatively, let Th : {x : I(X) e ])} where D is some proper frLter, e.g.
D: {x : AArA s x}.) BúTh is a semitheory (respectively, theory) of any
of the above logics, so they are paraconsistent. Note that A= B VrB but not in
general A nrA I B, nor A,rA I B.
3. Propositional Logic in a Category
A knowledge of basic category-theoretic and topos-theoretic concepts is assumed
here. For a clear introduction, see e.g. Goldblatt [1a]. The following definition then
dualises the usual definitions for toposes.
Definition 1l-3. A com.plement-classifierfor a category B with terminal object
1, is an object Q together with an arrow.F: 1--* 0 satisfying the condition that
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is a pullback. X¡ is the cornplernent-character of /. This generalises the situation
in Set where F: {0} --+ {0,1} has F(0) :0, and X¡ is the characteristic function
of the set-complement of the image of /. That is, if f : a + b is a 1-1 function,
X¡:b --+ {0,1} is given byX¡:1 if r €b- f@), and X¡(z) :0 if r € f(a).
An (elementary) cornplement-topos is a category with initial and terminal ob-
jects, pullbacks, pushouts, exponentiation, and a complement classifier. It is clear
that, if E is a complement-topos and E' is the category obtained by renaming f-
as 7 and eachX¡ as X¡ then .E' is a topos; since initial and terminal objects, pull-
backs, pushouts and exponents are prior category-theoretic notions independent of
classifiers. This enables a dualisation of all topos constructions substituting F for
? and X¡ for X¡, as follows.





















This is plausible for a complement-classifier. It is the dual of the definition I of
for toposes.









This dualises r for toposes
X,,
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Disjuncti,on V:Ox0 --+ flis thecomplement-characterof (F, F):I -- Oxf)
(F, F)
Compare with ^9eú, where the complement of {(0,0)} in2x2 is {(1, 1), (1,0), (0, 1)}
Conjunction A : 0 x 0 --+ f) is given by
[(Fo,1o), (1o, Fo)]
F
Compare again Set, where the complement of conjunction is {(1,0), (0, 1), (0,0)}.
The above definitions of V and A dualise by reversing those of A and V respectively
in toposes.
Let E be a complement-topos with classifier F : 1 --+ f), and let E'be the topos
obtained by renaming F as T and eachX¡ as x¡. Let a, brc,... be variables rang-
ing over unspecified arrows of E, let ,9 be an identity statement about E involving
some of (ø,brcr...) as well as some subset of the constant arrows (F,Trrr,V,A),
and let ,S'be the statement obtained by substituting (T, r,-r, A, V) respectively for
the latter. Then
Proposition 11.4. (Duality Theorem) s is true in E if .9' is true in E'.
Proof. It is clear that the diagrams for (F,Tr,r, V, Â) are diagrams
for (T,r,-ì,4,V) where these are renamed, and that compositions, pullbacks,
pushouts, initial and terminal objects and exponents are prior category-theoretic
notions unaffected by the renaming. So any construction establishing identity in -E
is under the renaming a construction establishing identity in E' , and vice versa. !
Definition 11.5. As for the usual t-semantics for toposes, the truth ualues
of a complement-topos ,E are the monics: t -- f), also called elements oT {1. A
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wffs are assigned to truth values and the connectives {r, V, A} agree with their
complement- topos counterparts.
Proposition 11.6. The truth values of E form a paraconsistent algebra, when
7r is interpreted as the maximal element and F is interpreted as the minimal ele-
ment, and A, V are interpreted as O and U respectively.
Proof. This is a matter of verifying that the conditions for a paraconsistent
algebra in section two are satisfied, and these are ensured by the duality theorem.
First one needs al) b : a iff afì ó : ó; but the dual is ø O b : aiff ¿ U b : bwhich
holds for open sets and for the elements of 0 in topos theory. For latticehood one
needs first the partial order properties (t)-(3):
(1) reflexivity, i.e. a1ari.e. al)a:aìa:a
(2) antisymmetry,i.e. (aUb: ó and al)b: ø) only ila:b
(3) transitivity,i.e.(aUb:óand bl)c: c) onlyif øUc:c. Also:
(4) aìb1a,b, i.e. (aìb)era: (øfì ó) n ó: at)b
(5) c1a nó iff c1a and c 1b, i.e. (ønó) tlc: citr(altc: cand ónc: c)
(6) a,b3aUb, i.e. aU (øU b) : bU (aU b) : avb
(7) aUbl citr(a ( c and b1c), i.e. (aUó)U c:ciff(øUc: cand bUc:c).
Dualised, these are respectively
(1d) aìa:al)a:a
(2d) (aUb:óand aÀb:ø) onlyif a:b
(3d) (anó: ó and bf)c: c) only iÎ alc: c
(4d) (ø u ó) t)a: (øu å) Ub: aUb
(5d) (aub) Uc: citr(at)c: cand buc:c)
(6d) aÀ(a n ô) : ón (a ¡¡ ó) : ¿ ¡ 6
(7d) (anó) oc: c iff ((øf-ìc) :c and (ånc) : c;.
These are all facts about truth values in a topos E', indeed facts about lattices of
open sets. For distributivity, one needs (8) cU(bnc): (cUö)n(øUc) and
an (óU c) : (ø n ó) U (øn c); which dualise to (8d) aÀ(bUc) : (an å) U (ø n c)
and ¿ U (ó n c) : (a U ó) n (c U c) which both hold of the elements of toposes.
The maximalityof Tr and minimality of F are (9) øUTr: Tr and aCtF: F
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respectively; which dualiseto (9d) alìI: I and øUT: T. These assert the
minimality of I and the maximality of T and hold of E' as desired. Finally one
needs (10) o U å: Tr itrraUb: á. Dualised this is (10d) aÀb: I iffra tb: b,
i.e. a l-ì ó: I itr ó 1-ta; but this is the condition for pseudo-complements in the
topos E' , ar'd holds of open sets when r¿ is the interior of the Boolean complement
of ø and I is the null set (Goldblatt [1a], p.179). ¡
One can go to verify that the consequent further properties (i)-(vi) of paracon-
sistent algebras specified in section 2 also hold of complement-toposes.
(i) al)ra : Tr dualises to ¿ O 1a : L which holds of the truth values of a topos
as well as of open sets.
(ii) rral) o, : at i.e. rra ( ø, dualises to rra la : a, i.e. a 1--t1a, which holds
of open sets.
(iii) r(ø o b) : ra U ró dualises to r(ø u ó) : r¿ l-ìró which holds of open sets.
(i") r(øfìra): Tr dualises to r(aUra) : I;the Boolean complement of ¿Urø
is a boundary, so its interior is the null set.
(") r(øUó) n (røñró) :r(aU b), i.e. r(ø U b) <ratìró, dualises to r(a n ä) U
(rø U ró) : r(ø t^t b), i.e. r¿ U rå < r(o fl ó), which holds of open sets.
("i) allra+ F, and øl)rraf rrai.e. not¿ 1rra,, dualiseto¿U-ralT
and ¿Urr¿ f tn i.e. not rr¿ ( a, and these are in general inequalities for
open sets.
But the inequalities become equalities when a : Tr oÍ o, : F; since Tr f)lTr : F,
Trur/Tr - r(Tr, F ìrF: F and FurrF - rrF dualise respectively to
IUrI : T, Ilìrrl - rrl, TUrT : T and TOrrT - -r-rT, all of which hold
in toposes.
Thus we now have from the previous two propositions and according to the
definitions of theoremhood and deducibility of section 2.
Proposition 11.7. The set of all paraconsistent valuations on a complement-
topos determines a paraconsistent logic. n
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4. Implication
It is time to come clean about implication, on which the authors of this chapter
hold slighily different views. The usual intuitionist story defines â: f) x Q --+ f)
as Xt , whe¡e å is the equaliser å ' O 
.-+ f) x C, * C, ; and then for any arrows /, gPrt
which are truth values: 1-+ f ), defines f + g to be + o ("f,g), where (/,g) is the
usual product map: 1 --+ 0 x f,l.
We note here that in toposes there also exists h' as the equaliser
U
h',Ø'--+f,) x n Å f), as well as versions substitutin| prz ror pr1. In the cor-
responding complement-topos, the same constructions obviously exist, with the
property that (/,9) factors through å in the topos itr (1,9) factors through å' in
the complement-topos, and similarly with å and å' reversed.
PL thinks that the right dualisation of X¿ in the topos is X¿, in the complement-
topos. X¿, o ff,g) correspondstoCurry'rg-/; butthisproduces/ - f :F,
for every truth value /. It isn't obvious how to avoid this consequence if one has
X without X. PL favors having both; which strictly takes one outside toposes, but
has the advantage of allowing a truth range and a falsity range for every concept.
CM thinks that there is at least one simple and reasonable implication on any
lattice, namely f + g:Tr if / < 9, else f + g: f'. This can beproduced in
complement toposes as follows.
Proposition 11.8. LeL f and g be truth values f ,g , | -+ o. Then the product
map (.f, g) is exactly one of two types.










Type 2. (f ,g) Íacilors through å '@'--+ 0 x f)
(f, s)"
J
I ,__-+0 x f-l
(f, e)
where (f , g) p is the factorisation of U, g).
Proof. consists of proving that (/,9) is of type 2 ifr d = 1 in diagram 1








It is desired to prove that ! is iso. Now (/, g) o | : h o (i,j) b1the pullback. But
(Í,g): ho(f,,g)eby thefactorisation. So åo (f,s), o !: ho(i,i). But å is
monic, soleft-cancellable; hence (f ,g) " !: (i,j). But (i,j) ismonicsince (/,9) is,
by the pullback. so (.f, g) " I is monic. But then ! is monic (Goldblatt p.39 Ex(2)).
Now ! is certainly epic, so ! is both epic and monic. But in any complement-topos,
as in any topos, an epic monic is iso (proof of this by running through Goldblatt
pp'109-110 substituting F for ? and X¡ for X¡, and then for the Corollary noting
that Theorern2 p.57 is independent of the dualisation). Thus d= r.
R to L : If ! is iso then it has an inverse !-r. Then (f ,g), can be defined as
(i,il " !-1. This is because the arrow (i,i) " !-r : I ---+ @ is unique in making the
diagram commute: if k : I ---+ @ is any other arrow making the diagram commute,
then we have that (f,g) : h o (i,j) " t-l : h o fr; but since å is monic ancl
left-cancellable, k: (i,j) " !-t as required for the definition. That is, (/,g) factors
through O, ro (/, g) i. of type 2. tr
Now let fr,gr,fz,gzbe truth values such that (fr,gr) is type 1 and (fr,Sr) i"
type2. (Note that there is at least one of each type: (Tr,F) is type I and (F,Tr)
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There are very many aspects of quantification theory of toposes which we do
not deal with, but identity and higher order types cleserve mention. It is customary
to treat identity as a logical symbol; so that it is built into the assignment clause
for identity that r t : ú does not hold. In light of the earlier chapters, this is not
natural for complement-toposes, and so one should discard assignment clauses for
identity such as that on Goldblatt p.246. Higher order logic and type theory is
obtained in topos theory because of the fact that toposes, being Cartesian closed
categories, contain all powerobjects, which serve as semantic values of syntactic
types' However, powerobjects are prior to the classifier, so it is to be expected that
these constructions go over to complement-toposes unchanged. This is perhaps not
so surprising given that a parallel construction can be done for classical logic and
set theory with powersets.
6. Conclusion
It hardly bears saying that a comprement-topos really is a topos, it is just a
matter of how one understands the notion of a subobject classifier. This can be
masked by the usual terminology of r : 1 ---+ CI, rather than f' as we have. There
are various natural paraconsistent propositional logics arising from the t-semantics
of complement-toposes, and thus from toposes. The bias toward intuitionism is at
least not justified by these structural aspects of a topos, since it depends on how
they are interpreted.
We conclude this section by raising the question of whether there is a construc-
tion internal to topos theory (rather than dualising 'outside' the topos as we have)
which also yields paraconsistent logic. This seems not unreasonable. It also seems
reasonable to think that there are other avenues of the dualisation; for example
closed set sheaves, which are accord.ingly explored in the next chapter.
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With this chapter we examine categorial sheaves over the closed sets of a topo-
logical space. Aside from the historical interest that sheaves seem to have been
defined over closed sets first before the more usual definition over open sets, there
are a number of other reasons for developing the theory of sheaves over closed sets.
First of all having a base topology of closed sets gives us a working concept of
boundary that does not exist for the open set sheaf notion. One area in which
this may work for us is the mathematics of physics. Lawvere in the introduction
to Categories in Conti'nuum Physics [21] mentions the speculation that there is a
role for a closed set sheaf in thermodynamics as a functor from a category of parts
of a body to a category of "abstract thermodynamical state-and-process systems"
(p.g). Another reason for closed set sheaves is their efiect on categorial logic. A
closed set topology ordered by set inclusion is a paraconsistent algebra. Via the
sheaves we can introduce this paraconsistency to toposes.
The first two sections contain a brief description of some of the existing theory of
categorial sheaves. We note that categories of sheaves as standardly understood are
toposes. It will be our claim that categories of SET-valued sheaves over the closed
sets of a topological space are toposes in just the same way. Since the existence of a
subobject classifier and the resulting subobject classifying maps is a defining feature
of a topos, we will be obliged to show, contrary to some standard presentations,
that there is a construction for the classifying arrows ¡ of sheaf monics that does
not rely on !-completeness of the base space topology. We establish the necessary
construction as a corollary to a theorem at the end of section two. This clears the
way for section three where we briefly justify the notion of a sheaf over closed sets
and the claim that the category of all sheaves over the closed sets of topological
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space is a topos
In essence what we describe is a category, indeed a topos, of sheaves over a
closed set topology understood as a poset category. It shouìd be noted that our
discussion ultimately is given in terms of the theory of j-sheaves and as a result
the categories we describe are not necessarily equivalent to categories of continuous
local homeomorphisms or sheaf spaces. We therefore emphasise a particular type
of j-sheaf category: one that includes a set theoretic covering system for the base
topology. It will then be appropriate to describe our particular construction as a
category of sheaves.
For a category C any contravariant functor Cop -- StrT is called a SET-valued
presheaf. The SET-valued sheaues ate a special subset of the presheaves. Through-
out this discussion we assume that C is a small category.
2. Pretopologies and Topologies for Categories
This section follows similar discussions in Johnstone [15a] and in Goldblatt [1a].
Definition 12.L. Ã pretopology on a category C with pullbacks is a system
P where for each C-object [/ there is a set P(U). Each P(U) contains families of
c-morphis^r {u. :\ u : i e I}. The following conditions are satisfied.
(i) for each U e C, {id"} e P(U);
(ii) ilV---UinC and {U, :\U:i,e I} e.P(U),rhen {Vxuy¿3V:ieI}
in P(Iz). Note zr1 is the pullback in C of ad along V --+ [J;
(iii) if {Ui:iU:ie I}€p(U),andforeachi e I,{V* !+U,:keI{;} e
P(U;), then {%r !4 uo:i U :i € I, k e IÇ} € p(U). Nore that V*is
an example of a double indexed object rather than the intersection of I{ and
V¡.
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The notion of a pretopology is a categorial generalisation of a system of (set the-
oretic) covers on a topology T where a co?)error U € T is aset {U; : (I; € T,i e I}
such that U{U¿ , i e I} : y. The generalisation is achieved by noting that the
topology ordered by inclusion is a (poset) category and that any cover corresponds
to a collection of inclusion arrows U; --+ U. Given this, any family of arrows con-
tained in P(U) of a pretopology is also called a cover.
Definition L2.2. In analogy with sheaves over a topological space we have
the notion of sheaves over categories with pretopologies. We shall say that any
contravariant functor F : Cop -i SET \s a sheaf just in case for each U € C and for
each {U¿ :t U : i e I} € P(U), we have an equaliser
do
F(u)--+ II ¡(ø) = il 
F(u; xu u¡)
iel d,1 ¿,i
where ds and d4 are product arrows determined respectively by the images under
F of the first and second projection maps (J¿ xu U¡ - U¿ and U; xu {Jj - U¡, a\l
i,j e I.
Pretopologies do not in general uniquely determine a category of sheaves. To
do that we need the notion of a (categorial) topology.
Definition 12.3. For an object U in a category C a IJ -sieue is a family -R
of C-morphisms with codoma\n IJ such that if. V 3 U e R and W L V i" uny
C-morphism, then the composite I4l \ V 3 fl e R. (Some writers make no
terminological distinction between sieves and their categorial duals. Others do,
and name the duals cribles. Still others, notably Goldblatt [14], use the opposite
naming convention, their crible being our sieve). A topology on C is a system -/
of sets J(U) for each U € C where each J(U) is a set of [/-sieves called coaering
sieves. We have the following conditions:
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A system -I is a topology for C if:
(i) for any U e C, the maúrn¿l sieve {o : cod(a) : U} e J(U);
(ii) if R € J(U) and V \ U is a morphism of C, rhen
f-@) -- {W 3V : f .o e ,B} is in J(V);
(iii) if fi€ J(u)andsisasieveon[/whereforeach V !e e Rwehave
/.(^9) in J(V), then S e J(U).
Note that a collection of morphisms with codom ain U can be a U-sieve without
being a covering sieve on U.
A small category C together with a topology .I is called a site. We now define a
sheaf on a site (C,J) to be any contravariant functor f : Cop -- SET satisfying the
equaliser condition expressed in terms of covering sieves for U rather than covers.
A category of sheaves on a site is called a Grothendieck topos and denote d sh(C, J).
Proposition 12.4. (Johnstone, [15a]) Any Grothendieck topos is an elemen-
tary topos. tr
Proposition 12.5. Given a pretopology P we can define a topology "/ that will
give rise to the same sheaves on C. We say that for any (J € C, we have _¡? e J(U)
iff ,R contains a pretopology cover {a¿ : i e 1} e P(U). n
Definition 12.6. The category of all presheaves on C is denoted SETc"o and
when c is a small category, sETc"o is a topos (Goldblatt, [14], pp.204-2r0). The
classifier object in SETc"o is a presheaf f): c"p ---t sET where ror u €c,
f-¿(U) : {all sieves on U},
and for v \ u in c, ft(/) : f)(u) --+ f-¿(y) (also denoted f lfl) is given by
f¿(t/) I S* {W 3V, f .a e S} € f-¿(y)
When all arrows inC areinclusionsthis becomes Sr+ {W:W Ç Vand W e S}
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A topology "/ exists as a presheaf J : Cop --+ SET where we have C ) U ,- J(U)
and for any V \ U inC the map /(/) : J(U) -- J(V) is given by R,- f"(R).
Clearly, .I is a subobject of 0; that is, an inclusion J - f) exists. The classifying
map associated with this inclusion is denoted by j, and since it has proven possible
to describe the same category of sheaves on C in terms of either J or j, that map
J : fl + f) is also called a topology. Note that J is a topology on C and j is a
topology in SETc"o.
The notion of a topology as an endomorphism of the classifier object has been
extended to all elementary toposes.
Definition L2.7. Any map j , Q --+ 0 in a topos t is a topology in t if. lhe




Sheaves are then distinguished objects of t identified with respect to j. Such objects
arecalled j-sheaues. Amonic X':+ X€t iscalled j-denseif itsclassifyingmap
¡o factors through -/ -+ f).
Proposition 12.8. For any topos t,an object F is a j-sheaf if and only if for
any t-arrow 13 : X' --+ .F and any j-dense monic a : X' ,--+ X there is exactly one





The category of sheaves identified in this manner is a full sub-category of t and
will be denoted sh¡(€).
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Proposition 12.9. (Johnstone, [15a]) If t is atopos with topology j:f) --+ f),
then sh¡(t) is also a topos. n
3. Subobject Classifiers
We have seen described in Definition 12.6 the standard construction of the
classifier object for SET-valued presheaf categories. We complete the description
by giving the cosntruction for the classifier arrow true and subobject classifying
arrows. We follow this with a dependent construction for the subobject classifier
of a j-sheaf category. We include a theorem about that construction.
Definition 12.10. The map true: I ---+ 0 in SETc"o is a natural transformation
given by components trueo for all a € C. The functor 1 is given by C > U ,- {Ø}
with the obvious restriction maps. Clearly this is a terminal object for SETc"o.
The components oL true are trueo: {Ø} -- Cl(ø) where true"(Ø): maximal ¿-sieve.
Equally, 1 is a j-sheaf for any j (trivially true by Proposition 12.8) and will be
terminal for the sheaf category slz¡(SETc"o).
For any SETc"'-monic r : F r--+ G the classifying arrow ¡" is a natural trans-
formation G ---+ f,) given by components (¡")" : G(a) -- Q(o) such that for any
r e G(a), we have
(x")"(") :{ó---+ a:Gi@) €ra(F(ó))}
where b -+ a is aC-morphism, Gfr is the restriction map G(a) --+ G(ó), and 16 is the
ó-component F(ó) --+ G(ó) of the natural transformation r. It is straightforward to
confirm that X" is a natural transformation and is the unique map that makes the











Proposition 12.11 (as taken from [14], p.371). The category så¡(sET'"') has a
subobject classifier and it can be described by the following SETc"o-diagram where







So, given that we are dealing with SET-valued functors, for all a € C, we have
fl¡(o) : {.9 : ,S e f)(a) and (ido),(^9) : j"(S)}. tr
We intend now to show that the classifying maps, yr,, ror monics, r : F ,--+ G in
så¡(SETc"o) are similarly related to classifying maps for monics in SETc"o. First
we need
Proposition L2.12. (Johnstone, [15a]) For any topos t with topology j, the
category sh¡(t) has finite limits and the inclusion functor sh¡(t) ---+ t preserves
them. tr
In essence, the limit in t of a finite diagram of j-sheaves is a j-sheaf. And
in particular a pullback in så¡(SETc"o) is a pullback in SETc"o and a pullback in
SETc"o of j-sheaves is a pullback in sår(SETc"o). As a corollary, any sh¡(t)-monic
is monic in t and any morphism between j-sheaves that is monic in t is monìc in
sh¡(t). This holds since any map A 3 B is monic if and only if the following is a
pullback.
A !\A
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Proposition 12.13. When t is a topos with topology j and r ; F,---+G is a
sh¡(t)-monic, we have ¡" : e- Xr, .














Let r be a monic and the inner square be a pullback in sh¡(S). Let y: e.Xi. We
will refer to parts of the above diagram by (clockwise) vertices. So, {F,G,0¡,1} is
the inner square, that is, the pullback diagram lor true¡ and yr,.
Map e is an equaliser and therefore monic, so
X+. r - true¡ . f ifr e - X+. r : X. r : e. true¡. /
(The conditional, if LHS then RHS, is trivial). In other words {F,G,fl¡,1} com-
mutes itr {4G,fl,1} commutes. Likewise, we prove that {8, G,Qj,1} commutes
itr {8,G, C¿,1} commutes and indeed that {F, G,Qj,1} is a pullback ffi {f, G, CI, 1}
is a pullback. But {E,G,or,1} is a pullback; and since e.true¡ - true, there is,
by definition, exactly one x that makes {8,G,ç},1} a pullback in t, namely x,.
So, e. XJ" -- Xr. !
Corollary. For SET-valued j-sheaves over a category C, any a e C, and any
sheaf monomorphism r, we have Xt,þ): X,(a).
Proof. The nature of equalisers in SET. !
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4. Closed Set Sheaves
Typically sheaves over topological spaces are defined in terms of the open sets
of the base space. The notion of a category of sheaves over a site allows us to define
a category of sheaves over the closed sets of a topological space and announce that
these categories are toposes.
Given a closed set topology r we can define a covering system C where for each
U e.r wehave C(U): {{U;:U¿ € r}:U :U{U;: U; €. r}}. Now, anytopology Z
is partially ordered by set inclusion, so any topology forms a poset category where
all morphisms are the inclusions. For that category let R : {U; :\ U : i e I}
be any pretopology cover. Since between any two objects of 7 there can be at
most on earro\Ã/ and it must be an inclusion, we can interpret -R to be a family
{dom(a¿) : d; €. r?} of elements of T. The defining conditions for a pretopology
become:
(i) for each U e T, {U} e P(U);
(ii) 11V çU inT and {U¿ :i e I} € P(U), rhen {V ìU¡:i e I} Ç p(V);
(iii) if {U;:ie I} € P(U) andforeachi € lthereexists {Vï'k e I{;} Çp(Ui),
then {I{i : k e I{;, i e I} e P(U).
Plainly, if we define C as suggested above then, in essence, we have a pretopology
for the poset category. Given a pretopoloçy C rvve can define a (categorial) topology
,,/ for category SETZ"' that will give rise to the same category of sheaves.
The constructions for the toposes sh(T,J) and sA;(StrTz"o) u.r" then standard.
We can use either an appropriate version of the equaliser condition Definition 12.2,
or Proposition 12.8, to identify those functors in SET7"' that are sheaves over
closed sets. In surrr:
Proposition 12.4. The category of sheaves over the closed sets of a topological
space forms a topos.
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This theory can be extended in a number of directions. One is to identify
constructions in toposes of closed set sheaves dual to various morphisms in toposes.
It is asserted here that the pseudo-difference arrow (p.108), dual to intuitionist
implication, does exist in such categories (proof omitted, see forthcoming).
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CHAPTER 1.3: DUALITY
The first people to think (around 1970) that incompleteness and inconsistency
are somehow equally reasonable, seem to have been Da Costa and the Brazilian
school of logicians, and independently the Routleys. The idea expressed itself in
Brazilian logic in the paraconsistent C-logics, dualisìng by abandoning the law of
Noncontradiction - (A k - A), rather than Excluded Middle A V - A as in
intuitionism; and additionally adopting the opposite Double Negation axiom to
intuitionism. The Routleys proposed their +-operation on theories (see Definition
3.4 or below), which had the property that for any background logic satisfying
minimal conditions, the x of an incomplete theory is an inconsistent theory and
vice versa. The capacity to admit both inconsistent and incomplete theories was
seen as essential to, and explicative of, relevance, at least at the propositional level.
Neither the Brazilians nor the Routleys appealed to topological duality, which has
only become clear more recently, but which would seem to be an expression of
Brazilian intuitions.
This chapter briefly surveys the *-operation; then applies it to open and closed
set theories,, then finds an alternative to the x-operation which has different but
similar effects.
Recalling Definitions 2.8 and 3.4, an tr-semitheory is a set of sentences ?å closed
under the rule: if A ìs in Th and l-¿ A ---+ B then B is in Tå. An tr-theory is an
tr-semitheory closed under conjunctions. An tr-semitheory is prime if whenever a
disjunction is in it at least one of the disjuncts is also. And for the *-operation,







IllL (A -- B) t (-B --+ -A) then This an tr-semitheory iff ?4. is an
-L-semitheory.
If in addition De Morgan's Laws and the Double Negation Law are theorems
of ,L then Th is an -L-theory iff Th- is a prime tr-semitheory.
Under the same conditions as (2), This a prime,L-theory ifrTh. is a prime
.L-theory.
If I L A +-+ --A (Double Negation Law) then Th** : Th.
If lL A *- --A then ?å is inconsistent iff Th* is incomplete.




(1), (3) and (6) can be described as *-invariance results. (a) is an involution
result. Attention is drawn to (5) which is a duality result of a different kind from
the previous chapter. However, x also has interesting effects on theories of open set
logics and closed set logics.
Definition 13.2. A theory on a closed set logic or open set logic is simple iff
sentences are assigned only to either (i) the whole space, (ii) the null set, (iii) any
boundary, (iv) any coboundary, that is the whole space minus a boundary.
Obviously (iii) and (iv) cannot both hold if the logic has only open sets, or
only closed sets, in \f (PJ4 has both). Also, theories need not be simple: consider
the closed set topology {4,{r},(--, rl,l*,f-),-R} where the third and fourth
elements are not boundaries.
Proposition 13.3.
(1) Let L be a closed set logic with all elements but ,F designated. If Tå. is an
inconsistent complete simple theory then Tå. is the consistent complete (simple)
theory formed by dropping all sentences .4. such that both A and -A both hold in
Th.
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(2) Let L be an open set logic with just T designated . 11 Th is a consistent
incomplete simple theory then Th* is the consistent complete theory formed by
adding all sentences A such that neither A nor -A hold in Th.
Proof.
(1) Ler A and -,4. be in Tå. Clearly by the definition oT x, A is not in ?å.. But
inTh,1(,4) must be aboundary, so I(--4¡: the null set, and so --Ais not in
?å. Hence -A is in Th*.
(2) Let neither A nor -AbeinTh. By the definition or.*, A is in ?å*. But in
Th, I (A) must be a coboundary, so I (--¡¡ : the whole space and --A is in ?å.
Hence -A is not in ?å*. !
Thus, to inconsistentise a consistent complete theory one can add various atomic
sentences A such that -A holds, and evaluate as a simple theory in a closed set
logic; whereas to incompletise, one can drop various atomic sentences A such that
-A does not hold and evaluate as a simple theory in an open set logic.
Definition L3.4. Thx : d,f {A: -A is in Th}
Proposition 13.5.
(1) Let L be a closed set logic andTh be an inconsistent complete simple theory.
Then ?åx is the consistent complete theory formed by dropping all -(z'+1) A and
adding all -(zn) ,4, such that A is atomic and both A and -A are in Th.
(2) Let L be an open set logic and Th be a consistent incomplete simple theory.
Then ?åx is the consistent complete theory formed by adding ¿ll -(2n+r) A and
dropping all -(2') A, such that A is atomic and neither A nor -A areinTh.
Proof.
(1) Let A and -A hold in Th. Clearly A is inTh". Since This simple, --Ais
not in Th,so -,4. is not in 7å". Sincs---1is in Tå,, --AisinThx etc.
(2) Let neither A nor -AbeinTh. Clearly A is not \nThx. Since This simple,
--A is in Tlr, so -L is in 7åt. Since ---1is not inTh, --A is not inThx etc.
r28 Duality
These results contribute to the duality between incompleteness and inconsis-




PROVA'BILITY, TRUTH AND SETS
(with Joshua Cole)
1. Introduction
It is appropriate to end with a chapter on topics in what has been called in this
century the foundations of mathematics, if only to draw attention to the disavowal
of foundationalism in mathematics, but also to draw the attention of mathemati-
cians to the fact that the foundations constitute a mathematically interesting area.
Furthermore, the paraconsistent approach grows historically out of logic, which has
certainly been part of the usual conception of foundational studies.
Three areas are considered: provability, truth and sets. First there is considered
the fate of the classical Gödel sentence and thus the concept of provability, in the
finite inconsistent arithmetics. It turns out that it becomes a truth predicate in a
certain weak sense. The question of stronger senses of the truth predicate (which
can be distinguished inconsistently but not classically) remains open. Second, we
review the well-known use of a fixed point method in connection with the truth
predicate, as demonstrated by Kripke. Third, we review the application of the fixed
point method by Gilmore and Brady to set theory. This demonstrates the existence
of incomplete and inconsistent set theories with naive comprehension. In the latter
the inconsistent R.ussell set can be demonstrated to exist (non-well-founded sets).
This is a highly desirable state of affairs, since it has the prospect of mathematics
being able to rely on the full generality of set abstraction: given any property, one
can collect up into a set just the things having that property. It turns out that both
uses of the fixed point method produce incomplete as well as inconsistent theories,
which are Routley-+-duals of one another.
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2. Provability
Gódel's first and second incompleteness theorems arise by means of a partial
mapping of the metalanguage of arithmetic into its object language. Specifically,
one represents (a) the concept of provability via the provability predicate Prov(r),
and (b) the capacity for self reference via the Diagonal Lemma. From these it is a
short argument to the first incompleteness theorem, namely that if an (axiomatis-
able) arithmetical theory Th is consistent then it is incomplete. On the other hand,
if the mapping of the metalanguage were not partial but total in the sense that
one were able to represent the truth predicate in the object language while retain-
ing self reference/diagonalisability, then one could demonstrate the inconsistency
of Th; that is, Tarski's theorem, which essentially amounts to the Liar paradox.
The parallel between the Gódel sentence 'This sentence is unprovable' and the
Liar sentence 'This sentence is false', is obvious and striking, and has been noted
many times. That is to say, the provability predicate is the nearest one gets within
consistent arithmetic to the truth predicate, the Gódel sentence is the consistent
arithmetical analog of the Liar sentence, and the first incompleteness theorem is
the consistent counterpart of the Liar paradox.
This section aims to contribute to these observations by demonstrating that
when one moves to inconsistent extensions of classical arithmetics, specifically the
finite moduli arithmetics, then the provability predicate becomes, in a sense to be
specified, a truth predicate. The consequence of this result is that in appropriate
inconsistent theories the Gödel sentence is, in the same sense, the Liar sentence.
2.1 Consistent Preliminaries
In this section, the terminology and approach to the classical logic case of the
Gódel theorems is summarised, drawing on the approach of Boolos and Jeffrey [4a].
We deal with classical arithmetical theories containing Robinson arithmetic Q as a
subtheory, including Peano arithmetic Pf .
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Definition 14.1. If X is any arithmetical sentence, r X1 denotes the Gódel
number of X. A predicate F(r) is said to be a ytrouability predicate for a theory
Th itr for any sentence X :
(i) ill,rhX then lrn F(tX-)
and (ii) lrn F(rX > Y.) ¡ (F(-X.) r r(rl,r))
and (iii) trn F(-X.) r r(rF(-x.).).
If F(z) is aprovability predicatefor Th,we denote F(z) atso by ProvT¿(z); but it
should be noted that in general there is more than one provability predicate for a
given Th.
Proposition L4.2. Peano Arithmetic Pff and Robinson Arithmetic Q have
provability predicates.
Definition 14.3. A set ,9 of sentences is said to be definable in Q iff there is a
predicate Prov"(z) such that for any sentence X
(i) il X e ^9 then [-qProv"(-X.)
and (ii) if X ø,S then Fq -Prov"(-X.).
Proposition 14.4. Any recursive set, and in particular the set of theorems of
any axiomatisable complete theory, is definable in Q.
Definition 14.5. A function /(z) is said to be representable in Q \tr there
is a predicate F(r,y) such that for any natural numbers a,b il f @) : ó then
Fç (Vy)(f (*,y) = y : n), where I'n)n reptesent a, å respectively in the arithmeti-
cal language of f-. (This definition generalises to the case where ø is an n-tuple
but that does not concern us here.)
Proposition 14.6. Every recursive function is representable in Q
Proposition L4.7. (Diagonal Lemma) For any predicate F("), there is a
sentence Ë1 such that Ì-ç H : F('-H-r). In particular, since -Provo(r) and
-Provpg(r) are such predicates, there are sentences Gq and Gp# such that
lq Gq:-Provq(t"d) and Fç Gr#:-Provp4(tCrì).
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Intuitively,, -I1 "says" in Q and any supertheory: 'This sentence has the property
F', while Gq and Gpç "say" 'This sentence is unprovable in 8l P#'. G7¡ is called
af the Gódel sentence forTh.
Proposition 14.8. Any axiomatisable complete theory containing Q is incon-
sistent.
Proposition 14.9. (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem). Any consistent
axiomatisable theory containing Q is incomplete.
Definition 14.10. A truth predicate for a theory Th is any predicate Tr(r)
having the property that for any X,Lrn X : Tr(-X-).
Proposition 14.11. Any (classical) theory containing Q and having a truth
predicate is inconsistent.
2.2 The Inconsistent Case
Moving to the inconsistent finite arithmetics RM3', we recall the following facts
from Chapter 2. The RM3'are all inconsistent, complete and decidable. More than
the last, there is a recursive function "fn(c) returning 2,I or 0 respectively as r is
the Gödel number of a sentence assigned T, B or r. respectively in Ë, where Ë is
short for any of the RM3'. By representability, therefore, there is an arithmetical
predicate Fn with the corresponding representability properties. That is, in Q,
F^(tX-,y) is provably true of 2,7 or 0 only, whererxr ir the Gödel number of a
sentence assigned T, B or .F respectively in -R. It is therefore natural to make the
following definition:
Definition L4.L2. Prov¿(r) :df Fn(r,1) V Fa(r,2).
Proposition 14.13. The predicate Provp(r) is a provability predicate for ,R.
Proof. From the previous section, three conditions must be satisfied to be a
provability predicate.
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Ad (i): If t-R X then by representability (Proposition 14.6), le F^(t X-,2). Hence,
since Q C R, I p F^(- X- ,2). So, by the three-valued tables for V, l-pProva( - X-).
Ad (ii) and (iìi): note that Prov¿ never takes the value T,for any X. This is because
of the transparency of r?: back in Q,for fixed (-r-), F^(-X-,y) is provably true
of just oîe U) namely 2,, I or 0, and is provably false of all other y. Passing to,R,
then, the negation of F¿ remains provable of all y other Lhan 2, 1 or 0. But in
RM33 , say, (that is mod 3) we have that 2, 1 and 0 are provably equal to some of
these A þ.g.5, 4 and 3 respectively). But RM33 is transparent (as are all the,R);
that is, provable identities are intersubstitutable in all contexts. So -f'n holds of
2, 1, and 0 in -rB, so that .Pn is B or F in l? when y \s 2,1 or 0. By the tables for
V, this ensures that for those values of y, Provp is B or tr' also. But by the tables
for RM3, a J sentence with such an antecedent takes a designated value. !
Now it can be shown that in the above defined sense (Definition 14.10), Prov6
is a truth predicate for rB.
Propositi on 14.14. For all X , I n (X = Prov¿(-X.)).
Proof. From the three-valued tables for :, X : Y fails to hold only when
one side takes the value ? and the other side takes the value F. Now if X is T
then since Prov is a provability predicate, then bV (i) of the previous proposition,
FpProv¡(tX-).That is, the latter does not take the value r' in,R. On the other
hand, by the argument for (ii) and (iii) of the previous Proposition, Prov¿(-X.)
is never ?. Consequently, when X is F, their : holds as required. !
This proposition is not a trivial reconstruction by means of the trxtendability
lemma of something which holds in Q, t n cannot be replaced by l-ç else Q would
be inconsistent (by the Diagonal lemma applied to the predicate -Prorn(r)). It
is now shown that the Gödel sentence models the Liar sentence in the sense that
both the Grídel sentence and its negation are theorems of Lhe RM3'. The Gódel
sentence for r? is that sentence whose existence is guaranteed by diagonalisation in
Q; that is, the sentence which expresses in Ç the statement 'I am unprovable in
R.',.
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Proposition 14.15. lnGn and l-r-ç".
Proof. First note that the existence of Gn is ensured by the classical Diag-
onal Lemma (Proposition 14.7), as the sentence such that given the predicate
-Provn(z), Fq Gn = - Provn(-G"t) suppose not l-p Ga. By representabil-
ity, l-ç- Provp(-G;). By the Diagonal Lemma, lq Gn, so that, since e C Æ,
lnGn.That is, from not lnGn it follows that l-¡ G¿;hence lnGn.By repre-
sentability again, Fç Prov¿(-G;). By the Diagonal Lemma again, Fo-Gn. But
Q c R, so l-¿-¿;". tr
A further interesting fact follows here: that the denial of the Gödel sentence
for any of the -R is already provable in Q. This is as it should be: since the -R
are decidable, when G is provable in r? then this fact is provable in Q,, hence by
diagonalisation so is the denial of G. It further follows that if Q is consistent, then
the Gódel sentence for -R is unprovable in Ç.
Proposition 14.16. (Strong diagonalisation for Gp).
lnGn <-+ - Ptov"(-G;)
Proof. From Proposition 14.14, Gn is B in any of the ,R. Since Prov¿ is a
provability predicate and Gp holds, so does Prov¡7. But by the argument of the
previous proposition Prov4 is never T. Thus Prov¿ is exactly B, so that -ProvR
is also. The RM3 tables for ++ then ensure the Proposition. tr
Problem: Prov is a weak truth predicate in the sense that the : of Proposi-
tion 14.4 does not guarantee detachability in general; though being a provability
predicate there is detachability one way (Proposition la.13(i)). We have just seen
the stronger detachability is present for Gn via the stronger connective +-+. Can
Proposition 14.I4 be reproved with * replacing :, or at least detachability the
other way, perhaps with a modification to the natural Prov that we have used?
There is a point here about Lób's theorem. This says that, in any theory Tå
extending Q and in the same language, if F is a provability predicate for Zå, then
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\1 lrn F( -4.) ) A then iFrn A. This might look like an insuperable barrier
to Prov being a truth predicate, since a truth predicate would have the above
properties so that triviality would follow. However, Löb's theorem breaks down in
the inconsistent finite models. This is because the proof of Lób's theorem essentially
requires one to deduce the consequent of a J statement from its antecedent, which
one cannot do in these inconsistent nontrivial theories. Now it is possible that
a stronger version of Lób's theorem can be obtained for the stronger language
containing --+ as well as ), since the property I Tr(-4.) .t A would certainly
ensure Lhat Tr would be a provability predicate, and the --+ has the necessary
deductive force. However, while possibie, this is not obviously true, since adding
to the language formally voids the diagonal lemma which is applied in the usual
proof of Lób's theorem, so that Löb's theorem might break down for this addition
to the language. In the following sections it is seen that a truth predicate can be
added to the classical language without triviality.
3. Tbuth
3.1 The Fixed Point Method
The fixed point method is an iterative method for constructing a model for
a collection of axioms. In general terms we take as starting point an already
established model and extend it by adding new logical predicate symbols with
their attendant governing axioms. The axioms to be modelled need to have a
conditional or biconditional main connective and may be quantified. The model
for the new axioms is given a (transfinite) inductive definition. Some simple rules
are iterated to eventually produce the new extended model. It should be noted that
the underlying logic of models generated in this way are non-classical. Depending
on your philosophical disposition the logic can be incomplete or inconsistent, as we
shall see.
These sections will be structured in the following way. Firstly the method is
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described in general terms. Then, contrary to historical sequence, it is shown how
the method has been used by Kripke to model the T-scheme in languages which
contain their own truth predicate. Then we see how the method can be used to
model axioms in set theory. In particular it provides a method for modelling the
axioms of comprehension and extensionality. Gilmore appears to have been the
first to use the method to model the axiom of comprehension in a restricted, non-
extensional set theory. Later Brady showed how to model the extensionality axiom
as well in an inconsistent logic. Then followed Kripke, while later use of the method
has been made by Feferman in connection with the foundations of category theory.
Finally there is brief speculation on the possibility of further applications for this
method.
Suppose that we have a language ,C which we wish to extend by adding an
n-ary predicate P". Let L have an interpretation l with domain D. The usual
interpretation for a predicate is in terms of a subset of D". That is, arr n-aty
relation or D. We define the interpretation of. P" in terms of an ordered pair
(Sr,Sr) where both ^9r and,92 are n-ary relations on D.,Sr is called the extension
of P arad ^92 is called the antiextension. The axiom to be modelled will be of a
biconditional form: Aiff B, where,4 is a sentence of the form Pn(at¡d2¡...,an)
and B is a formula containing some of a1ra2t...,an.
Basically the model is built up in stages by repeatedly adding to the interpre-
tation of P to force sentences which are instances of the axiom's LHS A to be
interpreted true or false whenever its corresponding RHS B is interpreted as true
or false respectively at the previous stage. Each time the model is extended in
this way a whole new collection of sentences become available as true RHSs of the
axiom, thus requiring the model to be again expanded to include a new collection
of corresponding LHSs to acount for the axiom's truth.
Eventually, through the magic of infinity, there will be a stage where for each
candidate RHS true (false) in the interpretation, its corresponding LHS will already
be interpreted true (false). Such points will be called fixed points. So we have ex-
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tended the original language L to contain a new predicate Pn. We have extended
the original interpretation 1by interpreting P' in terms of the pair (51,,92). The
interpretation of everything else remains unchanged. Let Is be the original inter-
pretation /. The fixed point method will generate a succession of interpretations
Io,,It, Iz, . . . . In successive interpretations the interpretaiton oî. P" which is the
ordered pair (S1, Sz) is modified by extending the relations of ^91, Sz or both.
If we think of successive changes to the interpretation as being the results of
applications of a rule /, i.e. In¡1 : Ó(1"), any fixed point of {, i.e. interpretation
1¡ such that /(/¡) - I^, will be an interpretation which will model the extended
language.
3.2 The fixed point method applied to truth theory
The liar paradox and its variations have been thought to arise from the capacity
of languages to express their own truth and falsity predicates. The Tarski hierarchy
of languages is an elaborate attempt to avoid the paradoxes by postulating.infinitely
many levels of language, each with its own truth predicate Truen. Sentences at level
n cal. only be named in level n * 1 and greater. This is complicated and unnatural
and doesn't correspond well with the facts. In natural languages we are clearly
able to name sentences in the language without jumping to higher and higher
levels. There is only one level not many.
In his 1975 paper 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' [19], Kripke showed that it is
possibie for a language to contain its own truth predicate and yet still avoid the
liar and related paradoxes. Using the fixed point method Kripke outlined a more
intuitive theory of truth than the Tarski language hierarchy. Although Kripke was
not the first to use the method, his paper is used to illustrate the fixed point method
because its application to truth theory has particular intuitive appeal.
The truth predicate ? is governed by the ?-scheme axiom
T(rA1¡:4
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Using the fixed point method we are able to show that an uncontroversial language
not containing its own truth predicate can be extended to contain its own truth
predicate which behaves according to the T-scheme. We start with a language .C
(.,V, k,),:,1,V) and extend it by adding the unary predicate T(").The axiom
to be modelled, the ?-scheme, has a : main connective.
We will interpret the truth predicate ? in the extended language by the pair
(,S1,Sz) of unary relations on D (i.e. subsets of D). The interpretation of every-
thing else in the extended language will remain as þefore, closed sentences being
interpreted in the values {True,False}. Initially 7 will be interpreted as (Ø, Ø) and
it will be built up in stages by applying a function / until a frxed point is reached.
The function / appends new sentences to the extension 51 and antiextension ,92
of ? according to the wff evaluation rules. That is d((St,,Sr)) : (Sí,Si). The wff
evaluation rules are applied with T only partially interpreted by (Sr,Sr) and the
elements of D which are codes of sentences interpreted True are collected together
to form .91. Elements of D which are not codes of sentences or are the codes
of sentences intepreted False are collected together to form.9i. This explains how
interpretations Is, It,Iz,. . . are defined. For a limit ordinal the situation is different.
Let À be a limit ordinal, then ,9;,¡ : Uo<ÀS¿,o lor i :1,2.
The problem can be seen as the problem of explaining to someone the notion
of truth. We assume that they understand the meanings of all sentences in the
Ianguage except those containing the word 'true'. The initial complete ignorance
of the notion of truth is indicated by the empty interpretation (Ø,Ø). fne concept
of truth is built up in stages by applying a simple rule: we are entitled to assert (or
deny) that any sentence is true (or false) under the exact same circumstances we
can assert (or deny) that sentence itself. This is the function / in our formalisation.
Our subject has a complete understanding of when sentences not containing the
word 'true' can be asserted or denied. By applying the rule about truth they
are able to glean a partial understanding of sentences containing the word 'true'.
By applying the rule once from a situation of complete ignorance sentences like
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" tDogs are mammals' is true" and "'The moon is a piece of cheese' is true" will
be interpreted as True arrd False respectively. However, sentences like ' "'Dogs are
mammals' is true" is true' will still not be interpreted. This partial understanding
of sentences containing the word'true'is formalised by (Sr,r,Sr,r). Applying the
rule governing truth again will result in this last sentence being correctly interpreted
True. At afixedpoint 1r, d((,Sr,r,,9r,.1)) : (Sr,.r,Sr,r). So, applyingtheruleabout
the word 'true' adds nothing further to the concept. At such a point we will say
that the model is saturated and the language contains its own truth predicate.
Now the theory of truth which results from this treatment can be shown to
be incomplete. That is, some sentences never get assigned a truth value. Some
sentences are ;onsidered neither true nor false. An example is the Liar sentence.
Assume it does get assigned a truth value and let a be the least ordinal such that
I"(LIAR) : True(False). Once we permit such a sentence to have a truth value we
unleash its paradoxical potential. Applying the rule / we generate Io+7 which has
the effect of reversing the Liar's truth value. That is 1"+1(LIAR) : False(True).
This contradicts the monotonicity of the operation / which will be proved in the
section which follows.
3.3 The proof that fixed points model the T-scheme
To prove that fixed points provide a model for the ?-scheme axiom we require
a simple lemma about the construction.
Lemma 1. If a ( B then for any sentence ^9 if 1"(.9) : ?rze, then
Ip(S): True. If o(^9) - False, then /B(.9) : False.
This lemma says that the interpretation of the truth predicate 7 is only ever
changed by giving a truth value to sentences which were previously not interpreted.
Once a sentence becomes interpreted as a truth value, its value never changes in
subsequent interpretations. If we define the relation ( between interpretations as
I. I Ip iff Sr,, C St.,g and S2,o Ç Sz,p then lemma 1 says that þ is a monotone
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increasing operation on (.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is by induction on the number of connectives
in .9. If ,S is an atomic sentence then lemma t holds. Assume for sentences A and
B that the lemma holds. We prove that lemma t holds for a sentence .9 where S
is of the form rA, AV B, AkB,(1r)A,(r)A.
e.g. Let I"(AbB) : True. By the wff evaluation rules I"(A) : I.(B) : True.
By the induction hypothesis, IB(A) : IB(B) : True. So IB(AþB) : Tru". There
is a similar proof for I"(AUB): False.
Divide the proof that the fixed point method generates a model for the ?-scheme
into two parts: one for each direction of tire biconditional. The modelling of the
schema for general sentence o is proved by showing the modelling of one instance
of the schema for an arbitrarily chosen sentence S.
Let /¡ be a fixed point of the method. That is, d((St,^, ^9r,^)) : (Sr,r, ^9r,r).
Left to right: We assum" /^(f (S)) : Tru% and show that 1¡(S) : True. LeI
a be the least ordinal for which 1,(?(S)) : True. a will be a successor ordinal
because (i) it is non-zero, and (ii) if it were a limit ordinal then by the method
of construction there would be an ordinal B < a such that Ipg(S)): True, thrs
contradicting the assumption that a was the least such ordinal.
If a is a successor ordinal and the least ordinal for which 1"(7(.9)) : True, then
by the method of construction it must be the case that 1.-¡(.9) : True. Now, since
1o-r ( 1, it follows by lemma 1 that 1"(S) : True as required. A similar proof
can be run assuming 1¡(T(.9)): Folt" and showing that 1.r(S) -- False.
Right to left: We assume 1¡(S) : True and show that 1¡(T( S)) : Tru". By
the method of construction it follows that 1¡-,,1(?(S)): Tru". But since 1¡ is a
fixed point I¡: Is+t So 1¡(T(S)) : True as required. If /r(S) : False it follows
by a similar argument that 1À(?(S)) : False. ¡
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3.4 The proof that there are fixed points
The method has a certain intuitive appeal and fixed points would seem to be
the kind of solution to the problem of representing the truth predicate that we are
looking for. However, it is not immediately obvious that fixed point solutions will
always exist.
The proof that there are fixed points is a simple argument based on some
assumptions about the language being modelled and the function ó. The method
will generate a chain of ordered pairs of n-ary relations on D modelling the predicate
P" in our language:
(sr,o, sr,o) s (sr,r, sr,r) < (sr,r, sr,r) 1 . . .
At each stage in the construction more sentences in the language (or their names)
are being added to the extension and antiextension of P". At every stage, at least
one new sentence gets decided. An assignment to extension or antiextension is
never changed by a later assignment. The relations of extension and antiextension
only increase in size, they never retract. This feature of the method results from
the monotonicity of the function /.
There are only denumerably many sentences our language which contain the
predicate P'. You could show a 1-1 correspondence with the natural numbers by
listing the sentences containing P" in alphabetical order or similar.
So for some À of the second number class, (Sr,^, ^gr,.r) : d((Sr,^,.gr,i))
4. The Fixed Point Method Applied to Set Theory
P.C. Gilmore appears to have been the first person to use the fixed point method
in a recognisable form although he attributes its origins to a persistence lemma by
Roger C. Lyndon in 1959. In his paper) 'The Consistency of Partial Set Theory
Without Extensionality' [124], Gilmore shows how to model the comprehension
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axiom in a partial set theory. To say that the theory is partial means that for a set
^9 in the theory, its characteristic function




is a partial function.
The theory extends predicate logic wìth two new primitìve binary predicates €
and /. New terms in the theory are formulae of the form {z , P,Q} where P and
Q are'positive' formuiae. That is, formulae in which only conjunction, disjunction
and quantifications are used.
The axioms to be modelled are the pair:
(1) (,)[(" € {y'P(a),a(a)}v (P(r)kQ(,))) = p(*)]
(2) (')[(' I {y , P(a),a@)} v (P(r)kQ("))) = Q@)]
The main connectives in these two axioms are disjunctions and the method
requires a conditional or biconditional main connective. Gilmore gives ¡ pair of
conditional sentences for each axiom (1) and (2) whose conjunction is logically
equivalent to the original axiom.
(1.1) (")[(" € {u : P(*),Q@)}): P(r)]
(1.2) (u)[(P(z)&-Q@)) ) x e {y, P(y),A@)}l
(2.1) (")[(" / {", P(*),8(r)}) I 8(r)]
(2 2) (ø)[r(P(r)kQ@)) ), 1 {y, P(y),4(y)}]
He shows how these four sentences are modelled using the fixed point method.
We interpret € and / by a pair of sets (St, Sr). Sr and 52 are built up in
stages by applying a simple rule: assume we have (St,,, S2,o) already defined for an
ordinal a. We generate Sr,o+r by appending to ,51,o sentences a € {x : P(r),Q@)}
for all sentences P(a)bQ(a) such that 1"(P(a)ktQþ)) : True. Similarly we
generate Sz,o+t by appending to S2,o sentences a / {r : P(r),Qþ)} for all sentences
-tP(a)kQ(a) such that 1,(rP(a)kQ@)) : True. This amounts to a definition of
the function /.
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For a limit ordinal l, S¿,¡ : Uo<ÀS¿,o for i :1,2
We let Is of the construction be a model for the language without the new
predicates € and / with (Sr,o, Sr,o) : (Ø,Ø).
Again the proof that the fixed point method generates a rnodel fr¡r the set t]reory
axioms requires first a lemma thaí þ is monotone.
Lemma 2. If a ( B then for any sentence S if 1"(S) - True, then 1B(.9) :
True. I11,(.9) - False, then /p(^9) : False (cf. Lemma 1).
Proof. The proof proceeds as an induction on the number of logical connectives
in the sentence ^9. This is Lyndon's persistence lemma. E
Armed with this lemma we can now set about proving that the fixed point
method generates a model for the four sentences (1.1), (L.2),(2.1), (2.2).Let ,I¡ be
a fixed point. That is, let 1r : Ä+r.
(1.1): Assume for arbitrary ø that I¡(a e {r : P(x),,Q(")}) : True. We want
to show that I¡(P(o)) : Tru". Let a be the least ordinal for which I,(a e {n :
P("),8(t)]) : True. o is a successor ordinal. So by the method of construction
I.-{P(a)k-Qþ)) : True. Now a - 1 < l, so by Lemma 1 I¡(P(a)k-rQ(a)) :
True. Hence I¡(P(a)): Tru".
(2.I): Assume for arbitrary ø that Ix(o I {x : P(r),Q(")}) : True. We want
to show that I¡(Q(o)): Tru". Let a be the least ordinal for which I,(a e {r:
P(*),Q(t))) : True. c is a successor ordinal. So by the method of construction
I.a(--tP(a)kQþ)): True. Now o - 1 < À, so by Lemma I, I¡(=P(a) k QþD :
True. Hence I¡(Qþ)) -- True.
(1.2): Assume for arbitrary ø that /¡(P(ø)&r(Ç(r)) : True. We want to
show that I¡(a € {* , P(r),Q(")}) : True. By the method of construction
1,r+r(o € {r : P(*),Q@)}): Tru". But 1¡ : Is.+t, so I¡(a € {z : P(r),Q@)}):
True.
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(2.2): Assume for arbitrary ø such that I¡(rP(a)kQþD: True. We want
to show that /¡(a I {" , P("),A@)}) : True. By the method of construction
I.r+r(a Ø {, t P("),,Q@)}) : True. But 1¡ : 1À+r, so 1¡(a I {" , P(*),Q(r)}) :
True. n
We can be assured of the existence of fixed points by virtue of a proof similar
to last time.
Like Kripke's truth theory, Gilmore's set theory is incomplete. Neither of the
following sentences will be interpreted true:
R,€R,
R'øR'
where R' : {r: r € rr" Ø r}.
LeL a be the first stage at which I.(R' e R') : True. By the method of construction
a is a successor ordinal and 1.-1(,r?' e R'): True contradicting the assumption
that a was the least such ordinal. A similar proof can be provided ror R' / R,.
So we are able to model a versiop of the axiom of comprehension of set theory
using this method. Gilmore's paper is significant because it led the way for a
number of useful applications of the method. In 1971 Ross Brady showed that
both the axiom of comprehension and a version of the axiom of extensionality
could be modelled using transfinite induction in a paper 'The Consistency of the
Axioms of Abstraction and Extensionality in a Three-Valued Logic' [5r]. This
paper is interesting not so much for its modelling of extensionality, but because it
models the axioms in paraconsistent three-valued logic. Where Kripke and Gilmore
are incomplete, Brady is inconsistent. But the difference between the modellings
is only superficial - inconsistent models can be simply transformed to become
incomplete and vice versa.
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Brady models a more familiar version of the axiom schema of comprehension
(ly)(z)(z e y * P(x,21,...,"n))
We extend propositional logic by adding the new primitive predicate symbol €
which is governed by a familiar comprehension axiom. Brady's model has a back-
ground logic Lukasiewicz three-valued. The values are 1,|,0.nd the first two are
designated.
Initially all wfs of the form z € y are assigned the truth value |. fms is the
initial interpretation Is. As the construction proceeds, more and more of these
sentences get assigned either a value 0 or 1 according to a rule / : assuming we
have 1o defined for some ordinal a. Then 1o-,1 is generated from 1o by making
the following changes: I..a(a € {r : P(x)}) : I"(p(o)). That is, sentences
a € {r: P(ø)} get assigned a value 1 (0) at stage o* 1 whenever the sentence p(a)
was interpreted 1 (0) at stage o. For a limit ordinar À, Is(a € {r: r(")}) :1 (0)
if for some o ( ì, \(P(a)): 1 (0).
Like in the previous two constructions, we again have a set of sentences which
is the extension of the new predicate symbol and a set of sentences which is its
antiextension. These are the sentences assigned the values 1 and 0 respectively.
Unlike the previous constructions every sentence gets assigned a truth value, be-
cause initially all wffs of the form r e y are assigned the value |. Now I is a
designated truth value so that paradoxical sentences involving € get assigned a
designated truth value.
It can be proved that,R / R where A : {r : r / r} never gets assigned
a value 0 or 1 because that would contradict the monotonicity of /. AIso, the
sentence R, e R, where R, : {r : r e r} never gets assigned a truth value 0 or 1
because there can be no first level at which this value is assigned. Such sentences
remain with the initial truth value |. n"t it is only a matter of convention whether
sentences which never get assigned a truth value of true or false by the method are
no ru ue ,ora u gn tru t ue, or a
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third designated truth value. The method does not stipulate which.
The axiom of extensionality for set theory does not lend itself to a simple mod-
elling by the fixed point method. This is because it is not in required form. We
add to our language a new predicate : for sets and model the axiom:
(r)(y)(z)þ : a ) (r e z : a e z))
This has a conditional main connective but we need the sentence containing the
new predicate : on its right for the method to be simply applied.
Brady models a different axiom of extensionality:
(rXy)[(rXu e x <-+ u € y) > (")(" € z +_+ y e z)]
using transfinite induction. This axiom does not contain any ne\^/ predicate symbol
: and the construction does not fit the general fixed point method procedure.
5. Further Applications
Clearly the fixed point method has quite general application in mathematics.
It can be used to model axioms which introduce a new predicate symbol and which
are in the appropriate form. The purpose of studying this method was in the hope
that it could be used to model some axioms of category theory.
The current foundations for category theory seem unnecessarily restrictive in
the kinds of categories they allow us to construct. Categories are restricted in size
so as to avoid Russell-type paradoxes. The thought is that it might be possible to
give a comprehension axiom for category theory which permits the construction of
the types of categories which seem intuitively possible but which are forbidden by
the current foundations. The modelling of such an axiom could perhaps employ
methods similar to ones used in here.
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Weierstrass
zero degree
45
45
151
151
38,151
6,44,49,52-3
20
24,27
18,21
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2
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